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Population aging poses two major challenges for Asian policy makers: 
(i) sustaining rapid economic growth in the face of less favorable 
demographic conditions; and (ii) providing affordable, adequate, 
sustainable old-age income support for a large and growing elderly 
population. This book explores the second issue by examining the pension 
systems of eight countries in East and Southeast Asia: the People’s Republic 
of China, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. It also puts forward both country-
specific and region-wide reforms to address two critical areas of pension 
reform, namely, fairness and sustainability. 
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Foreword
Asia’s stellar economic achievements in the past have benefitted 
from its favorable demographics as the region’s large and youthful 
population helped to propel high and sustained growth; however, as 
a result of declining fertility and rising life expectancy, the region will 
have a much older population in the coming years. future growth 
will therefore depend less on a favorable population structure than 
it did in the past.
faced with a rapidly aging population, developing Asia must address 
two critical challenges: maintaining growth and providing adequate, 
affordable, sustainable income support for the elderly. This book 
deals with the second issue by examining the pension systems of 
eight developing Asian countries—the People’s Republic of China, 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,  Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. It builds upon the recently published Pension 
Systems and Old-Age Income Support in East and Southeast Asia: 
Overview and Reform Directions by making an in-depth study of two 
issues that are especially important in pension reform: fairness and 
sustainability. Despite their diverse income and development levels, 
the common concerns in the pension systems of these eight countries 
are inequity and potential unsustainability. 
Both fairness and sustainability can help to build a strong national 
consensus for old-age income support. Achieving fairness in cover-
age, net benefits, and retirement age between the public and private 
and urban and rural sectors, as well as between current and future 
pensioners, is crucial for broadening support for robust pension 
systems. The systems also need to be sustainable to assure workers 
that the benefits promised at the end of their working lives are in 
fact delivered. 
The country-specific analyses in this book suggest that much remains 
to be done to achieve fairness and sustainability in the current 
systems. In addition to country-specific measures, common, region-
wide reforms are suggested. first, the urgency for addressing the 
challenges aging populations face must be recognized. Second, 
delivering pension benefits must be emphasized. Third, the impact 
of rising longevity on the length of retirement must be managed. 
We hope that by raising awareness on these critical issues and the 
required reforms, this book may serve as an effective reference for 
strengthening pension systems across developing Asia.
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Donghyun Park* and Gemma Estrada**
In the past, developing Asia’s youthful population contributed significantly to the region’s rapid economic growth. The increase in the share of the working-age population, who tend to work 
and save more than the young or the elderly do, led to an increase 
in the labor force and in aggregate savings. Sound institutions and 
policies, such as flexible labor markets and heavy investments in 
education and human capital, enabled developing Asia to capture 
this demographic dividend; however, as a result of falling fertility and 
rising longevity, the region is currently in the midst of a far-reaching 
transition toward older populations that will fundamentally alter its 
future demographic landscape. A demographic dividend turns into 
a demographic tax as the relative share of the elderly in the popula-
tion rises and the relative share of the working-age population falls. 
At a minimum, demographics will become a less significant source 
of growth in the future than they have been in the past. 
Within the region-wide aging trend there is a considerable heteroge-
neity across subregions and countries. In particular, East and South-
east Asia are at a more advanced stage of the demographic transition 
than South Asia. Even within East and Southeast Asia, countries such 
as the Philippines are still relatively young while others such as the 
Republic of Korea are aging rapidly.
Despite this diversity, the demographic transition is one of the 
biggest medium-term structural challenges facing Asia as a whole. 
The sluggish recovery of the advanced economies from the global 
Introduction
*  Principal Economist, Economics and Research Department, Asian Development Bank 
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financial crisis clouds Asia’s economic prospects; and the region 
also faces a number of internal structural problems, in particular 
population aging which poses two major challenges for Asian policy 
makers: sustaining rapid economic growth in the face of less favor-
able demographic conditions; and providing affordable, adequate, 
sustainable old-age income support for a large and growing elderly 
population. In this book, we explore the second issue, specifically 
the pension systems that are the central component of old-age 
income support. for the most part, Asian countries do not yet have 
well-established pension systems capable of providing economic 
security for their growing elderly populations, and even the more 
mature pension systems in the region suffer from a wide array of 
structural shortcomings that must be addressed if they are to fulfill 
their central objectives.
While demographic change is the primary impetus for pension 
reform in Asia, there are a number of other factors that lend a sense 
of urgency to the task of building up sound and efficient pension 
systems. foremost, informal, family-based old-age support mecha-
nisms—adult children supporting their elderly parents—are break-
ing down as a result of extensive social and economic changes. for 
example, the nuclear family is replacing the extended family as the 
dominant living arrangement, and the share of the population living 
in rural areas is dwindling as a result of industrialization and urban-
ization. The effects of globalization on labor markets provide yet 
further impetus for strengthening Asian pension systems. Integration 
into the world economy, in particular global trade, has undoubt-
edly been a key ingredient of Asia’s stunning economic success; 
nevertheless, globalization inevitably unleashes intense competition 
and inflicts extensive structural dislocations. Strong social protection 
systems, including pension systems, can mitigate the insecurity that 
globalization brings.
This book builds upon the recently published Pension Systems and 
Old-Age Income Support in East and Southeast Asia: Overview 
and Reform Directions1 by taking a closer look at two issues that 
are especially important in pension reform: fairness and sustain-
ability. Promoting fairness and equity in pension systems matters 
1 2011. Donghyun Park, ed. London: Routledge.
and matters a great deal because it helps to build a robust national 
consensus for old-age income support. A pension is ultimately the 
promise of a future benefit in exchange for a current contribution. 
An effective pension system therefore requires the general public’s 
confidence that the promise will be kept. A lack of fairness and 
sustainability undermines this public confidence and the national 
consensus required for building a strong pension system.
In this book, we explore fairness and sustainability in the pension 
systems of eight countries in East and Southeast Asia: the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The eight differ 
widely in terms of their income and development levels as well as in 
the history and maturity of their pension systems. The authors are 
highly respected pension experts with in-depth knowledge of their 
respective country’s pension system and offer both a detailed analysis 
of the current system and suggestions for reform. 
With respect to fairness, there is a great deal of disparity among these 
countries in terms of coverage, level of net benefits, and retirement 
age. for example, to attract personnel into the civil and the military 
service, their pension benefits are often more generous than those 
of the rest of the population. In some cases, beneficiaries contribute 
relatively little into these systems further enhancing their net benefits 
to the extent that they can pose a risk to fiscal sustainability. Another 
major disparity is between urban and rural areas since frequently, 
pension coverage is largely limited to urban areas. Intra-generational 
disparities also arise between the formal and informal employment 
sectors as Asia has a large number of workers in the latter who do 
not enjoy the protection of labor regulations or of social safety nets. 
Disparity also affects sustainability which in turn can seriously 
undermine efforts to build a national consensus for pension reform. 
If fairness deals with intra-generational disparities, sustainability 
addresses inter-generational disparities. The two main types of 
pension systems are defined contribution and defined benefit. In 
the former, people’s benefits tend to be closely linked with their 
contributions; the systems tend to be financially sustainable. In 
stark contrast, in defined-benefit schemes, that in practice tend 
to be pay-as-you-go systems whereby contributions from current 
workers pay for the benefits of current retirees, there is little or no 
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link between one’s contributions and one’s benefits. Many pay-as-
you-go, defined-benefit pension schemes are therefore unsustainable 
in the long run; those in Asia are no exception. Without far-reaching 
reforms, the financial burdens of these schemes on future workers 
may become politically unacceptable. fundamental reforms include 
raising retirement ages to reflect rapidly increasing longevity and 
raising contribution rates. 
These disparities make building a national consensus for pension 
reform difficult because they dilute the general public’s sense of 
ownership and thus weaken popular support for reforms. National 
consensus is critical because many Asian systems are still underdevel-
oped. Indeed, even in some middle-income countries like Indonesia 
and Thailand, recognizable national pension systems are still in an 
embryonic state. Even mature Asian pension systems with a long 
history need to undertake broad, deep reforms if they are to fulfill 
their central mandate of delivering economic security to a rapidly 
growing elderly population. 
Unfortunately, there is only limited awareness of the huge social 
and financial challenges old-age income support entails, and most 
countries do not yet have a systematic strategy for coping with them. 
This lack of preparedness is perhaps understandable in light of the 
fact that until quite recently Asia was a young continent reaping 
the demographic dividend its young workers offered. Ironically, just 
a generation ago the primary demographic concern was too many 
young people, not too many old people. This led to drastic measures 
like the PRC’s one-child policy. Just as Asia’s economic landscape was 
transformed beyond all recognition in one generation due to excep-
tionally rapid growth, its demographic landscape is transforming due 
to a change in population age structure that is unprecedented both 
in its scale and speed.
Given the general lack of public awareness about the urgent need to 
prepare for rapid demographic changes, Asian governments should 
take the lead in building consensus for establishing sound, efficient 
pension systems, especially given the erosion of traditional, informal, 
family-based old-age support. This is especially true in countries at 
advanced stages of the demographic transition such as the Republic of 
Korea though even younger countries like the Philippines should start 
to lay the foundations for effective systems as policies implemented 
today will heavily influence the capacity of those systems to deliver 
old-age economic security in the future. Building consensus will require 
educating the public about the challenges rapid demographic change 
presents and initiating and sustaining public debate about pension 
reform. Governments can form the debate by providing information, 
e.g., about the benefits of saving for retirement. 
The concept of saving for old age is something of a novelty in Asia, 
so enlightening the public about the need to prepare for old age and 
encouraging them to participate in pension systems are of paramount 
importance for old-age income support. Voluntary participation and 
compliance will not, however, be forthcoming if there are significant 
discrepancies in fairness, i.e., in coverage, net benefits, and other key 
parameters. Likewise, a lack of sustainability will severely undermine 
public confidence that the system can fulfill its fundamental promise 
to deliver benefits in the future. fairness and sustainability are thus 
indispensable for establishing the national consensus for old-age 
income support that in turn will serve as the foundation for a strate-
gic national blueprint for coping with the challenge of providing for 
the growing number of elderly. We therefore hope that this book can 
contribute to meaningful pension reform across the region.
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Abstract
The working-age population in the People’s Republic of China 
is destined to shrink after peaking in 2016 marking the end of 
its demographic dividend. Economic growth is set to slow, and 
low effective retirement ages, rapidly improving life expectancy, 
changing work patterns, fluctuating price inflation, expectations 
of improved living standards, and mediocre returns on pension 
investments will present serious challenges to the existing pension 
system. Urban enterprise workers, rural dwellers, and civil and public 
service employees have their own pension plans, but their different 
contribution rates and benefits do not exhibit fairness and may not 
be sustainable. The urban and civil and public service systems are 
mandatory while the rural scheme is voluntary. The retirement age is 
60 years for men, 55 for white collar women in the urban pension 
system and civil and public service system, 50 for blue collar women in 
the urban system, and 60 for women in the rural program. Those ages 
were set when life expectancy was much lower. The urban enterprise 
system is a contributory, defined-contribution plan with individual 
accounts. The civil and public servant scheme is a defined-benefit plan 
wholly financed by the government, and the rural system is a defined-
contribution plan with government and worker contributions going 
into individual accounts. Significant changes must be implemented 
to improve and rationalize the benefits of the different systems to 
develop a more efficient, robust, and balanced pension framework for 
the country. Suggestions for reform include converting the civil and 
public service system to an urban enterprise system, making the rural 
system compulsory, improving both the urban and the rural systems, 
resolving the pension positions of migrant workers, agreeing on a 
protocol for inter-provincial and international transfers of benefits, 
and integrating the rural and urban systems by the second half of 
this century.
* Chair, Stirling Finance Limited, Hong Kong, China
 (stuart.leckie@stirlingfinance.com)
The People’s Republic of China
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Overview
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a very large, very complex, and 
very fast changing society with tremendous regional variations. The 
one-child policy became effective in the late 1970s and is estimated 
to have reduced potential population growth by as many as 300 
million people over the last 30 years. This policy initially led to a lower 
youth-dependency ratio and to a higher ratio of working-age popula-
tion, but as the relatively large working-age group grows older, aging 
will set in and the dependency ratio will deteriorate every year. 
As the country’s population reached 1.34 billion by end of 2010, 
the share of people aged 14 or younger dropped to only 16.6% of 
the entire population from 22.9% 10 years before (figure 2.1). At the 
same time, the percentage of people aged 60 or older increased from 
10.3% in 2000 to 13.3% in 2010—a total of 178 million people. The 
PRC now has more senior citizens than all European Union countries 
combined, and the number is expected to rise to 200 million by 
2015. People in the age group 15–59 years account for 70.1% of the 
entire population. Though this was responsible for a 3.3% increase 
in the labor force over the last decade, the working-age population 
is destined to shrink after peaking in 2016 when the PRC will reach 
the end of its demographic dividend. 
further challenges include rapid urbanization and unequal economic 
development nationwide that have led to a geographical redistribution 
Source: Stirling finance research using 1990, 2000, and 2010 population census data.
Figure 2.1 Age Structure in the People’s Republic of China  
in 1990, 2000, and 2010
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of the population and to a surge in migrant workers that will certainly 
demand more attention and policy guidance from the government 
in the future. In the last decade, the number of urban residents 
increased by 13.5% to 49.7% of the population. Migrants have 
been arriving continuously from populous, less-developed western 
and central areas to the rich eastern coastal provinces bringing the 
number of residents there to almost 38% of the country’s population, 
2.4% more than a decade ago. In an unprecedented change, the 
average household size has decreased from 3.44 in 2000 to 3.10 in 
2010, a 10% drop; while the number of households increased from 
348 million to 402 million, a 16% increase (Government of the PRC 
1990, 2000, 2010).
The current potential support ratio of the working-age population 
to the retired population stands at 6, but it will inexorably fall to 
2 by the year 2040 as per the United Nations forecasts (United Nations 
Population Division 2010). With an estimated elderly population 
of 400 million by 2040, pension costs are going to expand exceed-
ingly rapidly. 
The Current System
The following are the three main systems for providing pensions in 
the PRC (details are in Table 2.1): 
•	 the urban pension system consisting of five elements—
minimum guarantee, social pool, individual account, volun-
tary enterprise annuity and other voluntary supplementary 
benefits, and family care—currently covering 180 million 
active urban enterprise workers and 50 million pensioners;
•	 the civil and public service pension system that has about 
40 million participants; and
•	 the rural pension system with two major components—social 
pool and individual account—launched in 2008 to eventually 
provide pension benefits for all 674 million rural residents.
In general, pension arrangements in the PRC differ from those in 
western countries in the sense that most rich countries provide 
relatively high universal pension benefits to cover the entire popula-
tion while in the PRC, citizens other than civil servants and public 
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Table 2.1 Pension Systems in the People’s Republic of China
System  
Features
Urban Pension 
System
Civil and Public 
Service Pension 
System
Rural Pension 
System
Status Mandatory: social pool/
individual account (IA)
Voluntary: enterprise 
annuity (EA)/private 
pensions
Mandatory Voluntary
Retirement age 60 (males)
55 (females, white 
collar)
50 (females, blue collar)
60 (males)
55 (females)
60 (for both males 
and females)
Types of plans Social pool: unfunded
IA and defined 
contribution (DC)
EA and DC 
defined benefit (DB) Social pool:  
unfunded
IA and DC
Contributions Social pool:
~20% of salaries by 
employer
IA: 8% of salary by 
employee
no 
self-contributions 
100% financed by 
government budget 
Social pool: 100% 
from government 
budget;
IA 
Self: 100/200/300/ 
400/500 yuan  
per year 
Government: 
30+ yuan per year
Investments IA: bank deposits and 
government bonds; 
1-year bank deposit 
rate applies for money 
accumulated
EA:	≤30%	in	equities/
equity	products;	≤50%	
in	bonds;	≥20%	in	cash	
and cash deposits
not applicable (n.a.) IA: bank deposits 
and government 
bonds; 1-year 
bank deposit rate 
applies to money 
accumulated
continued on next page
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System  
Features
Urban Pension 
System
Civil and Public 
Service Pension 
System
Rural Pension 
System
Benefits Social pool: monthly 
pension based on 
average local monthly 
wage, indexed 
individual wage and 
years of employment
IA: monthly pension of 
1/139 of IA balance at 
the time of retirement 
assuming at least 15 
years of contributions 
otherwise lump sum 
payable
EA/private pensions: 
lump sum or annuity 
benefit 
Monthly pension 
equivalent to a 
certain percentage 
of final pay 
(composed of post 
wage and rank 
wage) based on 
years of service 
Social pool:  
≥55	yuan/month;
IA: monthly pension 
of 1/139 of IA 
balance at the time 
of retirement age 
assuming  
at least  
15 years of 
contributions, 
otherwise lump 
sum payable
Replacement 
rate upon 
completion 
of 35 years of 
contributions
58% 90% ~17%            
(contributing  
100 yuan/year); 
~30%               
(contributing  
500 yuan/year) 
Pension 
increases
Depending on real 
price movements and 
economic development
Depending on 
the adjustment to 
current working 
cohort’s salaries
Depending on real 
price movements, 
rate of earnings 
increase and GDP 
growth rate
Extension to 
survivors
Remaining balance of 
IA at the time of death
n.a. Remaining balance 
of IA at the time of 
death
Table 2.1 continued
Source: Stirling finance research and Leckie (2011).
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service employees have pension benefits that meet only basic post-
retirement needs. Even so, the sustainability of the current pension 
arrangements remains a serious issue. 
Contribution Rates 
Substantial disparity exists among the three systems, and one key 
factor is the contribution rate. It is mandatory for all enterprise 
workers and for their employers to pay 8% and about 20% of an 
employee’s monthly earnings as contributions to individual account 
and social pool pensions respectively, while civil servants and public 
employees do not need to contribute at all as their pensions are 
100% financed by the government. The 20% (or more) monthly 
contribution may be less of an issue for state-owned enterprises or 
for large corporations; however, small or medium-sized companies 
often find it challenging to fulfill this obligation. The wage disparity 
among provinces and regions can be extremely wide even within the 
same pension system. It varies significantly by sector, type of organi-
zation, local minimum wage level, and local cost of living. Also, there 
are cap and floor contribution rates that limit contributions payable 
by high wage earners and benefits received by low wage earners. 
Retirement Age
for both the urban enterprise system and the civil and public service 
systems, the retirement ages of 60 years for men, 55 for white collar 
women, and 50 for blue collar women were set a long time ago when 
life expectancy was much lower. Today, the average life expectancy is 
71 years for men and 74 years for women nationally and is longer for 
urban residents. More importantly, this is life expectancy at birth, but 
the more relevant indicator for pension purposes is life expectancy at 
retirement age which is expected to be even longer.1 for sustainability, 
the retirement ages for both men and women should be gradually 
raised. Not only would this decrease pension expenses, it would also 
increase contribution income and investment returns as well. The rural 
pension system is ahead of the urban and the civil and public service 
systems with respect to this important element as the pension age has 
been set at 60 for all rural residents irrespective of gender.
1 There are no data available for life expectancy at retirement age in the PRC.
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Men and women should in fact have the same retirement age in 
the urban system, and there should be reductions in pensions for 
early retirement and enhanced pensions for deferred retirement. The 
female retirement age should be gradually increased to 60 after 
which the normal retirement age for men and women should be 
extended to 65.
Replacement Rates
In terms of gross replacement rates,2 the current average in the PRC 
for urban retirees is 77.9% which is greater than the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 57.3%, 
as illustrated in figure 2.2.
However, although the current replacement rate of 58% for urban 
enterprise workers, shown in figure 2.3, is higher than the recom-
mended 40%–50% set by the International Labour Organization for 
a worker with 35 years of service, the difference between the urban 
enterprise system and the civil and public service system averages 
32%. In other words, even if enterprise workers and civil and public 
servants receive the same amount of final pay, civil and public 
servants will receive a monthly pension equivalent to 1.5 times the 
amount enterprise workers are entitled to. In addition, most enter-
prise workers receive much lower pay than civil and public service 
workers. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the government has granted increases 
in the social pool pension system for enterprise workers 7 times in the 
past 6 years, there is still a large gap in actual amounts compared with 
the civil and public servant pension arrangements. Statistics show 
that enterprise workers received a monthly pension of 1,400 yuan 
on average in 2010 compared with 1,200 yuan in 2009. In a report 
dated 2 March 2011,3 95% of the 95,300 respondents expressed 
concern over the lack of equity and fairness in the current pension 
system for urban workers. 
2 The gross replacement rate is defined as the average (pre-tax) gross pension 
payoff over the whole retirement period divided by gross pre-retirement earnings.
3 http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1201&MainCatID
=12&id=20110302000133
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Figure 2.2 Gross Replacement Rates of Mean Earners
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Under the new rural system, the monthly basic benefit of 55 yuan 
($8.50) literally can buy a pensioner only a pound of pork and is 
certainly not sufficient to meet any international standards for 
replacement rates. The government is fully aware that this amount 
must grow substantially in coming years to reach a satisfactory level.
Figure 2.3 Expected Replacement Rate by Sector in 2011
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Source: Stirling finance research.
Investments
The individual account aspect of the system relies on a meaningful 
accumulation of assets. So far, only enterprise annuity plans can invest 
part of their assets (up to 30%) in domestic equities. for individual 
account monies under both the urban enterprise system and the rural 
system, the current rules allow investments only in bank deposits 
or government bonds with returns linked to 1-year bank deposit 
rates. Such returns offer no protection against the surging inflation 
in the PRC: price inflation averaging 4%–5% annually; wage infla-
tion averaging 10%–12% annually, and asset inflation at 15%–20% 
annually for residential property. The average return on investments 
for individual account assets in comparison has been as low as 2% 
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per annum. Quite simply, the target replacement rate for urban 
workers will be achieved only if long-term investment returns on 
individual accounts match the long-term rate of growth in earnings 
as illustrated in figure 2.4.
Source: Stirling finance research (2011).
Figure 2.4 A Comparison of Investment Returns and Inflation 
Rates in the People’s Republic of China in 2011
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Longevity 
The longevity of the population has improved enormously; in fact, life 
expectancy in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen is close 
to western levels though rural areas lag behind. The overall picture is 
further complicated by the large number of migrant workers employed 
in cities and the rapid increase in urbanization throughout the country. 
When determining the long-term sustainability of the social pool pension 
system, allowances must be made for continued increases in longevity.
Extension to Survivors
An issue that needs to be addressed concerns the demise of a worker 
or pensioner who has family obligations to parents, to a spouse, or 
to children. A more comprehensive approach to providing survivors’ 
benefits is essential.
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Legacy Pensions
The current urban enterprise pension system combines the pension 
obligations under the old state-owned enterprise pension system 
with those under the new system. This means that not only are many 
early retirees covered by the current system but also that all the legacy 
pensions will remain part of the pension debt for many years. Those 
who retired before 1997 made either no or minimal contributions, 
but they are fully entitled to pension benefits. Employees who joined 
the current pension system after 1997 have to make contributions 
for at least 15 years before they are eligible for benefits. 
Aggregate Pension Burden
Table 2.2 shows that total employment in the civil and public service 
sector increased from 32.1 million in 1990 to 40 million in 2007. In 
the same period, the total wage bill increased from 68 billion yuan to 
over 1 trillion yuan, representing 4.1% of the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). Pensions to civil and public servants are based on final 
salary; that clearly implies a very rapidly expanding government obliga-
tion in the future.
Table 2.2 Civil and Public Service Employment Size and Wages 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007
Employment (millions)
Public Service 23.0 25.3 26.9 27.1 28.7
Civil Service 9.1 10.1 10.6 10.7 11.3
Total 32.1 35.4 37.5 37.9 40.0
Wage bill annually (billion yuan)
Public Service 48.8 139.4 259.1 507.9 741.7
Civil Service 19.2 55.9 106.4 223.5 325.1
Total 68.0 195.3 365.4 731.4 1,066.8
Civil and public employment relative to total employment  
(excluding rural workers) (%)
Public Service 8.9 7.8 7.5 6.5 6.3
Civil Service 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.5
Total 12.4 10.9 10.4 9.0 8.8
Wage bill relative to GDP (%)
Public Service 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9
Civil Service 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
Total 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.1
Source: Hu and Herd (2009).
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Coordination among Regulators
Pension systems in the PRC are under the joint oversight of five 
government agencies, namely the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security (MOHRSS), responsible for the urban and rural 
systems; the Ministry of finance (MOf), responsible for budgeting 
and subsidies; the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), responsible 
in some provinces for regulating and collecting payments for pension 
contributions and benefits; the Ministry of Civil Affairs, responsible 
for “di bao” (i.e., basic poverty alleviation) payments and civil service 
pension payments; and local authorities responsible for public 
service pensions.
The pension systems require first-class coordination among these 
government agencies; however, due to each regulator’s unique duties 
and responsibilities, conflicts of interest are inevitable. for instance, 
the MOf usually forecasts pension income and expenditures in the 
short to medium term, e.g., over the coming 5 years, for the country 
as a whole for national budget forecasts while the MOHRSS projects 
long-term trends over the next 50 years both for each province and 
nationally. Another example is that while MOHRSS wishes to encour-
age voluntary contributions from participants and their employers 
(if applicable) to enterprise annuity schemes, the SAT offers no tax 
incentives for those contributions to either employers or employees. 
Coordination among the agencies, hence, needs to be further 
enhanced as their joint efforts are unquestionably vital for making 
policies, issuing guidelines and documents, and monitoring progress 
on implementation–all of which will have a direct impact on the 
strength and sustainability of the country’s pension arrangements. 
Policy guidelines should be straightforward and easy to implement 
for both employees and employers which will also help to improve 
the utilization of resources by the government. Policies should further 
encourage cooperation among these government agencies. 
Involving the Private Sector
The rationale for private sector pension is to ease the burden on 
governments for supporting aging populations, yet if private funds 
are invested mainly in government bonds, pensions will be a claim 
on future taxpayers all the same. In the PRC, insurance companies, 
fund managers, commercial banks, and trust companies are involved 
in private sector pension subject to official approval from MOHRSS. 
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Enterprise annuity assets have been growing annually, and by the 
end of 2010, totaled 300 billion yuan ($46 billion) and covered over 
14 million employees. The private sector should use all its resources 
to enhance investment returns.
Quality of the Reporting System 
It is vital that the authorities make comprehensive statistics available 
on a timely basis for the urban pension system, for supplementary 
benefits, and for the rural pension system. for the urban system, the 
total number of workers and pensioners is available, but other impor-
tant information is kept confidential. for example, a key metric is the 
amount of assets in the individual accounts and how much is real 
money and how much is notional only. Reliable statistics are avail-
able for the enterprise annuity system but not for the supplementary 
retirement benefits provided through group insurance policies or 
self-administered arrangements. The number of counties that have 
introduced the new rural system voluntarily looks impressive, but 
the level of participation in each county may be more indicative 
of acceptance. Reasonably detailed information on investments is 
available for the national social security fund, but it is important to 
know whether or not all investments are valued at market value in 
order to properly measure investment returns.
Training Professionals 
A basic requirement for any country to properly design, finance, 
and implement pension systems is to have a sufficiently large corps 
of competent professionals that includes accountants, actuaries, 
administrators, communication specialists, economists, investment 
professionals, lawyers, statisticians, system experts, and trainers. 
With a population of 1.34 billion, a minimum of 1.3 million of such 
professionals for the PRC would be necessary. In this respect, the PRC 
is manifestly deficient. A professional qualification scheme needs to 
be introduced that combines top-level academic study at universities 
with practical experience in both the public and private sectors. 
Suggestions for Reform 
Considering the paramount importance of equitable, sustainable 
pension systems in the PRC, we would like to propose a number of 
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improvements. The order of timing of structural reforms in all three 
sectors should be the following.
•	 Introduce rural pensions on a voluntary basis.
•	 Convert the public service system to an urban enterprise 
system.
•	 Convert the civil servant system to an urban enterprise system.
•	 Make the rural system compulsory.
•	 Improve the urban system.
•	 Improve the rural system.
•	 Resolve the pension positions of migrant workers.
•	 Agree on a protocol for inter-provincial and international 
transfers of benefits.
•	 Integrate the rural and urban systems.
Civil and Public Service Sector
Although the number of civil and public servants are not nearly 
as high as those in the other systems, there is a strong need for 
reform with the growing disparity between the systems. Arrange-
ments should be brought into line with the urban system within the 
next 5 to 10 years without affecting pensions already in payment 
and protecting all accrued pension entitlements. This should be well 
received by the greater community as a positive step toward creating 
a more harmonious society. Civil and public servants will, however, 
certainly require guarantees and commitments from central or local 
governments to ease the transition. 
Rural Sector
The gap between rural pension and the average urban worker’s 
pension should be narrowed significantly over the next 40 years 
subject to the following measures in order of timing.
•	 Encourage voluntary participation. 
•	 Give subsidies on a proportional basis, not flat amounts.
•	 Enhance returns on individual accounts.
•	 Grant pension increases aggressively.
•	 Increase pension amounts at retirement accordingly.
•	 Make the system compulsory.
•	 formalize portability arrangements.
•	 Integrate the rural and urban pension systems.
20 Pension Systems in East and Southeast Asia
Urban Sector 
The urban pension system also needs to be improved with a final 
goal of integrating it with the rural system in the second half of the 
century. The measures recommended are the following:
•	 Raise the normal retirement age to 60 for both males and 
females.
•	 Ensure all individual accounts have real assets.
•	 Improve returns on individual account assets.
•	 formalize portability arrangements. 
•	 Define a protocol for pension increases.
•	 Educate and improve communication to all members and 
pensioners.
Two important elements are within the control of government, 
namely the pace of future salary increases and the rate of future 
pension increases. Careful consideration by policy makers should be 
given to both.
Yves Guérard*
Abstract
The current pension system comprises a program for civil servants; 
a separate, similar program for the armed forces; and private sector 
schemes, including employer pension funds, financial institution 
pension funds offered by banks and insurance companies and open 
to all workers, and the publicly sponsored Jamsostek Program that 
theoretically provides a lump-sum payment at age 55 or earlier when 
employment terminates. While 100% of civil servants and military 
personnel are covered, only 14% of private formal sector workers are 
covered, and there are great disparities in benefits. Unlike the private 
sector schemes, civil service pensions are based on final pay, indexed to 
wages, and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. To eliminate coverage 
disparities in the formal sector and to provide the average level of 
protection enjoyed by the small fraction of the formal workforce that 
enjoys some protection, pension programs should be expanded by 
271%. To cover both the formal and informal sectors, the pension 
programs should be expanded by 740%. In 2004, Indonesia adopted 
a law to address the disparities and reduce future dependency ratios. 
The proposed National Social Security System will include even those 
not economically active and the poor and underprivileged. If the law 
is implemented in conjunction with limited reforms to the 1969 civil 
service program, current disparities would be significantly reduced. 
Reporting should be expanded to provide meaningful indicators for 
participants, outcomes, and benefits; and an authority responsible 
for defining and implementing the retirement policy should be  
clearly identified and should have the power to coordinate and 
monitor outcomes.  
Indonesia
* Actuary and Social Security Expert  (yguerard@magma.ca)
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Overview
Demographic aging is a well-known global phenomenon as in most 
countries fertility is declining, sometimes due to government policies, 
while longevity is increasing. Table 3.1 indicates that by 2030, the 
population in Indonesia aged 65 and older will be 30 million.
Table 3.1 Population Aged 65 and Older, World and  
Selected Countries
Economy
Population, 
2030 
(million)
Population 
65+, 2030 
(million)
Change 
in 65+, 
2005–2030 
(million)
65+, 
Share in 
Popula-
tion (%), 
2030
China, People’s 
Republic of 1,458 238.4 138.00 16.4
India 1,508 133.1 78.80 8.8
Indonesia 280 30.0 17.50 10.7
Japan 118 38.2 11.00 32.4
United States 368 71.1 34.30 19.3
World 8,318 978.9 499.80 11.8
Source: World Economic forum (2009). 
Although at 10.7% the proportion of the elderly in Indonesia will 
be lower than the world average of 11.8%, it underestimates the 
actual burden since the retirement age is closer to 55 while in the 
other countries in Table 3.1 it is 60 and older. More importantly, 
the 30 million people aged 65 and older in 2030 is 240% of the 
12.5 million people in that age group in 2005, thus over a 25-year 
period the burden will have more than doubled. Remedial initiatives 
need to be identified sooner rather than later. 
The fundamental risk for a society, particularly for the nonproductive 
older segment, is that the expanding social security becomes a burden 
to the active, younger workers. Unfair allocations will generate more 
resistance in a context of scarcity, thus not only the amount but also 
the way the burden and the risks are redistributed would matter. 
Robert J. Shiller, better known as the author of Irrational Exuberance, 
commented on the risks. 
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The fixed schedules in the current systems mean that the retired 
people are promised a fixed income whatever happens to the fraction 
of the population that is retired or the income of the working people 
relative to the income that retired people once had. These systems do 
not share risks between generations. from a generational standpoint, 
they transfer the income risks of the retired people to the working 
people and their dependents who thereby bear magnified risks, the 
risks of both generations (Shiller 2003; pp. 169–170).
This is especially the case in Indonesia where pensions are based on 
final pay and indexed on the basis of wages; thus, pre-empting part 
of the growth for retirees and shielding them totally from any risk, 
including sharing the longevity risk. 
The sustainability of the burden is a desirable outcome for the 
beneficiaries, workers, government, and civil society in general. A key 
determinant of the burden is the old-age dependency ratio, that can 
be expressed as the number of persons eligible for support over the 
number of active workers. This ratio is very sensitive to the retirement 
age since extending the active age group by 1 year has a double 
impact by both reducing the numerator and increasing the denomi-
nator. The other important factor in sustainability is the replacement 
rate, i.e., the proportion of the pre-retirement income that is payable 
to people eligible for old-age support. 
from a financial sustainability perspective, what counts is the ratio of 
total pension payments to total salaries. Aggregate pension costs as 
a percentage of payroll can be obtained by multiplying the replace-
ment rate for all beneficiaries by the dependency ratio:
pension payouts as a % of payroll = replacement rate x  
dependency ratio
Increasing the retirement age has an impact beyond social protection 
because it also increases the labor force, and thus the productive 
capacity of the economy. Using population census data for 2010 
(Government of Indonesia 2011), the dependency ratios at different 
retirement ages are shown in Table 3.2. The dependency ratio would 
decline dramatically if the current average retirement age of 55 were 
increased to 70.
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Traditionally, the active population is measured from age 15, but 
education and training tend to delay entry into the labor market. 
Thus, the impact of excluding persons younger than age 18 from 
the labor force is also shown in Table 3.2. 
The Current System
In Indonesia, the pension program for civil servants covers employ-
ees of central and local governments, including teachers and health 
professionals in public institutions but not employees of state-owned 
enterprises who are instead considered to be part of the formal 
private sector. There is a separate program for the armed forces that 
is similar to the civil service program. 
Although the law regulating the status of voluntary private programs 
was adopted in 1992, the development of private schemes was limited 
because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, high termination 
indemnities under Labor Law 13, and competition from the publicly 
sponsored private sector Jamsostek Program. Jamsostek, although 
mandatory, did not achieve an adequate level of coverage for similar 
reasons.  Low performance made the program unattractive, and weak 
enforcement imposed an administrative burden but  generated little 
added value. Other private programs are employer pension funds cover-
ing employees of one employer or of a group of related employers and 
financial institution pension funds (fIPf) offered by banks and insurance 
companies and open to all workers. There can be an overlap in the 
participation data, but to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that there 
is no overlap, but this slightly  overestimates coverage. 
Table 3.2 Dependency Ratios in Indonesia in 2010
Age group
Population 
(million)
Dependency 
ratio from 
age 15 (%)
Average 
retirement 
age
Dependency 
ratio from 
age 18 (%)
Total 234.2  
0–15 62.5  
15–54 144.0 19.2 55 21.0
15–59 153.1 12.1 60 13.2
15–64 159.6 7.6 65 8.2
15–69 164.2 4.6 70 5.0
Source: Author‘s calculations. 
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In order to combine statistics from different sources to obtain the 
distribution of the population in the labor force, we converted the 
information to percentages of the total current population (Table 3.3) 
 Table 3.3 Distribution of the Population in the Labor Force  
in 2008, by Age Group (%)
Classification 0–14 15–59 60+ All
Population 28.17 67.76 4.07 100.00
Active 0.53 40.88 3.71 45.12
Formal 0.05 15.84 0.63 16.52
Informal 0.48 25.04 3.08 28.59
Unemployed  4.95  4.95
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bureau of Statistics and National 
Development Planning Agency (2011).
Table 3.3 shows that the economically active population totals 
50.07%. It is difficult to allocate the unemployed to either the formal 
or informal labor force. The informal sector represents 63% of the 
labor force,1 which makes coverage a challenge. Economic activ-
ity continues well beyond age 60 in the informal sector whereas it 
ceases before age 60 for most people in the formal sector. 
Current Disparities in Retirement Income
Table 3.4 provides a more detailed analysis of the working and retired 
population in terms of social protection. Note that the dependent 
1 28.59 divided by the sum of 28.59 and 16.52, excluding the 4.95% which is 
neither formal nor informal. 
Table 3.4 Pension Coverage by Category of Worker (%)
Category Active Retirees All
Civil servants 1.78 0.67 2.45
  Spouses 1.22 0.69 1.91
Private 0.90 0.18 1.08
  Spouses 0.62 0.04 0.66
Jamsostek 3.60 0.00 3.60
Total 8.11 1.58 9.70
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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spouses of contributors share in social protection measures provided 
to the head of the family. 
At first glance it would seem that only 9.7% of the population 
benefits from some form of social protection leaving over 90% 
without protection in old age. furthermore, the distribution of that 
9.7% is very unequal as follows:
•	 Civil servants: 4.36% of the population covered at 100%; 
•	 formal private sector: 5.33% out of 12.16%,2 i.e., 43.8%; and 
•	 Informal sector: no predetermined retirement age; coverage 
is essentially 0%.3 
This analysis, however, grossly overestimates income protection in 
old age for the following reasons.
•	 Jamsostek does not provide social protection in old age. 
fewer than 10%4 of the participants receive benefits at retire-
ment (PT Jamsostek 2008) and no meaningful protection is 
provided since the amounts payable are small and there is 
no annuitization.
•	 for spouses, the level of protection is limited since the amount 
of income payable to survivors is a percentage of the pension: 
36% for civil servants and generally 60% in private sector 
programs. There is no spousal benefit from Jamsostek since 
the benefit is a lump sum payable at age 55 or earlier on 
terminating employment.
Coverage becomes 6.10% by eliminating Jamsostek which reduces 
formal sector coverage other than for civil servants to 1.74% of an 
eligible population of 12.16%, which is only 14.3% not 43.8%. for 
the formal and informal sectors combined, the figure is 6.10% out 
of 45.12%, which is only 13.5%.
2 16.52% (Table 3.3) minus 4.36% (civil servants).
3 The number of participants in fIPfs includes 429,312 individuals not sponsored 
by an employer; some of them could be self-employed accumulating retirement 
savings that are not locked in until retirement. There are also individuals who take 
out insurance policies or who contribute to mutual funds, but these are general 
savings not dedicated to retirement protection.
4 Only 8.27% of all payments are received at retirement age. 
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To eliminate coverage disparities in the formal sector and to provide 
the population with the same average level of protection enjoyed by 
the small fraction of the formal workforce, pension programs should 
be expanded by 271% (100%/36.9%). To cover both the formal and 
informal sectors, the expansion should be 740% (100%/13.5%).
The gap in coverage is an important and visible but incomplete 
measure of disparity because the level of protection offered by the 
different private programs varies, and may be higher or lower than 
the level guaranteed to civil servants. for private formal sector workers 
this disparity is, however, mitigated through entitlements to severance 
pay and long-service leave payable upon termination of employment, 
or at retirement. These benefits, stipulated by Article 167 of Labor 
Law 13 of 2003, are taxable and may represent up to 32 months of 
pay. Generally, these benefits are not pre-funded and thus may not be 
payable in full in cases of closure or bankruptcy. Since they are payable 
in a lump sum, they provide very limited protection in old age.
Disparities Other than Coverage
The objective is not necessarily to achieve equal levels of protection 
in terms of amount of monthly income as the level is influenced by 
other factors including the following: 
•	 retirement age;
•	 survivors' benefits;
•	 disability coverage;
•	 indexation of pension income;
•	 longevity protection; and
•	 tax treatment.
Disparities in earning levels carry over into retirement, but they can 
be reduced by providing survivors' benefits or disability pensions. 
All programs should offer longevity protection, a risk that is very 
difficult to hedge on an individual basis. Post-retirement indexation 
is essential to maintain the purchasing power of the pension.  
Retirement Age 
The average for civil servants is 57 whereas it is generally 60 in private 
plans. Lump sums from the Jamsostek Program are payable at age 
55 or when employment terminates. for civil servants, early  retirement 
can be at age 50 with 20 years of participation, but retirement is not 
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mandatory before age 56. In private occupational plans, retirement 
savings are locked in until 10 years prior to the normal retirement 
age. In fIPfs, the savings are not fully locked in since an amount equal 
to all contributions, excluding interest accruals, can be withdrawn 
anytime unless otherwise stipulated. 
Tax Treatment
Current disparities are exacerbated by tax preferences for pension 
income. The best practice is to exempt contributions deductible from 
taxable income when made and to exempt returns on assets from 
income tax but make all benefit payments taxable, summarized by the 
acronym EET. This approach is favored because it partly transforms the 
income tax into a consumption tax that promotes long-term savings. 
It makes sense also from a fiscal point of view since the tax deferral for 
individuals increases future taxes that the government will collect to 
meet the cost of services for the elderly, especially health services that 
tend to be in greater demand in the last years of life (Guérard 2011).5 
In the case of Indonesia, the disparity has been exacerbated by the 
reduction in November 2009 of the maximum benefit tax from 25% 
to 5%. That reduces the fiscal base of current retirees but does not 
create an incentive for current workers to contribute since there is 
no assurance the 5% maximum will still apply when they retire. 
Baseline Retirement Income Disparities
The civil service pension program appears to provide generous benefits 
as they accrue at the rate of 2.5% of final pay per year up to a maximum 
of 75%; however, pensionable pay is only a fraction of total pay, thus 
the replacement rate is well below 75%. It is estimated that total pay 
is roughly between 200% and 300% of pensionable pay, thus the real 
replacement rate is on the order of 25% to 37.5%. furthermore, index-
ation is on the basis of wages not prices. Audited financial statements 
by the government of Indonesia report that pension payments for 2009 
amounted to rupiahs (Rp)39.8 trillion, which is also the amount of contri-
butions on a pay-as-you-go  financing basis. This amount is, however, not 
representative of the normal level of contributions but reflects a tempo-
rary surge in retirement due to an anomalous demographic  distribution 
reflecting a prior surge in hiring (National Civil Service Agency 2011). 
5 Age-specific costs are about the average for the 30–44 cohort, less than 50% of the 
average for the 5–30 cohort, but over 200% of the average for ages 55 and older.
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To compensate, an arbitrary adjustment was done to reduce the contri-
butions by 25% as an approximation of the longer-term trend.
The Jamsostek Program is described as “old-age savings” but provides 
only a lump-sum payment which is the accumulation of joint contribu-
tions of 5.7% of wages that is payable at age 55 but more frequently 
at prior termination of employment. Even assuming, contrary to reality, 
that contributions will be accumulated until retirement and converted 
into a life pension, the result would only be about 14.1% (12.4% for 
females) of average contributory wages according to the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates 
(OECD/World Bank 2011). In 2009, the program reported 8,495,732 
participants with total contribution of Rp9.28 trillion and assets of 
Rp60.3 trillion or Rp7 million per participant (about $800).
Reports published by the Pension funds Bureau of Bapepam-LK focus 
on the number of participants, assets, and funding levels. Coverage 
has increased by 5% over 2008 to reach 2,681,233 participants from 
6,061 employers in 276 pension funds. Invested assets have reached 
Rp112.51 trillion. There is no information about contributions or 
benefits; however, by comparing 2009 assets with 2008 assets taking 
into account average returns on investments, it is possible to estimate 
the net inflow at about 4% of 2008 assets—about Rp3.6 trillion. 
Since the programs are still not mature, it is assumed that pay-outs 
were lower than contributions. Using an arbitrary assumption that 
the 2009 outflows were 50% of contributions yields an estimate of 
Rp7.2 trillion for new contributions in 2009 (Table 3.5). 
 Table 3.5 Retirement Program Participants and Contributions 
as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in 2009
Scope of 
program 
 No. of 
Contributors 
 
Contributions, 
Rp Trillion 
% of 
GDP, 
2009
Coverage, 
% of 
active
% of 
GDP, 
both 
sectors
% of 
GDP, 
formal 
only
Civil service 4,524,205 29.85  0.55 4.42 12.51 4.58
Private 
 plans 
2,057,101 7.20  0.13 2.01 6.64 2.43
Jamsostek 8,495,732 9.28  0.17 8.30 2.07 0.76
All 3 
programs
15,077,038 46.33  0.86 14.73 5.83 2.13
Notes:
1. Active: 102,366,700
2. GDP: Rp 5,400 Trillion
Source: Author’s calculations.
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It should be emphasized again that the above calculations are based 
on approximations and estimates for illustrative purposes only; the 
inclusion of Jamsostek is on an “as if basis” assuming the use of the 
existing cash flow to enhance retirement income.
Table 3.5 shows very rough estimates of current flows of contribu-
tions to the three categories of programs covering different segments 
of the workforce and their dependents. The percentages of coverage 
are slightly different from those that reflected retirees and survivors 
separately in 2008. These are for 2009, the latest year available, and 
are based on contributors. The aggregate estimated contributions for 
the 15 million members of the labor force amount to Rp46 trillion or 
almost 0.9% of gross domestic product (GDP). The penultimate column 
shows what it would cost to extend each program to the entire labor 
force, and to extend the existing coverage to all. As percentage of GDP, 
contributions would increase from 0.9% to 5.8%, a jump of 544%. 
The concept of retirement applies somewhat differently to the infor-
mal workforce, so the last column shows the percentage of contribu-
tions to GDP if the program were limited to the formal workforce. 
The increase is reduced to 2.13%, but that is still a jump of 137% 
which raises the issue of affordability.
The Size of Pension Disparities
The size of the disparities above should not be a surprise as numerous 
articles6 and academic analyses have been published on the dispari-
ties between the public and private pension programs around the 
world. The following extract from an OECD working paper published 
in May 2011 confirms that the challenge of reforming the civil service 
pension programs is global and part of a wider issue of fiscal sustain-
ability (Ponds et al 2011). 
In many countries the sustainability of fiscal policies is being 
questioned. A major driving force of this growing concern is age-related 
expenditure, such as health care and social security spending (public 
pensions). A sometimes overlooked reason for the sustainability 
problems, however, involves the pensions for government employees. 
In most countries there are separate pension plans for public sector 
employees. Traditionally, these specific arrangements are justified 
6 See in particular The Economist. 2011. Special Report on Pensions. 9 April.
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because they guarantee the security, integrity and independence of 
the employees and because they contribute to the attractiveness of a 
career in the civil service. General findings from research indicate that 
compared to pensions in the private sector, public sector pensions 
tend to offer more generous terms and feature lower funding levels 
(Palacios and Whitehouse 2006). Reforms have been undertaken 
in many countries. These reforms have been oriented at bringing 
remuneration practices in the public sector more in line with those 
found in the private sector.
These general findings closely match the situation in Indonesia where 
public servants’ pensions are based on final pay, indexed to wages, 
and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
National Social Security Law 40 of 2004
Indonesia has already adopted the National Social Security Law 40 to 
remedy disparities and reduce future dependency ratios. Although it 
has not been implemented yet, it still represents government policy, 
and therefore its impact should be taken into account in assessing 
future disparities. The council that should coordinate the implemen-
tation of the National Social Security System (NSSS also known as 
SJSN, its Indonesian abbreviation) was appointed on 24 December 
2008. The government’s intent was clarified and reconfirmed in a 
draft white paper.7  
Extending the Program to the Poor and Underprivileged
Although the program is contributory, it will include those who are not 
economically active since the government will pay the required contribu-
tions for the poor and underprivileged.8 This provision further reduces 
disparities in the availability of retirement income since government 
contributions are focused on the less economically active while active 
workers and their employers must share the costs of the program. 
The Ministry of Health issued 76 million cards in 2008 under the 
Jamkesmas Health Program for the poor, but the actual number for 
7 Published on the website of Bapepam-LK, a division of the Ministry of finance, on 
15 December 2009.
8 Article 1 of Law 40: “Contribution assistance is contributions paid by the 
Government for the poor and the underprivileged who shall be treated as social 
security system participants.”
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2009 was only 60 million or 26.3% of the population.9 Based on the 
population statistics previously cited, there are 1.35 dependents per 
working adult, so assuming the average applies to all families, there 
should be 2.35 cards per poor family. 
The low estimate of coverage in the white paper is that 22.5% of 
workers in the informal sector, i.e., 14 million, would qualify as poor. 
If it is assumed for calculation purposes that there is a relatively lower 
proportion of workers qualifying as poor in the formal sector, say 
7.5%, the estimated distribution is in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Social Security Program Contributors, Dependents, 
and the Poor 
Contributors and 
their dependents Distribution (%) Note
Total 100.00  
Younger than 60 95.93  
 
formal 14.70 92.5% of formal, younger 
than 60
Informal 19.77 77.5% of formal, younger 
than 60
Dependents 46.54 1.35 dependents per 
worker
Total contributors 
and dependents 81.02  
Requiring government assistance
Poor less than 60 14.92 Not included above
Poor Retiree 2.48 Above 60 without pension
Total poor 17.40 Compares to 19% from 
Ministry of Health
Source: Author’s calculations.
Health cards are issued to people older than 60 as well, for which 
2.48% is added This estimate of 17% means about 38.5 million 
9 Jakarta Post. 2009. Rp5,125 trillion in health insurance set for more recipients. 
2 December.
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people and anticipates a decrease in the number of poor as GDP 
increases faster than the population. 
How the contributions will be collected outside the formal sector is 
not yet clear. Even the formal sector represents a particular challenge 
in Indonesia since the workforce is fragmented into very small 
business units. The following statement summarizes the challenge: 
“Some 85% of all workers are in firms of fewer than 5 workers 
and 38% are in firms of only 1 worker. This raises serious concerns 
about obtaining employer contributions from these entities” (Rokx 
et al 2009). Obviously, the fact that no contributions have to be 
collected from the lower 25% of the informal sector and from other 
poor segments will facilitate achieving a high level of coverage thus 
eliminating almost all disparities in access.
Remaining Disparities in Social Protection
The recommendations in the white paper will more rapidly elimi-
nate some of the remaining disparities in Law 40 by removing the 
requirement of 15 years of contributions to become eligible for a life 
pension and by adding a social pension recognizing past years of 
contributions to the Indonesian economy. Given that the optimistic 
target for implementation was 2012, a 15-year waiting period means 
that the first pensions will be payable in 2037. Combined with a 
normal retirement age of 60, it means that people born before 1977 
would not qualify for a life pension from the NSSS but would receive 
lump sums equal to accumulated contributions. Thus, there is no 
real social protection in retirement. The implementation of Law 40 
as interpreted by the white paper would gradually remove the more 
significant disparities while providing a basic pension at the level 
of 0.5% of salary per year of participation by (i) setting a target of 
20% of average pay after 40 years of participation; (ii) changing 
the normal retirement age to 60 until 2037 then increasing it to 65 
by 2047; (iii) providing life pensions for survivors, disability protec-
tion, and longevity protection; and (iv) indexing life pensions to the 
consumer price index. 
Disparities between Sectors and in Retirement Ages
Disparities between the public and private sectors as to the level 
of pension income will remain after implementing the NSSS. This 
can be considered a human resource policy issue for the govern-
ment because the value of the pension is part of the remuneration. 
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The affordability of civil service remuneration and the part of the 
remuneration allocated to pensions is a policy choice. 
The retirement age, on the other hand, is a wider policy issue because 
of its economic impact on labor policy, portability between sectors, 
and productivity of the economy. It will also be seen as an issue 
of fairness that the benefits and burden of increasing longevity 
are shared appropriately. Given sustained increases in longevity, it 
becomes obvious that a 30-year career is no longer appropriate. There 
is also an issue of efficiency as in a more sophisticated environment 
that requires longer periods of education and training, a short career 
does not provide a fair return on the investment and deprives the 
government and the taxpayers of the qualifications and experience 
of civil servants who can still serve with distinction. 
Continuing increases in longevity will likely entail a new approach 
to the concept of retirement and the use of human resources. The 
current linear career model needs to be adapted. It may be that 
leisure time should be spread before and after retirement and that 
it would be a win-win solution, for example, to increase free time 
when it can make family life more enjoyable.
The white paper projects life expectancy for males and females 
combined from 18.4 years at age 60 in 2010 to the same 18.4 years 
at age 65 in 2050 due to reductions in mortality. This means that the 
average age at death will be 83.4 instead of 78.4, and the old-age 
dependency ratio will double from 12.9% for retirement at age 60 in 
2010 to 25.8% in 2030. If, however, the retirement age is changed 
to 65 by 2030, the dependency ratio will be 16.4% an increase of 
only 27%. 
The draft 2011 OECD report indicates that for Asian males the 
number of years of retirement is 18.3 versus 20.3 in non-OECD 
Asian countries; for females the numbers are 22.5 versus 25.6. 
Retirement ages for Asian males are on average 6 years lower than 
in OECD countries. 
Aligning the retirement age for civil servants with that for the NSSS 
would make sense both politically and economically. It would also 
reduce the disparity in the value of benefits. A quick simulation shows 
that a reform of the design to a 2%/year formula generating an 80% 
pension payable after 40 years at age 65 would reduce the financial 
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burden of the current 2.5%/75% formula by 44% to 0.31%.10 That 
change would need to be implemented gradually as it entails extend-
ing career service from 30 years to 40 years. This would correct the 
imbalance between career and retirement durations.
On the basis of the current expected age at death of 78.4 and 
an average retirement age of 57, the retirement period would be 
21.4 years, i.e., 71% of the working period, but as longevity increases 
to 83.4 according to expectations, the ratio would become 26.4/30 
or 88%. Moving gradually to a retirement age of 65 and a career 
duration of 40 years would reduce the ratio to 18.4/40 or 46%.
for a comparison with the NSSS long-term projections, the revised 
estimate should be reduced to reflect the white paper assumption 
of faster growth of GDP compared with that of the wages on which 
pensions are based. This ratio of 141.3% reduces further the estimate 
for the civil service program to 0.22% of GDP. The harmonization 
of the civil service program with the NSSS results in an additional 
reduction of 25% since the 0.5% is an offset to the 2% annual credit, 
thus the net contribution becomes 0.16% of GDP for a program that 
is complementary to the NSSS.
The combination of introducing the NSSS and reforming the civil 
service program would have the following long-term impacts:
•	 At maturity, the NSSS would represent a burden of 3.4% of 
GDP, of which the 1% contributed by the government on 
behalf of the poor can be deemed social assistance.
•	 The contribution for the civil service program is reduced from 
0.55% of GDP to 0.16% by changes in the formula and the 
retirement age, by GDP growth faster than wage growth, and 
by harmonization with NSSS.
•	 The net effect is to reduce considerably the disparities in 
pension expectations and limit the growth of the dependency 
ratio compared with the status quo.
10 Assuming returns compounded at 4%, a contribution of 1% per year accumulates 
to 56% after 30 years and to 95% after 40 years, that is 169.6%.  On Gam83, 
the life annuity factor is 11,841 at 65, i.e., 88.8% of the factor at age 60 that is 
13,334. 80 is 1.06667 times 75. Combining these factors generates a factor at 65 
that is 55.8% of the factor at 60, the main cause of the reduction being the length 
of the accumulation period.
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•	 The level of social protection in the informal sector jumps 
from 0% to 20% of average wages. 
•	 The minimum level of social protection in the formal sector 
also increases from 0% to 20%, and additional benefits are 
generated by occupational programs.
•	 The additional level of social protection from the occupational 
complementary program for civil servants becomes 60% of 
pensionable wages (about 27% to 30% of total pay), and 
the retirement age is harmonized with the NSSS; the ratio of 
retirement years over working years is rebalanced from 71% 
to 46% despite an assumed 5-year increase in longevity.
Essentially, the NSS would build a floor of social protection for all 
citizens and propose achievable targets for occupational private 
programs. Nevertheless, further reductions in disparities need to be 
promoted by a comprehensive old-age policy.
Suggestions for Reform
Implement the NSSS as interpreted in the white paper and make 
limited reforms to the 1969 civil service program as bold first steps 
to increase fairness in sharing the benefits of increasing  longevity 
by reducing the dependency ratio and disparities in access to social 
protection in retirement. Quantitative disparities will remain in 
pension incomes as they do in salaries and wages that reflect in 
part the choices made individually or collectively about apportioning 
income between years at work and years in retirement. These dispari-
ties could not be quantified accurately; the estimates presented are 
only illustrative of the magnitude and direction of changes.
A strong recommendation is that reporting be expanded beyond 
contributions and assets to provide meaningful indicators for 
participants, outcomes, and benefits. Because they are designed 
for financial institutions, current reports give very little information 
about the retirement income protection, that is the main purpose 
of the programs. 
Better information and communications would allow all stakeholders 
to identify gaps and disparities in coverage, replacement rates, and 
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retirement income. Decision makers would benefit from more public 
education and input about the orientation of the national retirement 
policy in order to build expectations that can sustainably be met. 
 Good governance requires that the authority responsible for defining 
and implementing a retirement policy that is affordable, sustainable, 
and robust enough to adapt to demographic and life-style changes 
should be clearly identified and should have the power to coordinate 
and monitor outcomes.  
Broad sustainability includes more than financial considerations as 
it rests on fairness and eliminating disparities. That objective implies 
the convergence and the rational integration of components, not 
necessarily one size fits all. It requires national leadership at the top 
level to coordinate a dynamic old-age policy. The wide impact on 
the economy and the need to balance the interests of a large but 
vulnerable segment of the population with other national objectives 
justify a high priority for the pension program reforms.
Seong Sook Kim*
Abstract
The defined-benefit national pension scheme was introduced in the 
Republic of Korea 23 years ago and is compulsory for everyone in 
the workforce aged 18 to 59 residing in the country. The four goals 
were extensive coverage, adequate benefits, equitable sharing of costs 
among generations, and long-term financial stability. Theoretically, 
coverage is universal, but for various reasons, 70% of people older 
than 65 at present do not receive old-age pensions, and the long-term 
financial state of the system is unstable. Two reforms have improved 
stability and equity among generations by sacrificing some benefits, 
but these issues still need additional attention as the Republic of Korea 
is one of the most rapidly aging countries in East and Southeast Asia. 
According to the projections of the financial review committee in 2008, 
the pension dependency ratio will be 90.1% in 2050 which means that 
if the system continues as it is, future generations must bear a huge 
burden, and the scheme will not be sustainable. Four scenarios for 
achieving the long-term financial goals are described and evaluated. 
Coverage should be extended, and the average contribution period for 
the insured should be increased, but this will not be easy to achieve 
because the country’s employment structure must first be improved.
The Republic of Korea 
* Head, National Pension Research Institute, National Pension Service, Republic of 
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Overview
As society ages, the role of public pension schemes is becoming more 
important for income security. Simply speaking, the more people 
who are eligible for public pensions, the better; but questions then 
arise about whether there are sufficient resources and about who 
should bear the burden in the short and long terms. The four goals 
of the public pension system in the Republic of Korea are exten-
sive coverage, adequate benefits, equitable sharing of costs among 
generations, and long-term financial stability; but they conflict and 
influence one another, so it is difficult to attain them simultaneously. 
Compromise is therefore necessary.
It has been 23 years since the defined-benefit national pension 
scheme was introduced. It is compulsory for anyone in the workforce 
aged 18 to 59 residing in the country, and anyone in this age group 
without earnings may voluntarily pay contributions. The universal 
application of this scheme has been achieved in principle, but there 
are many people who do not make contributions because they have 
very little or no income. Excluding non-working individuals, mostly 
housewives, was stipulated for ease of administration. Persons who 
were older than 60 when the scheme was introduced were also 
exempt, and as a result, 70% of people older than 65 at present do 
not get any old-age pensions from social insurance pension schemes 
and could thus face poverty. Because of this, a tax-based, basic 
old-age pension was introduced in 2007, but though the coverage 
of this scheme is wide, the level of benefits is low so it does not 
contribute much to alleviating poverty among the elderly.
Benefit levels were considerably reduced for long-term financial 
stability as soon as the national scheme was introduced, which 
reduced the burden on future generations and improved inter- 
generational equity but made the benefits insufficient. The popula-
tion will continue to age in the long term, so contribution rates will 
remain low compared with benefit levels. Accordingly, additional 
measures for long-term financial stability are undeniably needed, 
though they are not urgent. In the future, if contribution rates are 
increased to improve the financial status of the scheme, equity 
among generations could be a serious issue because future genera-
tions would pay more and receive less.
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The Current System
Extending Coverage
The national plan was introduced in 1988, but it was not until 1999 
when the scheme was applied to the total population aged 18 to 59. 
Old-age pensions were first paid to the 1933 birth cohort. Coverage 
is, however, limited as the nonworking population is excluded. This 
includes nonworking spouses (mostly housewives), students, 
and military personnel between the ages of 18 and 27. Women 
are the most disadvantaged of these groups. They may receive 
survivors’ pensions after their spouses die, but the benefit levels 
are much lower.
Similarly, workers at small firms or temporary workers can barely pay 
their contributions because of their low earnings and insecure jobs. 
The average contribution period of low-income workers earning less 
than 1 million won a month is less than half that of those earning 
more than 3 million won (National Pension Service 2009). Thus, 
though the system appears to be universal, in fact discrimination 
according to gender and earning level exists. The national pension 
system is thus in reality a social insurance program that only those 
who work and have earnings may access. 
According to a survey on types of employment by the National Statis-
tical Office (NSO) in August 2008, of the total workforce between 
the ages 18 and 64—23,616,000 people—10,658,000 were regular 
workers and 1,505,000 were employers; the remaining 11,453,000 
(48.5%) had difficulty accessing the pension scheme. That group was 
composed of 5,445,000 temporary workers, 4,530,000 self-employed 
persons, and 1,478,000 unpaid family workers (NSO 2008). 
As of the end of December 2010, the eligible population covered by 
the national scheme was 58.9% of those aged 18 to 59 (Table 4.1). 
Contributors to public pension schemes comprised 43.3%, the sum 
of the percentages of contributors to the national pension scheme 
(39.0%) and to public occupational pension schemes (4.3%).
If the proportions of temporary workers and the self-employed 
decrease as the employment structure improves, and if the propor-
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tion of women in the workforce increases, the proportion of the 
population that can access the national scheme and that of contribu-
tors will also increase. This will then increase both the proportion 
receiving old-age pensions and the benefit levels. 
Table 4.1 Participants in Public Pension Systems as of 
December 2010
Total population aged 18–59: 32.6 million (100.0%)
Nonparticipants 
in public pension 
systems:
12.0 million 
(36.8%)
Participants in public pension systems:  
20.6 million (63.2%)
Participants in the national 
pension system: 19.2 million 
(58.9%)
Participants in 
public occupa-
tional pensions: 
1.4 million 
(4.3%)
Noncontributors: 
6.5 million 
(19.9%)
Contributors: 
12.7 million 
(39.0%)
Note: The percentages were calculated against the total population aged 18–59. 
Contributors are the sum of 10,415,000 workplace-based insured persons plus 
2,164,000 (8,674,000 total individually insured persons minus 5,100,000 exempted 
from paying contributions minus 1,410,000 who did not pay contributions that 
month) plus 90,000 voluntary contributors. Noncontributors equal 5,100,000 individ-
ually insured persons exempted from paying contributions plus 1,410,000 who did 
not pay contributions that month.
Sources: National Statistics Office Statistics on Residents Registered as Population Aged 
18–59; National Pension Service (2010); Monthly Statistics, Government Employees 
Pension Service, http://www.geps.or.kr; and Korea Teachers Pension, http://www.ktpf.or.kr.
Adequacy of Benefits
A special old-age pension provided benefits to those who paid 
contributions for 5 years from the time the national scheme was 
introduced in 1988 until March 2009.1 Accordingly, most early 
pensioners are special old-age pensioners, and their pensions are 
quite low. Birth cohorts from 1949 and after were not covered by 
that pension, and a minimum 10-year contribution period for an 
old-age pension was applied which sharply reduced the proportion 
of the 1949 birth cohort that received old-age pensions (Table 4.2). 
1 The minimum qualifying years for an old-age pension is 10, but the special old-
age pension existed temporarily for those who were in their 50s when the scheme 
was introduced.
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As the average contribution period increases, the average pension 
amount also increases, but the average pension amount is still so low 
that it is not sufficient to cover living expenses. The average amount 
for women pensioners is 60%–70% of that of men; lately the dispar-
ity has been increasing because the contribution period is shorter and 
the average earnings of women are less than those of men.
The statutory earnings replacement rate was 70% in the early years 
of the national pension, but it was reduced to 40% through two 
reforms. Accordingly, the benefit level for future pensioners is not 
expected to increase much despite increased contribution periods 
which will create disparity between early and future pensioners.
While the proportion of persons covered by the national pension plan is 
not small, it appears that most do not receive sufficient resources from 
their pensions because of their low participation rates and of reductions 
in benefit levels. Private income security systems and social assistance 
programs should therefore play a role in old-age income security.
Equity among Generations
Reducing benefit levels in the national plan considerably jeopardized 
the adequacy of payments, but it significantly lightened the burden 
on future generations. The contribution rate for the system has been 
set at 9% since its introduction, which will be higher than the pay-as-
you-go rate until 2030. Afterwards, however, the pay-as-you-go rate 
is forecast to increase rapidly (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Pay-As-You-Go Rate for the National Pension System
(%)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2078
3.0 4.9 8.2 13.1 17.7 21.9 23.2 22.9
Source: Report of the Second National Pension financial Review Committee (2008).
The ratio of benefits to cost of the national plan exceeds 1 for all 
income strata because the contribution rate is still low in comparison 
with the benefit level. This means that future generations must bear 
the costs that the present generations have generated (Table 4.4).
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Table 4.4: Ratio of Benefits to Cost by Level of Earnings for the 
National Plan
Level of earnings 0.5A1 A1 1.5A1
Ceiling of 
earnings2
Ratio of benefit  
to cost3 2.7 1.8 1.5 1.4
Notes:  
1  A=1,814,477 won (the 3-year average earnings of the total insured population 
under the national plan as of the end of 2010).
2 3,680,000 won in 2010.
3  Economic variables (such as rate of earnings increase, rate of inflation, and rate 
of return on fund investments) in the Second National Pension financial Review in 
2008 were used. It is assumed that the insured participates in the scheme for 20 
years starting in 2010 and receives a pension starting in 2030. The discount rate 
for the ratio of costs to benefits used the same return rate as the national pension 
fund investment assumed in the 2008 financial review. 
Source: National Pension Research Institute.
Long-Term Financial Stability
Despite two reforms, the national scheme must be further stabi-
lized because of the rapidly aging society and the low contribution 
rate to benefit level. Plans to raise the contribution rate have not 
been successful thus far. The insured respond more sensitively and 
negatively to contributions they must pay now than to the benefits 
they will receive in the future; however, it seems that this issue will 
be raised again in the third financial review in 2013. In 2008, the 
second review projected that the fund would be depleted in 2060. 
Some people think this is quite sustainable while others argue that 
it is not sustainable in the long term and that the plan should be 
reformed again as soon as possible. The former view can be accepted 
because the current contribution rate is higher than the pay-as-you-
go rate, but the latter view can also be supported because the fund 
will be exhausted in the long term and the present generation will 
pass on too much of the burden to future generations. Therefore, a 
consensus must first be reached on defining the long-term financial 
stability and long-term financial goals of the national plan before 
policies for financial stability are designed. 
In the last two financial reforms, long-term financial goals were not 
considered, and reforms were made based on social acceptability. 
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The current financial status is the result. Some people advocate increas-
ing the future funding ratio while others argue that it is dangerous to 
operate a fund of such an enormous size because it may negatively 
influence the economy. These issues should be reviewed before another 
reform for long-term financial stability is undertaken.
Suggestions for Reform
Prioritization of the Four Goals
The four goals of the national pension program—extensive coverage, 
adequate benefits, inter-generational equity, and long-term financial 
stability—are all important, but if the main function of the program 
is income security for citizens, priority should be given to extending 
pension rights to more people. Adequate benefits are also important, 
but they can be achieved by a variety of income security systems; 
when the national plan was reformed, this assumption seems to 
have been made.
As benefit levels were significantly reduced, it became necessary 
to provide one pension per person instead of one pension per 
household. In other words, if benefits per household unit are to 
be adequate, it is more important that more people get their own 
pension rights. Also, the insured must contribute longer in order to 
have larger pension amounts. To attain this, both policy measures 
and managerial efforts will be needed.
Equitable sharing of the pension burden among generations and 
long-term financial stability are goals that should be considered 
together because long-term financial stability can be achieved 
if future generations can bear the costs. If, however, the current 
generation makes fewer contributions, receives more benefits, and 
is more widely covered, more costs will be transferred to future 
generations. Therefore, the four goals must be harmonized through 
social consensus.
If the first priority of the national pension system is extending 
coverage, equity and long-term financial stability can be the second 
priority though the level of achievement should be considered in 
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the context of adequacy of benefits, the feasibility of financing both 
present and future generations, and the adequacy of accumulated 
funds among other factors.
Targets and Strategies for Extending Coverage and Improving 
Adequacy 
A More Accessible Scheme
The national pension system covers residents aged 18 to 59; most of 
the workforce is included. If, however, insured workers declare that 
they are unemployed, even if they are actually working, the system has 
no means of verifying their claims, and they can be exempted from 
paying contributions. At the end of 2010, the population covered 
by public pension schemes was 20.6 million, which was similar 
to the workforce population aged 18 to 59; however, 6.8 million 
of the 19.2 million persons covered by the national scheme were 
either exempted from paying contributions or were delinquent. 
 Additionally, 36.8% of the population in this age range is not part of 
the workforce and therefore does not contribute to the national plan.
According to the financial review of the national plan at the end of 
2008, although abolishing the special old-age pension would reduce 
the rate of acquiring pensions for early 1950s birth cohorts, the rate 
would gradually be recovered by the birth cohorts of the 1960s and 
would exceed 70% for men though only 30% for women. A desirable 
target rate for the next 20 years would be at least 10% higher than 
that forecast currently. If this target is achieved, the proportion of 
old-age pensioners, survivor pensioners, and disability pensioners 
together under the national scheme will be nearly 60% of the total 
population aged 65 or older in 2030.
To increase the number of pensioners, permanent employment 
should be emphasized and the rate of women’s participation in 
the workforce should be increased. While these measures cannot 
be achieved immediately, it will be helpful to pursue policies and 
management measures for better coverage. Possible management 
measures are to (i) increase voluntary participation, especially of 
housewives; (ii) increase supplementary payments for insurance 
contributions; (iii) establish stronger links between the insurance 
periods of the national scheme and other public pension schemes; 
(iv) educate the population about the benefits of pension plans; and 
(v) publicize available schemes. 
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Possible policies include (i) extending credit, (ii) partially subsidizing 
contributions for disadvantaged groups, and (iii) reducing the 
minimum qualifying years for old-age pensions. Recently, voluntary 
contributions to the national pension system have been increasing 
which could be because of growing awareness of the need for old-age 
pensions and greater trust in the scheme. further improvements will 
require greater efforts to improve access.
Adequate Benefits
The adequacy of benefits can be assessed by the replacement rate. 
The target should be 30% of average earnings in real terms as of 
2030 because the average replacement rate at present is under 20% 
though the rate stipulated is 40%. Additional income for pensioners 
can be derived from working, from private pensions, or from savings 
and investments.
As shown in Table 4.2, the average pension payment gradually 
increases because the average contribution period of the insured 
increases as the system matures, but many of the current recipients 
joined the scheme when the replacement rate was 70%. The rate 
will continually decrease and reach 40% by 2028, so even if the 
average contribution period is lengthened, the average payment to 
future pensioners will not increase much. To increase the amount, 
it is necessary to increase the years of contribution and the average 
earnings of participants. If, on the other hand, priority is given to 
extending the scheme, the average earnings of the insured popula-
tion may decrease when low-paid workers are included. Pension 
payments from the national scheme are influenced by the average 
earnings of the total population insured and by their individual 
life-time average earnings. If those averages do not increase, 
future pension payments cannot increase much. The goal of extend-
ing the scheme may therefore conflict with the goal of providing 
adequate benefits.
Equity among Generations and Long-Term Financial 
Stability
The Present Situation
When the national pension was introduced, it was to be financed 
by “the modified funding method” in the early stages then by the 
pay-as-you-go method as the scheme matured (Min 1986). The 
modified funding method means adopting a lower premium than 
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the general average premium necessary for full funding (Nam et al. 
1990).2 This was, however, only the suggestion of the designers 
and has not been officially decided. At the time, the major interests 
were in setting up the system and providing adequate benefits. The 
relatively high contribution rate set during the initial period may 
well have been designed to boost economic development through 
capital accumulation.
The long-term sustainability of the scheme was a big issue among 
financiers as soon as it was introduced. Although it has been 
reformed twice in 20 years, there was no discussion on long-term 
financial goals or on future financing methods. There was instead 
only a consensus that Korean society is rapidly aging so the national 
pension should be sustainable in the long run with better inter-
generational equity. In 2013 when the third financial review is done, 
it is expected that there will be suggestions regarding the long-term 
financial goals of the scheme and measures for providing long-term 
financial stability.
Long-Term Financial Goals 
If long-term financial stability is debated in the third financial review, 
priority should be placed on the establishing adequate, valid, long-
term financial goals considering the following factors (International 
Labour Organization 2000): 
•	 target or benchmark benefit levels (either absolute amounts 
or in terms of replacement rates);
•	 degree of actuarial equity among generations;
•	 desired level of reserves; and
•	 desired contribution (or tax) rate.
The benefit levels, contribution rates, and financing methods of public 
pension schemes are determined by complex social and  political 
circumstances. The concept of actuarial equity among generations 
can be arbitrary, and the financing methods and levels of reserves are 
2 The modified funding method was defined as the method imposing lower rates 
than the general average premium due to the restriction of cost bearing capacity 
in reality, and then the shortfall is transferred to the future generations. It was said 
that by this method, a considerable amount of funds would be accumulated in 
the early stages but would be changed to the pay-as-you-go method in the long 
run because of increasing fund shortages. 
The Republic of Korea 49
different in each pension scheme. The financing methods and finan-
cial goals of public pension schemes can be influenced and changed 
by internal and external factors and can also influence those factors.
To decide the long-term financial goal for the national scheme in 
the Republic of Korea, the following factors should be considered: 
(i) adequacy of benefits, (ii) acceptable contribution rates in the short 
and long terms, (iii) reasonable size of reserves, (iv) adequate rate of 
benefit expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP), and (v) desire 
of people to change the scheme. The following are two possible 
scenarios for long-term goals.
Financial Goal 1a: Double the ratio of assets to expenditures in 
the last year of the financial projection.
Financial Goal 1b: There is no current-year deficit in the last year 
of the financial projection.
First scenario. The present scheme is maintained as it is, but the 
contribution rate increases to about 15%.3 The level of reserves is a 
dependent variable. The target year for achieving the financial goals 
is 2078, just as in the second financial review.
Financial Goal 2a: The contribution rate is fixed at 9%, and the level 
of benefits corresponds to it. 
Financial Goal 2b: The contribution rate is pegged to a benefit level  
of 40%.
Second scenario. The system is changed to a defined-contribution 
scheme. Contribution rates and benefit levels are equivalent.
Discussion. In the first scenario, if the contribution rate is assumed to 
increase by 0.48% every year from 2020 to 2029, the rate necessary to 
achieve financial goal 1a is 13.8%; the rate necessary to achieve financial 
goal 1b, on the other hand, is 15.8% with a 0.68% increase in the 
3 Because there was a provisional consensus in the committee of the first financial 
review, the ceiling for the contribution rate is set at 15% here.
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contribution rate annually during the same time period. In goal 1a, the 
ratio of assets to expenditures in 2078 appears to be 8.7:1 (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 Contribution Rates to Attain Financial Goals  
in the First Scenario
Financial Goal 1a Financial Goal 1b
Double the ratio of 
assets to expen-
ditures in the last 
year of the financial 
projection
No current year 
deficit in the last 
year of the financial 
projection
Contribution 
rates
2020–2029 0.48% annual 
increase 
0.68% annual 
increase 
After 2030 13.8% 15.8% 
Deficit in 2060 Ratio of assets to 
expenditures of 
8.7:1 in 2078
Note: The same assumptions of population and economic variables in the second 
financial review are used.
Source: Kim and Shin (2010). 
In the second scenario, if the system is changed to a defined-contri-
bution scheme, the benefit levels equivalent to a contribution rate 
of 9% will be between 19.0% and 22.2% according to discount rate 
assumptions, and the contribution rates equivalent to a replace-
ment rate of 40% will be between 16.3% and 19.0% according to 
discount rate assumptions. The insured represented are assumed to 
enter the scheme in 2010 and to make the average earnings of the 
total population insured. They have a 40-year contribution period 
and receive benefits for 21 years (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6 Achieving the Financial Goals in the Second Scenario
Discount Rate Assumption Financial Goal 2a Financial Goal 2b
Earnings increase rate
22.2%
(earnings  
replacement rate )
16.3%
(contribution rate)
Interest rate 19.0% 19.0%
fund investment return rate 21.9% 16.4%
Note: The same assumptions for population and economic variables in the second 
financial review are used.
Source: Kim and Shin (2010).
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Evaluation. If the above four financial goals are evaluated in terms 
of (i) level of contributions, (ii) adequacy of benefits, (iii) adequacy 
of reserves, (iv) benefit expenditure to GDP, (v) financial stability, 
and (vi) social acceptability, financial goal 1a appears to be the most 
acceptable and feasible overall (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7 Evaluation of the Scenarios for Long-Term  
Financial Goals 
Indicator Evaluation
(i) Level of contributions The contribution rates of goals 1a and 
2b seem too high.
(ii) Adequacy of benefits The benefits of goal 2-1 seem too low.
(iii) Adequacy of reserves Reserves will be too large in goals 1a 
and 2b.
(iv)  Benefit expenditure to GDP The rate in goals 1a, 1b and 2b is 
forecast to be 7% in 2078; that of goal 
2a will be half the forecast percentage. 
Neither is too high.
(v) financial stability Goal 1a < goal 1b < goals 2a and 2b
(vi) Social acceptability Goal 1a is considered to be the most 
acceptable. 
Overall feasibility Goal 1a seems to be most acceptable and 
feasible of the four.
Source: Author’s calculations.
While financial goal 1a seems to be the most acceptable, the contri-
bution rate necessary to maintain it will change whenever a financial 
review is conducted. Therefore, even if there is social support for this 
proposal, it will be necessary to create a system to warn in advance 
when and how additional reforms should be pursued to maintain 
the goal.
Conclusions
Although the national pension system was developed with astonish-
ing speed, coverage is still considered to be unsatisfactory, and its 
long-term financial state is unstable. These two issues seem to be the 
most urgent; the former may be the most important issue because 
the system exists to provide income security. Considerable benefit 
reductions have already necessitated one pension per person instead 
of one pension per household. Two reforms have improved long-term 
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financial stability and equity among generations by sacrificing some 
benefits, but these issues are still regarded as unresolved and need 
additional attention as the Republic of Korea is one of the most 
rapidly aging countries in East and Southeast Asia. According to the 
long-term financial projections by the financial review committee in 
2008, the pension dependency ratio will be 90.1% in 2050 which 
means that if the system continues as it is, future generations must 
bear a huge burden and the scheme will not be sustainable.
The coverage of the scheme should be extended, and the average 
contribution period for the insured should be increased, but this is 
not easily achieved because the employment structure must first be 
improved. Nonetheless, efforts should be made in terms of policy 
and management and by the insured themselves. 
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The current pension system comprises several schemes with different 
designs targeted at specific groups. Private sector workers have a 
defined-contribution, mandatory savings plan administered by the 
Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) that covers about half the labor force 
but is inadequate and inequitable. Median balances of less than 2 years 
of per capita income in 2009 will not finance retirement when life 
expectancy at age 60 in 2005 was 17 years for men and 20 years for 
women. In addition, there are no provisions for longevity and inflation 
risks or for survivors’ benefits all of which challenge sustainability. In 
contrast, civil servants have a defined-benefit, non-contributory plan 
that pays benefits for life and adjusts them periodically, and military 
personnel have a mandatory defined-contribution savings plan with 
the government as co-contributor; both include survivors’ benefits and 
together cover about 13% of the labor force. The disparities in benefits 
among the schemes and the uneven taxing of retirement financing 
programs are unfair. In addition, social assistance is very restricted and 
benefits are below the poverty line, and foreign workers (currently 
20% of the labor force) are excluded from the EPF and have limited 
access to public services. To improve fairness and sustainability of 
the pension system, policy makers should address longevity, inflation, 
and survivors' benefits in the EPF; minimize the differences between 
the civil servant scheme and the EPF; establish a more liberal social 
pension with better benefits; and tax providers of pension products 
fairly. Malaysia needs an integrated pension system that takes trends in 
longevity into account as the population aged 65 and older is expected 
to triple from 4.8% in 2010 to 15% by 2050.
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Overview
Malaysia is an outward oriented, globally integrated upper-middle 
income country1 with a relatively favorable land to population ratio.2 
The country has been governed by the coalition Barisan Nasional 
(National front) comprising the three major ethnic groups—Malay, 
Chinese, and Indian—for several decades. In 1970, Malaysia initiated 
a strong affirmative action program under its new economic policy 
(NEP) to improve the economic status of Malays designated sons 
of the soil (bumiputra), and to substantially increase their share in 
national income and wealth. The NEP has been controversial. It was, 
however, applied relatively less rigidly than was feared. It formally 
ended in 1990, but several of its features, including affirmative 
action, have continued in most parts of the country.
Malaysia aims to meet challenges from high- and low-income 
countries and become a developed economy by 2020. The plan is 
to raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) from $7,158 in 
2009 to $15,000 by 2020. To achieve developed-country status, 
Malaysia introduced the new economic model (NEM) in March 2010 
which envisages a shift toward productivity-driven growth instead 
of resource-driven growth, greater reliance on domestic demand, 
flexible labor markets, and further relaxing the strong affirmative 
action programs initiated in 1970 under the NEP. 
The fairness and sustainability of the pension system have become 
important public policy issues for a number of reasons. first, the 
greater reliance on domestic demand envisaged by the NEM and 
prevailing high income inequalities3 will require a modern pension 
system that emphasizes fairness and sustainability. Policy makers 
1 Malaysia’s international trade per capita in 2009 was $13,725, substantially 
higher than its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $7,158 (World Trade 
Organization 2010).
2 Malaysia’s physical area is approximately 127,000 square miles while its population 
in 2009 was 27.5 million.
3 Malaysia’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.38 in 2004 to 0.46 in 2009, an 
increase of 22% in 5 years. The share of income held by the top 20% of the income 
distribution was 8 times that held by the lowest 20%, and the share of income held 
by the top 10% was 10 times that held by the lowest 10% in 2004. These respective 
shares increased to 10 and 17 times, respectively, by 2009 (World Bank 2010). 
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recognize that such a pension scheme will need to be part of a 
broader social protection system (Aziz 2010). 
Second, demographic trends in Malaysia are toward population aging 
but there is still time to institute policies to address the challenges 
it brings. Projections indicate that the number of individuals aged 
65 and older will exceed those younger than 15 years in 2065. The 
number of people aged 65 and older increased from 0.49 million 
in 1980 (3.6% of the total population) to 1.36 million in 2010 
(4.8%) and is projected to increase to 3.89 million by 2030 (10.3%). 
Estimates from the United Nations suggest that it will increase to 
12.7% by 2040 and 15.0% by 2050. In every decade since 1970, 
the growth rate of the elderly population has exceeded the growth 
rate of the total population. 
A major contributor to rapid aging in Malaysia is increased life expec-
tancy. Between 1970 and 2005, life expectancy at birth increased by 
10 years for both males and females (Department of Statistics [DOS] 
2010). In 2005, life expectancy at age 60, the relevant age for pension 
analysis, was 17 additional years for male, and 20 for females (United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] 2010). 
The number of elderly females has exceeded that of males since 1980, 
and the differential is expected to widen (DOS 2010). 
Between 2010 and 2050, the percentage of persons older than 80 will 
more than triple, and the ratio of working-age persons to the elderly 
will decline from 13.6 in 2010 to 4.3 in 2050, a drop of more than 
two thirds (Table 5.1). As the current pension system does not have 
adequate arrangements for managing longevity and inflation risks or 
survivors’ benefits, sustainability and fairness need to be addressed. 
Third, Malaysia’s economic growth has necessitated substantial 
reliance on foreign workers. According to official estimates, in 
2009 Malaysia had about 1.18 million of them which represented 
nearly 9.8% of the total labor force. More than half were from 
neighboring Indonesia (Sani 2010).4 foreign workers are not required 
4 Malaysia introduced an annual levy on foreign workers in 1992 that varies by 
sectors with construction and manufacturing attracting much higher levies than 
plantations and domestic workers. In 2009, this ranged from 360 to 1,800 
Malaysian ringgit. The levy is not applicable to foreign professionals.
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to contribute to the national Employees’ Provident fund (EPf),5 but 
they are, however, included under the workman’s compensation 
scheme of the Social Security Organization (SOCSO).
Malaysia’s total labor force in 2009 was 11.32 million with a labor 
force participation rate (LfPR) of 62.9%. The LfPR for males was 
78.4% and for females was 46.4%. The relatively low LfPR for females 
suggests that as a group they are unlikely to accumulate sufficient 
retirement savings from their labor incomes. The LfPR for women 
aged 60 to 64 was 36.7% in 2008 compared with 62.6% for the 
total labor force. This is significant because the elderly are increas-
ingly female and their life expectancy continues to rise, but they 
will have inadequate resources in retirement given current pension 
arrangements. Increasing resources for them is essential. 
fourth, Malaysia has relied primarily on a single-tier retirement 
financing system involving mandatory savings administered by 
the EPf. With increasing longevity, relying on savings from income 
during the working years to finance retirement that in some cases 
may exceed the length of time spent in the labor force has become 
increasingly untenable for a significant proportion of the population. 
fifth, the expectations of policy makers in Malaysia have been that 
longer working lives will significantly contribute to retirement income 
security even while relying primarily on mandatory savings, but 
age-specific LfPRs do not support this assumption. Malaysia’s LfPR 
of 62.9% in 2009 was higher than Japan’s (60%) and the Republic 
of Korea’s (61%) and lower than Canada’s (67%) and Singapore’s 
(65%), but the LfPR of people aged 60 to 64 declined from 51% in 
1975 to 44% in 1990 to 37% in 2008 (Ong and Hamid 2010). This 
pattern holds true for those aged 65 to 69.
The Current System
Malaysia’s pension system does not have a unified structure that is 
applicable to both public and private sector workers; instead, there 
5 There was a brief period during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis when an 
attempt was made to require foreign workers to contribute to the EPf. 
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are several schemes with different designs, each targeted at specific 
groups. There is some overlap but it is not a well-integrated system 
as the schemes operate essentially independently of each other. The 
scheme for private sector workers relies on mandatory savings.
Employees’ Provident Fund
The EPf is among the oldest national provident funds globally. It is a 
defined-contribution, mandatory plan for employees and employers 
based on a prescribed rate of contributions accumulated as savings in 
a personal account. Employers with even one employee are required 
to contribute. from 1952 to 1975, the standard contribution rate 
was 10% of wages (5 % each from the employer and the employee) 
with no ceiling. In a series of steps, it reached 23% (12% from the 
employer and 11% from the employee) in January 1996. Since then, 
it has fluctuated within a narrow range. Though there is limited 
flexibility for withdrawing the balance in instalments, withdrawals 
are typically lump sums, so longevity, inflation, and survivors' benefits 
are not adequately addressed. Total EPf membership at the end of 
2009 was 12.37 million, of which 5.8 million (46.1% of the total and 
49.9% of the labor force) were actual contributors (EPf 2009). The 
number of employers covered was approaching 0.5 million in 2009.
Gross contributions are channelled into two accounts: 70% goes into 
account I and 30% goes into account II. Account I is for retirement 
and can be withdrawn only when a member reaches 55 years though 
prior to that members can use part of it to invest in approved securi-
ties. Savings in account II can be used for housing, tertiary education, 
and health needs and can be withdrawn at age 50. Neither of these 
ages coincides with the retirement age in 2011 of 60.
Due to the country’s robust GDP, employment and wage growth, 
and to moderately high investment returns, EPf balances have grown 
rapidly from 9.1 billion Malaysian ringgit (RM) (17.1% of GDP) in 
1980 to RM180.8 billion in 2000 (57.9% of GDP) to RM375.5 billion 
in 2009 (47.5% of GDP) (EPf various years). A recent report estimates 
EPf balances at RM463.0 billion ($153 billion) which made it the fifth 
largest sovereign pension fund in the world as of October 2011.6
6 Chua, H.B. 2011. Malaysia: EPf’s omnipresence. Asia Macro Weekly. 25 November.
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Our estimates7 suggest that annual real returns averaged 3.3% per 
year from 1961 to 2009. The real rate of return fluctuated between 
2.6% from 1961 to 1980 and 4.42 % from 1980 to 1996. from 
1999 to 2009, the real rate of return was 2.8% which is lower than 
the average return for 1961 to 2009. Expectations are that it will be 
increasingly challenging to generate higher real returns unless invest-
ment management policies become more diversified and sophisti-
cated. The EPf already owns around 46% of outstanding Malaysian 
Government Securities and holds equities worth 19% of the Kuala 
Lumpur Composite Index.8 It is thus already a predominant player in 
Malaysia’s domestic financial and capital markets. 
Civil Service Pension Scheme 
Civil servants have a defined-benefit pension scheme financed fully 
from the government budget without any contributions from benefi-
ciaries. In 2008, there were 1.24 million civil servants equivalent 
to 11% of the labor force and 4% of the total population (Ong 
and Hamid 2010). The total number of civil service pensioners was 
0.53 million in 2008, about 42% of the total employed and 4.5% 
of the labor force, and pension costs were RM8.4 billion or 1.1% of 
GDP that year. If the same pension benefits had been provided to 
the rest of the labor force in 2008, total pension costs would have 
been 26.7% of GDP9 and 96% of total government expenditures.10
The retirement age for civil servants is 58 which is clearly too low 
for current life expectancy at 60. The demographic profile and life 
expectancy of civil servants may differ from population averages; 
this will need to be considered in assessing the financial and fiscal 
sustainability of the scheme.
A minimum of 10 years of service is required to be eligible for a 
pension. Benefits vary between 20% and 60% of the last basic pay 
7 Based on data from EPf (various years).
8 See footnote 6.
9 Civil servants accounted for 4.5% of the total labor force in 2008, and their 
pension costs were 1.2% of GDP; applying this ratio to the entire labor force yields 
26.7% of GDP.
10 Total government expenditure was RM196.02 billion, or 27.3% of GDP (Ministry 
of finance 2010, Bank Negara 2009).
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(which excludes allowances), depending on the length of service. 
There are provisions for survivors and for those who are injured or 
die during service. Benefits are not indexed to prices but are changed 
periodically when salaries are revised. As most civil servants are 
Malays, this system is of particular relevance to them. 
The Armed Forces Fund 
The Armed forces fund (LTAT) was established in August 1972 by 
an act of Parliament. It is mandatory for all military personnel who 
are not commissioned officers. It also serves as a voluntary savings 
scheme for all military personnel. It is a defined-contribution scheme 
at a rate of 10% of monthly salary from employees and 15% from 
the government as employer. It has disability and survivors' benefits 
while the beneficiary is on active service. The age for full withdrawal 
is 50. Compulsory non-pensionable contributors receive their retire-
ment benefit as a lump sum (inclusive of government contributions 
and annual dividends) at age 50. Those who are entitled to pensions 
receive a lump sum at age 50 (inclusive of their contributions and 
annual dividends only), while the government’s co-contribution of 
15% is transferred to a retirement fund for payment as a monthly 
pension. There is also a provision for using funds to purchase housing 
once during service. 
While membership details are not available, in 2009 the LTAT received 
member contributions of RM615.8 million and processed withdrawals 
of RM608.6 million. The fund’s total assets declined from RM10.95 
billion in 2007 to RM7.34 billion at the end of 2009. Contributions are 
invested in financial services, medium-sized and heavy industries, and 
real estate. Members annually receive an administratively determined 
nominal dividend which was 15% in 2009. 
Social Security Organization 
Unlike the EPf, the Employees Social Security Act of 1969 is based 
on social insurance principles. It operates the Employment Injury 
Insurance Scheme and the Pension Scheme for Invalids. The former 
provides medical, disability, death, and rehabilitation benefits for 
workers injured on the job while the latter provides coverage for 
people who become invalids or who die due to any cause. SOCSO 
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also provides a pension for spouses on the death of actively employed 
beneficiaries younger than 55. 
SOCSO covers workers earning less than RM3,000 a month and 
is financed by contributions from both employees and employers. 
Once employees are covered, they continue to be covered even if 
their salaries exceed RM3,000. The rate of contribution for the injury 
scheme is 1% from the employer and 0.5% from the employee. 
Membership in SOCSO has been increasing since its inception in 
1975, and in 2009, it reached 5.3 million active members (48% of 
the labor force).
Social Pensions 
Malaysia’s Department of Social Welfare provides a monthly pension 
of RM300 to people older than 60 who are destitute, infirm, and 
have no next of kin. In 2009, there were fewer than 40,000 recipients 
who received only RM1,900 a year—much less than the legislated 
amount and lower than the poverty line of RM720 per month that 
year (Othman 2010). The narrowly defined eligibility restricts coverage; 
urban areas have better access to benefits (Ong and Hamid 2010). 
Suggestions for Reform
Fairness
The broader fairness issues concern the different pension arrange-
ments for those in the public and private sectors; the absence of 
social insurance principles in managing longevity, inflation, and survi-
vors' benefits during retirement; and the extremely limited public 
assistance to destitute, infirm elderly. The nearly exclusive reliance on 
a mandatory saving system based on wages will perpetuate inequali-
ties in retirement unless social risk pooling is introduced.  Inequalities 
may in fact even grow as the current arrangements provide very 
limited opportunities for retirees to participate in Malaysia’s economic 
growth as the country progresses to higher income levels. 
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Different Pension Provisions 
The differences in the designs of the pension schemes for private 
sector workers and for military and civil service personnel have 
significant implications for fairness. At the end of 2009, the EPf 
controlled assets of RM375 billion and paid a dividend of 5.7% to 
members while the LTAT controlled assets of RM7.52 billion and paid 
a dividend of 15%. 
EPf beneficiaries receive a lump sum at the final withdrawal age of 
55. Annuitization is not required though this option can be chosen 
voluntarily. The annuity markets in Malaysia, however, are not well 
developed due to limitations in matching long-term assets and liabili-
ties, particularly as longevity is expected to increase. EPf members 
therefore are required to use their savings to finance retirement 
for increasingly longer periods. This arrangement does not address 
longevity, inflation, or survivors' benefits. Pensions to civil servants, 
on the other hand, are paid for life, benefits are adjusted periodically, 
and there are benefits for survivors. 
Taxes 
Taxes on pension schemes in Malaysia are complex and raise many 
fairness issues. Employees can deduct up to RM6,000 annually 
from their incomes for contributions to provident funds and to life 
 insurance premiums combined. This limits implicit subsidies which 
vary positively with the marginal income tax rates, ranging from 
1% to 26% in 2010. When tax-advantaged EPf contributions are 
withdrawn in a relatively short period, the effectiveness of subsidies 
for retirement savings diminishes. In any case, the number of income 
taxpayers is relatively small in relation to the size of the labor force.11 
In addition, there is considerable variation in taxes on providers of 
pension-like products. for example, under Section 150 of the Income 
Tax Act of 1967, approved funded occupational schemes are not 
taxed subject to investment restrictions, but approved insurance 
schemes are treated differently. The life insurance fund is taxed at 
8% and is subject to charges under the risk-based capital framework 
11 In 2010, 21.3% of the total labor force paid taxes on wage income. There were 
6.4 million registered taxpayers, but, only 2.4 million of them paid taxes. (http://
thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?sec=nation&file=/2010/5/1/nation/6173469) 
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(Othman 2010). This creates an uneven playing field for providers 
and needs to be addressed.
Proposed Tax on Goods and Services 
Taxing services could burden the elderly because if international 
experience holds true, it is likely to increase the cost of living on a 
one-time basis by the differential between current sales tax rates 
and the proposed tax (Ebrill et al. 2001, Bird and Gendron 2007). 
As relatively lower income individuals are likely to hold larger shares 
of their financial wealth in the EPf, they may be disproportionately 
affected. The real value of social pensions in Malaysia could erode 
unless the level of benefits is adjusted. 
Sustainability 
financial sustainability in pension systems usually refers to matching 
long-term assets with liabilities. If projected liabilities are greater 
than projected assets, the only feasible options are reducing benefits, 
increasing contributions, improving returns on investments, obtaining 
funds from taxpayers on a long-term basis, or various combinations 
of all four. financial sustainability must, however, be distinguished 
from economic and social sustainability. Economic sustainability is 
the capacity of the economy to finance projected liabilities without 
sacrificing economic growth or other priorities. In this context, the 
most important macroeconomic variable is the long-term trend in 
economic growth as in the absence of growth, sharing available 
resources between the young and the elderly could become conten-
tious and potentially affect social stability.
In defined-contribution systems such as the EPf and the LTAT, the contri-
butions become the liabilities. Therefore, unlike the defined-benefit civil 
service scheme, matching assets with liabilities is not relevant. Sustain-
ability in defined-contribution systems instead must address adequacy 
of payments and of coverage as with rising incomes and expectations, 
the population may require more to provide security in retirement. 
Coverage 
The EPf currently covers around half the labor force, nearly all of 
whom are citizens. This is a significant increase from 35% in 1986 
(Asher 1994). The civil service and armed forces plans combined cover 
about 13%. While there is likely to be minor overlapping between 
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EPf and civil servants, there is substantial overlapping between EPf 
and SOCSO. There are some occupational schemes, including in state 
enterprises and state financial institutions such as Bank Negara, but 
membership is small. This leaves about 15% to 18% of the citizen 
labor force (20% is foreign) not formally covered by any pension 
scheme though some may invest in the financial and capital markets 
to finance retirement. 
Adequacy 
Civil servants and the armed forces are likely to fare better in terms 
of adequacy than private sector workers. The average savings of 
EPf members is only 1.2 times per capita income. Of the active 
members, 87% of the men and 90% of the women had balances of 
less than RM100,000 in 2009 while 2.3% of men and 1% of women 
had balances above RM300,000. The total savings were unequally 
distributed. Of members with balances of less than RM100,000, 
73.2% were less than RM50,000 and constituted less than a quarter 
of total savings. In contrast, 11.8% of active contributors accounted 
for 53.2% of total savings in 2009 (EPf 2009). This reflects large 
wage disparities and leads low wage earners to withdraw sums prior 
to retirement.
In a simulation study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), net replacement rates for the EPf, assum-
ing no pre-retirement withdrawals, were estimated at 34.9% for the 
median male earner and 31.1% for the median female earner (OECD/
World Bank 2011). This falls far short of the international benchmark 
of 66% from all income sources. The actual replacement rate is even 
lower due to high numbers of pre-retirement withdrawals that were 
not included in the OECD estimates. 
EPf pay-outs are therefore not adequate for most of its members. 
Median balances of less than 2 years of per capita income in 2009 
will not finance retirement when life expectancy at age 60 in 2005 
was 17 years for men and 20 years for women. In fact, it is estimated 
that about 70% of retirees exhaust their EPf pay-outs within 10 years 
(Othman 2010). Again, the EPf is not designed to address longevity, 
inflation, or survivors' benefits, but there are no other complementary 
schemes like social pensions to help sustain even modest replace-
ment rates for the elderly in Malaysia. 
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Given the currently very restrictive nature of social pensions, poor 
people not covered by any pension scheme are likely to have 
grossly inadequate retirement incomes. Broadening the eligibility 
for receiving social pensions and increasing the monthly payment 
could improve adequacy for the low-income elderly. Othman 
(2010) estimates that if all poor senior citizens were paid RM720 
per month—the official poverty line—the gross budgetary cost will 
be RM1.6 billion, equivalent to 0.23% of 2009 GDP. The number of 
beneficiaries was estimated at 185,200, 14% of those were older 
than 65 in 2010. If a similar benefit were provided to all elderly, the 
total cost would be RM11.7 billion or 1.7% of GDP. This appears to 
be fiscally feasible. The key constraint will be to devise cost-efficient 
delivery mechanisms. As the relative incidence of poverty is higher 
among the bumiputra,12 expanding social assistance would especially 
benefit them. 
Conclusions
If Malaysia is to become a developed economy by 2020, reforming the 
current pension system to improve fairness and sustainability should 
be accorded high priority. This is recognized by policy makers, but 
specific reform measures need to be articulated. The country needs 
an integrated pension system that includes publicly financed social 
pensions and better management of longevity, inflation, and survivors' 
benefits, particularly for private sector workers under the EPf. The 
differential treatment accorded public and private sector workers also 
needs to be addressed. This will require reforming the noncontribu-
tory civil service pensions. Trends in longevity, morbidity, and mortality 
must be taken into account in designing future pension systems. 
These reforms will make Malaysia’s pension system consistent 
with the aims of the NEM and will facilitate its emergence as a 
high-income, developed country. Malaysia has both the fiscal and 
institutional capacity to enhance the fairness and sustainability of the 
pension system. Public policy dialogue could be useful in developing 
the consensus necessary for effective reforms. 
12 In 2007, the overall incidence of poverty in Malaysia was 3.6% while for the 
bumiputra community it was 5.1% (National Economic Advisory Council 2010).
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Abstract
The Philippine pension system is primarily a defined-benefit scheme. 
The Social Security System (SSS) is mandatory for private sector 
workers, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is mandatory 
for public sector workers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Retirement Service Benefit System is required for the military. Together, 
they cover about 79% of the labor force and 28% of the population 
aged 60 and older. The GSIS program generally offers better benefits 
than the SSS as reflected in the gap between their replacement 
rates, but in both the rates are much higher than the best practice 
targets of 40% to 50% which make the programs unsustainable as 
the population ages. Removing the wage ceiling for GSIS members in 
2003 exacerbated the gap, and short-term salary averaging is another 
source of perverse redistribution. The large discrepancy between the 
contribution rate of the GSIS (21%) and the SSS (10.4%) reflects the 
significant imbalance between contributions and benefits in the SSS. 
This accounts for its shorter fund life (2031) compared to that of the 
GSIS (2055). In addition, both programs are administered and amended 
by GSIS members which could result in bias. The significant disparities 
between the SSS and GSIS test the fairness and sustainability of the 
entire system for present and future retirees. To preserve the pension 
system, the government should consider raising the retirement age, 
increasing contributions, combining the two programs, gradually 
shifting to a defined-contribution system, and expanding the economy 
although the current population growth rate of 2%, one of the highest 
in Asia, will make sustained economic growth a challenge. 
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* Independent Consultant, Actuary and fellow of the Actuarial Society of the 
Philippines (reyesernie@yahoo.com) 
 The Philippines 67
Overview
The defined-benefit system—the major component of the four-tiered 
Philippine pension system1—includes programs administered by the 
Social Security System (SSS) for private sector workers, the Govern-
ment Service Insurance System (GSIS) for public sector workers, and 
the Armed forces of the Philippines Retirement Service Benefit System 
for the military. Together they cover about 79% of the labor force 
and 28% of the population aged 60 and older. 
Defined-benefit systems are sensitive to demographic changes. With 
its median age of 22.5 years, the Philippine population may not be 
aging as rapidly as populations in other Asian countries, but the 
population growth rate of 2% will exert pressure on the government 
to increase its implicit public debt (Holzmann et al. 2000).2 Estimates 
for 1999/2000 showed that implicit public debt as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) for the Philippines was much higher 
than its explicit debt while spending for pensions was only 1% of 
GDP that year (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Philippine Public Debt as a Share of  
Gross Domestic Product (%), 1999/2000
Public  
debt
Pension  
spending
Implicit public debt by discount rate 
2% 4% 5%
71 1 185 107 81
Source: Carmichael and Palacios (2003).
The mandatory defined-benefit programs in the Philippines were 
created by separate laws and are administered by separate, 
government-run pension institutions. This has caused differences in 
1 The four tiers or pillars are (1) the social assistance pillar, (2) the mandatory 
defined-benefit pillar, (3) the mandatory defined-contribution pillar, and (4) the 
voluntary/supplementary pillar. The SSS, GSIS and the armed forces plan belong 
to the defined-benefit pillar. 
2 Implicit public debt is the present value of the payment stream that the pension 
scheme will have to pay current participants and their survivors for the contributions 
made up to the current date, provided the rules of the scheme stay the same.
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both design and implementation that have raised concerns about 
fairness and sustainability. The existing small and less-developed 
defined-contribution programs are not as affected as contributions 
and benefits are linked.
Some of the design features of the private sector SSS and public 
sector GSIS programs that are relevant to these concerns are enumer-
ated in Table 6.2. They could also apply to the military program. 
Table 6.2 Design Features of the Mandatory  
Defined-Benefit Programs
Private sector (SSS) Public sector (GSIS)
Optional retirement age 60 60
Mandatory retirement age 65 65
Benefit formula
 flat benefit
 Accumulation factor
 Benefit limits
P300
2%(AMSC)
40% of AMSC
Not applicable 
2.5%(AMC+P700)
90% AMC Maximum
Salary averaging method 5-year average 3-year average
Contribution rates
 Employer
 Employee
10.40%
7.07%
3.33%
21.0%
12.0%
9.0%
Ceilings on salary credits P15,0003 No ceiling
Minimum service requirements 10 years 15 years
Minimum salary eligibility P1,000/month Minimum wage 
Coverage of survivors Available Available
Compliance rate 31% Higher but data not 
available
Coverage (labor force aged 15–59) 75% of labor force 4% of labor force
Coverage (elderly aged 60+) 23% 1%
Sustainability 2031 2055
Portability Limited Limited
Investment in member loans Maximum 10% Minimum 40%
AMC = average monthly compensation in Philippine pesos; AMSC = average monthly 
salary credit.
Sources: Actuarial Society of the Philippines; Author's compilation. 
3 Average exchange rates for US$1: 2007, P46.1484; 2008, P44.4746; 2009, 
P47.6372. Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, Current Labor Statistics.
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Awareness of these discrepancies and of their implications will 
hopefully lead to steps to improve the sustainability and equity of the 
pension system. 
The Current System
Fairness
Pension programs involve transfers of resources between various 
classes of workers and pensioners, both within and across genera-
tions. The way these transfers are implemented and are influenced by 
demographic and economic factors have an impact on their accept-
ability and sustainability. The significant disparities in the Philippine 
pension system challenge both its equity and sustainability, and 
the effects of these disparities will spill over into the future as new 
generations of members4 flow through the system.
Inter-generational equity refers to how the burden on the older gener-
ation is passed on to the younger generation. One point of view is that 
if the old benefit at the expense of the young, it may merely be because 
different ages have different needs. As every cohort ages, it is subject 
to both benefits and taxes; thus there will be inter-generational equity 
as long as the allocation of public resources is not changed over their 
life course (Carmichael and Palacios 2003). The following standards 
for inter-generational equity were considered (Rydell 2005):
•	 allocating social spending at any given moment between 
younger and older people;
•	 just treatment for successive cohorts, e.g., ensuring that 
tomorrow’s retirees get pensions equivalent to current 
pensions; 
•	 sharing costs of the welfare system equally among cohorts; and
•	 just returns for contributions made during a lifetime.
Benefit Formulas Are Not Harmonized 
The GSIS program generally offers better benefits than the SSS as 
reflected in the gap between their replacement rates (Table 6.3). 
4 Refers to both covered active workers and pensioners.
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Achieving the redistribution objective is very evident in the case of 
the SSS. The greater the weight given to the flat benefit component 
compared to the earnings accumulation component, the greater 
the degree of redistribution. The SSS benefit formula implements 
this through the Philippine peso (P)300 flat benefit. for the GSIS, 
incorporating P700 in the accumulation component did not have 
the same effect. In some countries, the flat component is related to 
the nationwide average wage which is self-adjusting.
Lifting the monthly salary ceiling in the GSIS plan in 2003 from the 
original P16,000 also resulted in an abrupt increase in the replace-
ment rate of its high earners relative to the nationwide average. 
Private sector workers could resent funding the generous pensions 
of their public sector counterparts with their taxes. 
Replacement Rates are High
The replacement rates shown in Table 6.3 are much higher than the 
best practice target rates of around 40% to 50% for the average 
worker. for the GSIS, the replacement rates relative to the nation-
wide average shoot up even for wage levels exceeding the original 
ceiling of P16,000. These high replacement rates make the programs 
unsustainable as the population ages and are also not in line with the 
pension system’s key objectives, e.g., ameliorating old-age poverty, 
and constraints, e.g., the need to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. 
The ceiling on monthly salary credits remained at P15,000 for SSS 
but it has been the actual salary for GSIS since 2003. Thus private 
sector workers’ benefits are limited compared with those of their 
GSIS counterparts in the high-wage brackets who also benefit from 
additional government contributions. In addition, lifting the ceiling 
did not change conditions for the low-wage earners in the public 
sector (less than P16,000) but instead benefited only a few high-
wage earners. This resulted in perverse redistribution, a concern 
raised in an opinion column by a former vice-president of the GSIS.
We see today a GSIS pension program that allows a great disparity in 
the pensions of the rich who can afford the luxury of a Mercedez Benz, 
a BMW, condominium units, and travels abroad from a month’s social 
pension when the poor rank and file employee could not even buy his 
decent three meals a day much less the medicines that he needs from 
his measly monthly pension.5
5 Philippine Star. 2011. GSIS: The Need to Reform. 7 April. 
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Table 6.4 shows the aggregate effect of the discrepancy between the 
P15,000 ceiling of the SSS and the absence of a ceiling in the GSIS 
after 2003. Since 2000, the GSIS has increased its monthly pension 
benefit by as much as 84% (GSIS 2008).
Equity demands that workers in the same class receive the same 
pension benefit package in both the public and private sectors. The 
benefits have to be based on very basic requirements to ensure the 
sustainability of the pension fund while satisfying the social require-
ments of the majority who are in need. 
Salary Averaging for Computing Benefits is Short Term
The salary basis used for benefit computations is either the 3-year 
average or the 5-year average as opposed to the lifetime average 
used in other countries. Under the Armed forces program, the basis 
is the final salary of the next higher rank at retirement. This short-
term salary averaging is another source of perverse redistribution. 
Wage increases in the last few years of employment are generally 
steeper for high-income groups and could be abused through 
increases in salaries or promotions near retirement age. These abrupt 
increases in pension benefits have not been sufficiently funded from 
past contributions. Smoothing them out over the working lifetime of 
the employee will minimize this discrepancy. The effect of the shift 
from the current 5-year to lifetime averaging on the SSS program is 
illustrated in Table 6.5.
Table 6.4 Social Security System and Government Social 
Insurance System Pensioner Data
Year
SSS: Pensioners and Average Pension
GSIS Average 
Pension
Male Female
Total 
Number
Average 
Monthly 
Pension (P)
Average 
Monthly 
Pension (P)
2007 534,806 714,385 1,249,191 2,962 7,200 
2008 572,246 757,977 1,330,223 3,109 7,800 
2009 610,872 803,201 1,414,073 3,080 n.a. 
n.a. = data not available.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Actuarial Department of SSS and from 
GSIS Annual Reports.
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Using lifetime averaging, the replacement rate for the average worker 
drops from 78.1% of covered wage to 52.6%, which is closer to the 
best practice target replacement rate of around 40% to 50%. The 
lifetime averaging method is also more equitable as it is aligned 
with the source of contributions—the actual salaries received at each 
point in the member’s working lifetime.
Compliance Rates are Low
With the already high benefit-to-contribution ratio of the SSS, 
greater increases in contribution rates would be required to sustain 
the pension program if no improvement is made on the current 
compliance rate of 31%. The uneven burden for maintaining the 
benefit-contribution balance in the fund will be carried by the 
contributing members only.
Social Assistance and Social Insurance Overlap
Under the contributory program, the SSS covers workers earning at 
least P1,000/month (P12,000 per annum), but the annual poverty 
threshold in the Philippines in 2006 was P15,057. Workers earning 
P1,000/month could receive pensions of P1,200/month for 10 years 
of service or P2,400/month for 20 years of service which is more than 
their salaries while actively working. This segment falls below both the 
poverty line and the minimum wage threshold and may properly be 
Table 6.5 Estimated Replacement Rates under Different  
Averaging Methods (%)
I. SSS pensions computed on 5-year average salary prior to retirement 
Salary as % of  
nationwide 
average 
25.00 50.00 100.00 125.00 200.00 300.00
 Actual 120.42 79.34 78.07 77.82 72.89 48.59
 Covered 120.42 79.34 78.07 77.82 77.48 77.48
II. SSS pensions computed on lifetime average salary 
Salary as % of  
nationwide 
average
25.00 50.00 100.00 125.00 200.00 300.00
 Actual 120.42 60.21 52.61 52.36 48.94 32.63
 Covered 120.42 60.21 52.61 52.36 52.02 52.02
Source: Author’s projection model.
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offloaded to the social assistance program and financed from general 
revenues. The responsibility for this segment is everyone’s concern and 
should not be shouldered solely by private sector workers.
Contribution Rates are Different
The large discrepancy between the contribution rate of the GSIS (21%) 
and the SSS (10.4%) reflects the significant imbalance between contri-
butions and benefits in the SSS. This accounts for its shorter fund life 
(2031) compared to that of the GSIS (2055). The longer this imbalance 
continues, the greater the burden to be passed on to future genera-
tions of contributors as greater increases in contribution rates will be 
required to catch up with ever growing pension payments.
Administration is Public Sector for Both
Both the public sector and private sector programs are adminis-
tered by separate government-run pension institutions; however, the 
administrators of these institutions, as well as the legislators who 
created and amend the programs, are covered by the public sector 
program. This could result in preferential treatment for the GSIS that 
could be eliminated if the programs were combined. 
Sustainability 
The aging of the population has a major impact on the sustainability 
of pension plans. The demographic characteristics of the Philippines 
are therefore an important part of any discussion on sustainability. 
The dependency ratio—the ratio of the elderly (age 60 and older) to 
the active labor force (ages 15–59)—is used to illustrate the effect 
of demographics on the Philippine pension system.
Retirement Ages are Low 
Decreases in fertility rates combined with increases in life expectancy will 
age the Philippine population. figure 6.1 shows the projected shift in 
the age distribution to higher ages that will increase the burden on the 
current labor force for supporting the aged. If this trend continues, the 
top heavy structure may eventually result in the collapse of the system. 
The current programs allow early retirement at age 60 and 
mandatory retirement at age 65 with 10 years of service under 
the SSS and 15 years under the GSIS. When workers opt for early 
retirement, the effects are two-fold: fewer contributions to the fund 
and longer pay-out periods. The pay-out period is further extended 
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Figure 6.2: Life Expectancies for Elderly Filipinos  
at Various Ages
Source: Global Health Comparison Index. 
5
10
15
20
25
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Life expectancy (years)
Age
Male Female
with survivor’s benefits for male retirees as females have longer life 
expectancies (figure 6.2). 
Raising the retirement age is an option for improving the sustain-
ability of the program by reducing the current imbalance between 
contributions and benefits. The effects of changing the retirement 
age from 60 to 65 and to 70 under the SSS are simulated for males 
and females in Table 6.6. 
Figure 6.1: Comparative Age Distribution of the Philippine 
Population in 2010 and 2050
Source: United Nations Population Division (2010). 
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Table 6.6 Coverage for a Private Sector Worker Entering the 
Labor Force at Age 20, and Retiring at 60, 65, and 70
I. Case A: Retirement at age 60 with 40 years of service
Male: life expectancy 
=18.4
female: life expectancy 
=22.0
Wage class 50% 100% 200% 50% 100% 200%
Benefits/
contribution
1.71 1.69 1.67 1.94 1.91 1.90 
PV benefits/actual 
wage
10.27 10.11 9.44 11.63 11.44 10.68 
PV benefits/
covered wage  10.27 10.11 10.03 11.63 11.44 11.35 
II. Case B: Retirement at age 65 with 45 years of service
Male: life expectancy 
=15.1
female: life expectancy 
=18.1
Wage class 50% 100% 200% 50% 100% 200%
Benefits/
contribution
1.48 1.46 1.45 1.69 1.67 1.65 
PV benefits/actual 
wage
8.87 8.73 8.15 10.15 9.99 9.33 
PV benefits/
covered wage  8.87 8.73 8.67 10.15 9.99 9.91 
III. Case B: Retirement at age 70 with 50 years of service
Male: life expectancy 
=12.2
female: life expectancy 
=14.5
Wage class 50% 100% 200% 50% 100% 200%
Benefits/
contribution
1.25 1.23 1.22 1.44 1.41 1.40 
PV benefits/actual 
wage
7.51 7.39 6.90 8.60 8.46 7.90 
PV benefits/
covered wage  7.51 7.39 7.33 8.60 8.46 8.40 
PV = present value 
Source: Author’s projection model.
Note that workers retiring earlier get higher returns on their 
contributions compared with those who defer retirement, so it may 
be more equitable to factor in an actuarial adjustment factor for 
early retirement. 
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Changes in dependency ratios under the following assumptions 
are plotted in figure 6.3 based on the United Nations Population 
Division’s projections for the Philippines from 2010 to 2050:
•	 Retirement age 60: workers 15–59 support the elderly aged 
60 and older
•	 Retirement age 65: workers 15–64 support the elderly aged 
65 and older
Figure 6.3 Comparative Old-Age Dependency Ratios  
at Ages 60 and 65 
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Source: United Nations Population Division (2010). 
As shown in Table 6.6, the benefit-to-contribution ratio decreases with 
increases in retirement age. figure 6.3 additionally shows that the 
dependency ratio is reduced if everybody retires at age 65 rather than 
at age 60. Implementing the change in 2010 would have reduced the 
dependency ratio from 11% to 7% and in 2050 would reduce it from 
29% to 19%. The burden on the working-age group would thus have 
been reduced by 36% in 2010 and by 34% in 2050 compared to what 
it would have been if the retirement age were still 60.
Gender Considerations
The trend in the age-sex distribution of the Philippine population 
projected to 2050 (figure 6.4) also shows the increasing number of 
elderly females who will outlive their male counterparts. 
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Figure 6.4 Projected Age-sex Distribution of the Philippine 
Population in 2010 and 2050
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Source: United Nations Population Division (2010). 
The longer life expectancies of females in 2009 shown in figure 6.2 
are expected to increase in line with the historical trend in figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Historical Data on Life Expectancy at Birth  
in the Philippines
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Source: Global Health Comparison Index.
Effects of Population Aging and the Economy on the  
Pension System 
The sustainability of a pension system depends on balancing contribu-
tions with benefit payments. The following formula relates the effect 
of the dependency ratio and the other pension parameters influenced 
by the economy (e.g., GDP, inflation rate, and labor productivity) to the 
required contribution under a pay-as-you-go system. While it may not 
apply to the partially-funded defined-benefit programs in the Philippines 
unless the reserves run out, it illustrates the importance of developing a 
strong economy to mitigate the effects of aging on pension programs. 
C = required contribution rate = (Pave x NP60+) /  
(Wave x NC15–59 ) = B x D
where
Pave = average monthly pension
Wave = average monthly wage
NP60+ = number of current pensioners aged 60 and older
NC15–59 = number of current workers/contributors aged 15–59
B = Pave / Wave   
D = dependency ratio = NP60+ / NC15–59
It is noted that:
a) The ratios change each year with changes in demographics, 
economic conditions, and reforms implemented. Given the 
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increasing dependency ratios in (D), economic and reform 
measures that result in greater increases in average wages 
and smaller increases in average pensions will reduce (B) and 
assist in maintaining an acceptable required contribution rate.
b) A pension system with pay-as-you-go financing will result in 
each successive generation obtaining lower rates of return on 
their contributions to the scheme.
Projections by Standard & Poor’s indicate that economic improve-
ments alone may not be able to stabilize pension spending as a 
percentage of GDP without corresponding reforms in place. Under 
its base scenario of no change in current arrangements, the pension 
spending of selected Asian countries as a percentage of GDP from 
2010 to 2050 is shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 Pension Spending and Real Gross Domestic  
Product Growth (%)
Country
Pension Spending as a 
Percentage of GDP Real GDP Growth
2010e 2050f
Change 
2010e–2050f 2010e 2050f
Average 
2010e–2050f
PRC 2.2 2.6 0.4 9.8 2.4 4.4
Indonesia 0.9 2.1 1.2 6.0 4.4 4.9
Republic of 
Korea
0.6 4.4 3.8 5.0 5.0 2.0
Malaysia 2.9 5.6 2.7 6.0 3.0 4.1
Philippines 1.1 2.0 0.9 3.7 4.8 5.1
e = estimate; f = projected; PRC = People's Republic of China.
Source: Standard & Poor’s (2010). 
The government can deal with future imbalances in pension programs 
through structural reforms aimed at increasing economic growth 
and raising employment levels for older workers and through 
substantial reforms to the social assistance program that go well 
beyond current initiatives.
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Suggestions for Reform
Reduce Benefits
This could be done by modifying the benefit formula to achieve 
replacement rates of 40% to 50% and could include the following 
measures: 
•	 Change the weighting of the flat and accumulation compo-
nents to increase redistributive effects. 
•	 Shift to lifetime averaging. 
•	 Reintroduce a ceiling in the public sector program. 
•	 Include actuarial adjustments for early retirement to preserve 
equity.
Constraints 
a) There may be legal impediments to reducing vested benefits, 
but modifying future benefits can be done while recognizing 
credits earned in the past. 
b) If pension benefits decrease, supplementary programs will 
be needed for those with extra resources to save. Alternative 
savings plans have to be developed and regulated to protect 
workers who may outlive their reduced benefits. 
c) The shift to lifetime averaging would require a complete salary 
history for workers which may not be available in the database 
of the two pension institutions. Gradual increases in the 
number of years used for averaging may be more manageable 
as the databases are populated.
Raise the Retirement Age 
Senate Bill No. 2797 increasing the mandatory retirement age 
for government workers from 65 to 706 has been recently filed in 
congress. for consistency, a corresponding bill applying to the private 
sector program should also be filed. 
6  Philippine Daily Inquirer. 5 July 2011.
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Constraints 
The country must be prepared to deal with the resulting increase 
in the labor force. Uncertainty about the continuing deployment of 
filipino workers overseas due to global economic developments adds 
to this concern as there are not enough job opportunities at home. 
Increase Contributions 
This will reduce the gap between contributions and benefits, 
especially at the SSS, and will minimize the necessity to impose 
large increases on later generations of workers. Modifying benefits 
to cover only basic requirements will help to keep the contribu-
tion rates at acceptable levels while extending the sustainability of 
the programs.
Constraints
a) Initiatives to increase contributions always face stiff resistance, 
especially in a democratic country like the Philippines with 
a well-organized labor force. The last 1% increase in SSS 
contributions, which was not enough, was passed entirely 
to employers. The chair of the SSS has already announced a 
plan to increase the 10.4% contribution to 11% with the 0.6 
percentage points shared equally by the employer and worker. 
Monthly salary credits will also be increased to P20,000.7
b) Private sector employers have limited ability to absorb higher 
contributions as they could raise the cost of doing business 
and reduce competitiveness. This is not the case for govern-
ment with its power to tax. The high cost of doing business 
could cause private businesses to relocate and could increase 
the informal economy.
Combine the Social Security System and the Government 
Service Insurance System
This will remove the current inequities between the two programs, 
and any savings for the government could be channeled to social 
assistance programs. This could also involve offloading non-pension 
7 Manila Bulletin. 20 April 2011.
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related activities such as the non-life insurance operations of the GSIS 
or the social assistance coverage of the SSS.
Constraints
a) There may be a natural bias toward keeping the two programs 
separate and maintaining the superiority of the GSIS. The gap 
is quite wide; it will take some time to narrow it. 
b) Legislation is required, and the more extensive the change in 
the law, the longer it takes to amend it. 
c) Adjustments in operating systems are needed to fully integrate 
the two programs.
Shift to a Defined-Contribution System 
The defined-contribution, fully-funded element of the Philippine 
pension system is quite small. The trend worldwide is, however, 
toward larger defined-contribution programs as they are the more 
equitable and sustainable option. 
Improve the Economy
The government could provide an economic, investment, and regula-
tory environment that promotes the growth and sustainability of 
the pension programs equitably and helps to mitigate the effects 
of population aging. A regulator could be created to oversee the 
entire system and correct the disparities that challenge its fairness 
and sustainability. 
Constraints 
a) With the growing urgency to address the financial implica-
tions of population aging and to raise employment levels and 
increase economic growth, structural reforms on the current 
pension system would have a more immediate impact on 
promoting fairness and sustainability.
b) It will take greater sustained economic growth to alleviate 
poverty given the population growth rate of 2%, one of the 
highest in Asia. Slow economic growth, uncertainties over 
domestic and overseas employment, and lack of political will 
to advance reforms in the pension system could slow down 
initiatives to correct existing disparities. 
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c) Initiatives to promote equity and sustainability will affect 
benefits currently enjoyed by workers. Reductions in benefits 
may not be unfair, however, if applied consistently to all 
classes of members. As expressed by Philip Coogan, the issue 
is: “Nobody seriously disputes that employees should keep the 
pension rights they have accrued so far, although they may 
receive the benefits later; the battle is over whether employees 
should be allowed to keep accruing the same perks in the 
future" (Coogan 2011). 
Mukul G. Asher* and Azad Singh Bali**
Abstract
Singapore’s single-tier, defined-contribution pension system is 
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of workers, the lack of social risk pooling, and the absence of pension 
arrangements for foreign workers. Broad directions for promoting 
fairness and sustainability are fairly clear: (i) using more social insurance 
principles and social risk pooling instruments such as social pensions; 
(ii) reforming the investment policies of the CPF by bringing them 
more in line with the military’s SAVER Plan; and (iii) improving the 
design of the CPF to promote fairness. The government has both the 
financial and administrative capacity to do this but has instead placed 
disproportionate importance on achieving high economic growth 
while not taking sufficient account of the negative implications on 
social protection. In the 2011 general election, nearly 40% of the 
electorate voted for opposition candidates. This could be interpreted 
as an urgent need for a more balanced approach to economic growth 
and social protection.
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Overview
The city-state of Singapore has evolved from a lower-middle income 
country to a high-income country in just 4 decades. Its business 
location strategy has benefited from global trade, technologies, 
investments, and human resource flows. The main elements of its 
strategy are (i) keeping wage goods (including housing) affordable 
for the average worker; (ii) constantly upgrading infrastructure and 
human resources; (iii) maintaining low transaction costs and minimiz-
ing red tape; (iv) focusing on taking advantage of new opportuni-
ties and meeting possible economic challenges from neighbors and 
competitors; (v) maximizing labor market flexibility; (vi) managing 
the economy essentially as a corporation; (vii) maintaining tight 
political control with the promise of continuous improvements in 
living standards; (viii) accepting inequalities and relative poverty;1 and 
(ix) using socio-economic-political information as a strategic resource 
and not as a public good. 
The economic success of Singapore’s growth strategy is indicated by 
the increase in its gross domestic product (GDP) from $43.2 billion in 
1991 to $92.7 billion in 2000, and to $182.2 billion in 2009; and by 
the increase in per capita income from $13,800 in 1991 to $36,537 
in 2009 (World Bank 2010). Singapore’s real GDP growth, however, 
has moderated from an average of 7.6% per annum in the 1990s 
to 4.9% per annum from 2000 to 2009. Much of this growth was 
due to increases in inputs such as labor and capital with average 
annual labor productivity declining from 3.4% to 1.1% in that period 
(Vu and Monetary Authority of Singapore 2010). The official goal is 
to increase annual labor productivity to 2% or 3%. This target will 
not be easy to achieve as considerable organizational changes and 
policy reforms will be needed. 
Singapore’s economic success notwithstanding, several factors 
contribute to the need for policy makers to assign greater weight to 
1 Based on 2009 Central Provident fund (CPf) data, Mukhopadhaya and Venaik 
(2010) estimated Singapore’s Gini coefficient at 0.49. Since their estimates are 
based only on wage income derived from CPf data, the value of income-Gini will 
be higher, as capital income disproportionately accrues to higher income groups.
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the fairness and sustainability of the current pension arrangements. 
first, one of the consequences of Singapore’s growth strategy has 
been the growing number of noncitizens from 14% of the popula-
tion in 1990 to 26% in 2000 and to 36% in 2009. foreign workers 
(including professionals) constituted approximately 35% of the total 
labor force in 2009.2 The growth rate of citizens has been a fraction 
of the growth rate of noncitizens (Table 7.1). Such a trend is difficult 
to sustain in any country over the long term. 
Second, the population is expected to age rapidly in the next 
2 decades. According to the United Nations projections, the number 
of people aged 65 and older in Singapore will increase from about 
0.46 million in 2010 to 1.40 million in 2030, an increase of 207% 
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] 
2010). Life expectancy at age 65 is currently 17.4 years for men and 
20.8 years for women (Department of Statistics [DOS] 2009) and 
is also expected to rise. The ratio of working-age persons to the 
elderly will decline from 8.2 in 2010 to 2.7 in 2030 and further to 
1.7 in 2050. The median age of the resident population in 2009 was 
36.9 years; this is expected to increase to 53.7 by 2050 (DOS 2009; 
UNDESA 2010) (Table 7.2).
2 The resident labor force (permanent residents and citizens) was only 65.1 % of the 
total in 2009 (Department of Statistics 2010).
Table 7.1 Composition of Singapore’s Population  
in Selected Years
1990 2000 2009
No. 
(million)
Share 
of 
total 
Growth 
Rate
No. 
(million)
Share 
of 
total 
Growth 
Rate
No. 
(million)
Share 
of 
total 
Growth 
Rate
Population 3.05 100.0 2.3 4.02 100.0 2.8 4.99 100.0 3.1
Citizens 2.62 86.1 1.7 2.97 74.0 1.3 3.20 64.2 1.1
Permanent 
Residents 0.12 3.7 2.3 0.30 7.2 9.9 0.53 10.7 11.5
Nonresi-
dentsa 0.31 10.2 9.0 0.75 18.8 9.3 1.25 25.1 2.8
a Not citizens or permanent residents.
Source: Department of Statistics (2010).
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Table 7.2 Projections for Population Aging in Singapore
Population  
Aged 65+ 
Population  
Aged 80+ Dependency Ratio (%)
Working- 
Age/Elderly
Year (thousand) (%) (thousand) (%) (Total) (Child) (Old-age) (%)
2000 289 7.4 52 1.3 40 30 10 9.6
2010 458 9.0 90 1.8 36 24 12 8.2
2020 858 15.3 160 2.9 41 19 22 4.6
2030 1,394 23.3 297 5.0 61 23 37 2.7
2050 1,943 31.8 790 12.9 81 24 58 1.7
Source: UNDESA (2010).
Third, Singapore has relied primarily on a single-tier retirement 
financing system called the Central Provident fund (CPf) that involves 
mandatory savings administered by a national agency. With increas-
ing longevity, relying on savings during the working years to finance 
retirement, which in some cases may exceed the time spent in the 
labor force, has become increasingly untenable for a significant 
proportion of the population. Chia and Tsui (2011) have argued 
that converting housing assets into retirement income could be an 
important way to finance old age in Singapore. As CPf is the primary 
mortgage financing instrument, it would have an important role in 
such conversions. They recognize, however, that it will not be easily 
managed given the difficulties in determining prices and the market-
maker and guarantor required for the process.
fourth, the expectations of policy makers in Singapore have been 
that longer working lives will significantly contribute to retirement 
income security while still primarily relying on mandatory savings, but 
the age-specific labor force participation rate (LfPR) for males and 
females in Singapore does not support that expectation. Singapore’s 
total LfPR of 65% in 2009 was higher than Japan’s (60%) and the 
Republic of Korea’s (61%) and lower than Canada’s (67%), but the 
LfPR of the age group 60–64 that year was 51% which compares 
unfavorably with Japan (55%) and the Republic of Korea (56%). 
furthermore, the rate declined to 43% for the age group 65–69 and 
to 25% for the 70–74 cohort in 2009 (DOS 2010). This was particu-
larly true for women as only 1 out of every 6 in the 65–69 cohort 
was in the labor force. Since the mean life expectancy at age 65 for 
women was 21.5 years in 2009, it does not appear that working will 
be a major instrument for ensuring their financial security in old age.
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The Current System
Singapore’s single-tier pension system is a defined-contribution 
scheme administered by the CPf; it has become a key social, political, 
and economic institution. It was set up under the British colonial 
government in 1955 and is quite complex due to its multiple roles. 
It is, for example, the primary mortgage financing institution in 
the country. 
Although the CPf does not include any elements of social risk-
pooling, there is a system of social assistance for the indigent. In 
2009, there were 2,930 cases of public assistance totaling Singapore 
(S)$14 million, an average of S$4,800 per household per year or less 
than10% of 2009 per capita income. Public assistance is deliberately 
kept to a minimum. Cash relief is distributed on a per household basis 
and varies from S$200 to a maximum of S$570 per month (Ministry 
of Culture, Youth and Sport 2006). In fiscal year 2007, however, 
the average household monthly income was S$7,440 (http:// 
www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/hes.pdf). The government 
encourages semi-official welfare organizations to assist the indigent. 
As of 31 March 2011, the total membership in the CPf was 
3.35 million. Given that 35% of Singapore’s labor force is nonresi-
dent (i.e., citizen nor permanent resident), the coverage of the CPf 
may be regarded as nearly universal. The total balance in the fund 
was S$192 billion or 63.4% of 2010 GDP. The average balance per 
member was S$57,000 which was approximately equivalent to per 
capita income. This is inadequate as an average member will require 
financing for at least 2 decades of retirement. 
Current contribution rates to the CPf vary with age and are subject 
to a wage ceiling. The proportion of the contributions allocated to a 
member’s various accounts also varies by age. It is noteworthy that 
the rates decline with age; and so does the share explicitly allocated 
to retirement, which suggests that policy makers have assigned a 
low priority to accumulating cash for retirement relying instead on 
accumulating assets, particularly housing. CPf contributions, income, 
and withdrawals are tax free. 
In 2010, CPf contributions from employers ranged from 5.5% to 
15% and from 5% to 20% for employees, i.e., from 10.5% to 35% of 
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total wages. There was no increase in the wage ceiling of S$4,500 per 
month; if it remains fixed over the long term, it will decrease in real 
terms which in turn will have an adverse impact on the replacement 
rate. The government proposed increasing the ceiling to S$5,000 per 
month starting in September 2011.
CPf contributions are channelled into three accounts: 67% goes 
into to the ordinary account, which can be used for housing and 
investments; 19% goes into the Medisave account which can be 
used for hospitalization and catastrophic health insurance; and the 
remaining 14% goes into the special account, which can be used 
for retirement and other purposes. Interest is paid on the special 
and Medisave accounts pegged at the 12-month average yield on a 
10-year Singapore Government Security plus 1%.
The asset side of the CPf balance sheet comprises nonmarketable 
government securities with interest determined expost as the rate 
credited to CPf members (Asher and Nandy 2009). The proceeds 
from the securities are widely believed to be invested by the Singa-
pore Government Investment Corporation (SGIC), but statutory 
provisions do not allow the operations or investment performance 
of SGIC (or of Temasek, another government holding company) to 
be disclosed.
from 1987 to 2008, the real, annual rates of return to CPf members 
on their balances estimated by the authors from annual report data 
averaged only 1.2%, which was substantially lower than the real, 
annual GDP growth rate of 8.3% and the growth rate in wages 
of 5.2%. If rates of wage increases are higher than rates of return 
on balances, the replacement rate is adversely affected because it 
reflects the ratio of retirement income to pre-retirement income.
Prior to 1986, eligible civil servants were covered under a pension 
scheme3 financed by the government. In 1973, they were given the 
option of transferring to the CPf, but relatively few chose to do so. 
The transfer in 1986 was successful as the prior scheme was discon-
tinued for most civil servants though a few were allowed to continue. 
Most civil servants employed after 1986 are therefore covered by the 
3 The fund is governed by The Pension fund Act (Cap. 224A, 1996 Revised Edition) 
and is administered by the Ministry of finance.
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CPf.4 Non-pensionable civil servants have the same contribution rates 
and wage ceilings as citizens and permanent residents employed in 
the private sector. Pensionable civil servants, however, have lower 
contribution rates and a higher wage ceiling of S$6,000. The total 
number of pensionable civil servants, including political appointees, is 
unavailable. However, their number is relatively small because during 
the 1986 reform, pension benefits were granted to civil servants in 
only a few key services like the administrative service5 and to selected 
political appointees. These appointees could draw both salary and 
pension at age 55 and a minimum of 8 years of service. The pensions 
have, however, been frozen at 1994 salary levels. 
On reaching retirement, pensionable civil servants can choose among 
the following options: (i) full pension calculated at 1/600 x annual 
pensionable salary x completed months of service; (ii) a lump-sum 
payment based on full annual pension x 14.2; or (iii) a combination 
of a lump-sum payment and a reduced pension for 12.5 years after 
which the monthly pension is restored to the full amount. The 
Pension fund Act stipulates that the maximum replacement rate is 
not to exceed two-thirds of the highest pensionable emoluments 
paid to a civil servant. Under option (i), after 30 years of service the 
pension would be 60%; the two-thirds maximum is attained after 
33 1/3 years of service. Thus, pensionable civil servants have more 
options than other members of the CPf, even though they contribute 
to the CPf under a separate schedule.
In response to concerns expressed about the salaries and pension 
arrangements for political appointees in the 2011 general election, 
the government appointed a committee that submitted the report 
“Salaries for a Capable and Committed Government” on 30 December 
2011.6 They recommended that the current pension for political 
office holders be discontinued as of 21 May 2011.7 Those currently 
eligible would receive pensions that had accrued only up to 20 May 
4 The Pension Act stipulates that no civil servant employed after 1 April 1986 will be 
covered by the Pension Act, except officers who are appointed to such schemes of 
service designated by the President.
5 As of 31 December 2010, out of 76,000 civil servants, there were 228 officers in 
the administrative service (0.3%) (Public Service Division 2011).
6  http://www.psd.gov.sg/WhitePaper_WhitePaper 
7 The committee was in favor of covering political appointees under the CPf system.
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2011. The pension would be paid when the appointee steps down or 
retires from office. Thus, an appointee cannot benefit from a salary and 
a pension at the same time.8 The committee also recommended that the 
bonus paid to political appointees should no longer be based on GDP 
performance but on a broader matrix that includes real median income 
growth, the unemployment rate, and the real growth rate of the lowest 
20% income group, in addition to the growth rate of real GDP.
Members of the Armed forces are under a defined-contribution 
scheme called the SAVER Plan initiated in 1998. They have three 
options to invest their accumulated balances: (i) the stable plan, 
which is 50% cash and 50% bonds; (ii) the balanced plan, which is 
10% cash, 50% bonds, and 40% equities; and (iii) the dynamic plan, 
which is 10% cash, 20% bonds, and 70% equities. The default option 
is the balanced plan. 
Fairness
The broader issues concern the lack of social insurance principles in 
managing longevity, inflation, and survivors' benefits during retire-
ment and the extremely limited nature of public assistance to the 
elderly. The nearly exclusive reliance on a wage/employment-based 
mandatory savings pension system will perpetuate wage inequalities 
in retirement unless social risk pooling and redistribution measures 
are introduced. Singapore has not implemented any such measures. 
As noted previously, Singapore’s social assistance program is 
extremely limited in both coverage and level of benefits. Occasion-
ally, the government has shared a small portion of budget surpluses 
with its citizens, including the elderly, but this is not a substitute 
for a well-designed social assistance or social pension scheme with 
near-universal coverage and adequate benefits for the elderly.
Requiring the current work force to almost fully finance its retirement 
even as it lays the foundation for future growth that will benefit 
future generations mitigates social solidarity and social principles. 
International experience with pension (and healthcare) systems 
suggests that at least a moderate degree of social solidarity is essential 
8 Xuanwei, T. 2012. No More Pensions. Today. 5 January.
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for managing conflicts within and between generations. Singapore’s 
current pension system also does not permit the elderly to participate 
in economic growth as savings to finance retirement are based on 
past earnings. The design, administration, and governance of the 
system also raise specific fairness issues.
Different Pension Designs for Different Groups
The different designs of the CPf and the Armed forces pension scheme 
raise questions about fairness. As for the CPf, the funds managed 
by its board are invested differently than the funds managed under 
the Armed forces SAVER Plan. As of 31 March 2011, CPf member 
balances were invested in non-marketable government securities 
probably by SGIC as the government has been running fiscal surpluses 
if the International Monetary fund definition is adopted (Asher and 
Nandy 2009). Interest is determined administratively. Since the SGIC 
is not required to reveal the contents of its investment portfolio or 
its performance, CPf members are unaware of the actual returns 
obtained on their balances. 
In sharp contrast to this centralized, non-transparent investment 
strategy at the CPf, the Central Provident fund Investment Scheme 
(CPfIS) provides all CPf members older than 18 who have not filed for 
bankruptcy and have more than S$20,000 in their ordinary accounts 
and/or S$40,000 in their special accounts considerable choice of asset 
managers and of products; however, for relatively unsophisticated provi-
dent and pension fund managers, too many choices are not always 
conducive to sound investment decisions. Chia and Tsui (2011) estimate 
that from 2004 to 2009, nearly 50% of those who participated in the 
CPfIS incurred losses; nearly 33% had returns less than the CPf guaran-
teed 2.5%, and only 20% realized returns greater than 2.5%. 
The nontransparent investment policies of the CPf and the over-
abundance of choices of fund managers and products in the CPfIS 
contrast sharply with the policies of the SAVER Plan. As noted, it 
provides three portfolio options with different risk profiles, and 
investments are managed under the supervision of the Armed forces 
Council by professional fund managers on a collective basis. SAVER 
members do not have the option of structuring their investment 
portfolios. The design and governance of the SAVER Plan merit 
serious consideration by the CPf board.
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Taxes
As CPf contributions from employees are tax exempt, the rate of 
subsidy varies with the marginal rate of income tax. Individual 
income tax rates in fiscal year 2009 ranged from 3.5% to 20%, and 
the total number of taxpayers was 33.8% of the labor force. Since 
the labor force includes many high-income expatriates, the share of 
income taxpayers among citizens and permanent residents is likely to 
be lower. The implicit tax subsidy therefore is regressive with the vast 
majority of CPf members not benefiting from income tax deductions. 
In addition, the implicit tax on CPf wealth falls disproportionately 
on the lower-income group. The SGIC has publicly announced that 
it earned annual returns (in Singapore dollars) of 4.5% in 2008, 
but CPf returns were 1.2%. The difference could be construed as a 
recurrent annual tax on CPf wealth.9 The estimated tax was S$4.98 
billion [(4.5–1.2) x S$151 billion in member balances in 2008], 69% 
of net CPf contributions during 2008 or 92% of the net tax assessed 
on residents in 2008. The tax is both large and regressive as relatively 
lower income households are likely to have larger proportions of 
their wealth in CPf accounts. In estimating Singapore’s household 
tax burden, this implicit tax should be included.
Pay-Outs
In 2009, the CPf Lifelong Income Scheme (CPf LIfE) was introduced 
for pay-outs. Chia and Tsui (2011) describe the design of CPf LIfE 
as follows: 
When a CPf member joins CPf LIfE, a portion of his cash savings in the 
retirement account (RA) is used to pay for the premium for a deferred 
life annuity at a stipulated drawdown age. The remaining RA is 
allocated to a spend-down account, with phased withdrawal starting 
from age 65 to the drawdown age of the annuity. The withdrawal 
amount is managed in a way to ensure that the payment will last until 
the deferred annuity date.  This amount withdrawn from the managed 
spend-down account, together with the life annuity, provides monthly 
payouts till the member dies (p. 3).
9 This argument, however, ignores the benefits accruing to members from a 
guaranteed nominal return on their CPf balances of 2.5%. The evidence seems 
to suggest that the cost to suppliers for providing such guarantees is not trivial 
(Lachance and Mitchell 2003). Thus, the crude estimates overstate the extent of 
implicit tax on CPf wealth. 
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This suggests that members have some options about the starting 
point of the annuity and that CPf LIfE is thus a deferred annuity 
managed by the CPf and paid for by members. Its design raises at 
least two issues on fairness. first, the premiums charged for the 
annuity are based on age and gender, with women paying higher 
effective premiums than men as they as a group live longer. Thus, 
the premium is structured according to private, not social insurance 
methods.10 This is particularly disadvantageous to women who as 
a group have lower CPf balances than men but who need income 
support for a longer period. 
Second, the annuity benefit is specified in nominal terms. This implies 
that real benefits will decline at the rate of inflation. CPf LIfE thus 
does not increase the resources available for retirement. Instead, as 
members pay the premiums, it reduces those resources though the 
benefits are lifelong.
In addition, pensionable civil servants and some political appoin-
tees have defined-benefit pensions even though they are nominally 
under the CPf defined-contribution plan, and their payouts are more 
generous than those of other workers. The government has indicated 
that it will accept the recommendations on pensions for political 
appointees contained in the report, “Salaries for a Capable and 
Committed Government.”11 This will address fairness as far as politi-
cal appointees are concerned but it will still leave certain categories 
of civil servants with different pension arrangements.
Foreign Workers
Singapore has been able to sustain its economic growth by relying on 
foreign workers (Table 7.1), so their retirement income needs merit 
discussion. In 1980, the government introduced a levy on unskilled 
and semi-skilled foreign workers; it does not apply to foreign skilled 
professionals. The levy varies across sectors, skill levels, nationalities, 
and the number of local residents employed per foreign worker. Its 
economic function is not to regulate the supply of foreign workers as 
its size and composition are set administratively, so it is not a pricing 
10 This is also the case for the health insurance scheme—Medishield—administered 
by the CPf (Asher and Nandy 2009). Since market failure is inherent in healthcare, 
social insurance principles are particularly desirable in healthcare markets.
11 See footnote 8.
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mechanism though it is likely to have some impact on the relative 
demand for foreign labor compared with local labor. If, for example, 
the foreign labor supply is set at a high level, that increases the 
overall supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor which may depress 
the wages of Singaporeans in that particular labor market. It may 
also have an impact on the willingness of employers to invest in 
capital equipment and in improving human resources. 
While disaggregated data on the number of foreign workers is 
unavailable, as of 31 December 2010, there were 201,000 foreign 
domestic workers. The budget does not provide separate revenue data 
on the levy on foreign workers; it is instead combined with airport 
passenger service charges under the category “Other Taxes.”12 In 
2010, the revenue from Other Taxes was $2.24 billion, and estimates 
suggest that it will be $3.3 billion in 2011 (Ministry of finance 2011). 
A substantial proportion can reasonably be assumed to be from the 
levy on foreign workers. It is also a reasonable assumption that much 
of the economic burden of the levy is on the workers themselves as 
they have little market power; they therefore contribute significantly 
to fiscal revenues in Singapore. foreign workers are not, however, 
members of the CPf, they are not eligible for social and community 
benefits, and they do not receive the healthcare subsidies and health 
benefits that residents do. 
Sustainability
It is important to distinguish between financial and economic 
sustainability in pension systems. financial sustainability refers to 
matching assets with liabilities. If expected liabilities are greater 
than projected assets of provident or pension funds, the feasible 
options are reducing benefit levels, increasing the contribution rate 
or contribution base,  improving returns from investments, reducing 
administrative costs, or a combination of these. Another option is 
for the government to finance the actuarial deficits of provident and 
pension funds. This however, does not bode well for the long-term 
sustainability of the pension system. Economic sustainability, on the 
other hand, is the capacity of the economy to finance projected 
liabilities without sacrificing current and future economic growth or 
12 http://www.iras.gov.sg/irasHome/page03a.aspx?id=5676 
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other spending priorities. Thus, to ensure economic sustainability, 
policy makers must focus on sustaining long-term economic growth. 
Without economic growth, sharing resources between the young 
and the old, and among the elderly could become contentious. 
In Singapore’s defined-contribution system, the accumulations 
become the liabilities; therefore, matching assets and liabilities is 
not relevant. Instead, sustainability is tied to adequacy. As cover-
age in Singapore is nearly universal, extending it is not an issue, so 
adequacy must address the lack of instruments to mitigate longevity 
and inflation risks and to provide for survivors.
Conventionally, the adequacy of retirement financing is measured by 
the combined replacement rates in all tiers. This rate may be defined 
as the value of an annuity during retirement as a percentage of 
pre-retirement income. The replacement rate at retirement will not 
be sustained unless the annuity is indexed to inflation and is provided 
for life. There is also a need for survivors’ benefits to address gender 
imbalances during retirement. As women on average live longer than 
men, the older elderly will be disproportionately female. As women 
as a group have lower lifetime incomes, a mechanism to increase 
their resources is essential. 
Singapore’s pension system does not address inflation nor does it 
have a mechanism to address survivors’ benefits. CPf LIfE addresses 
longevity in a limited way, but the costs are borne by individuals 
through commercial-style insurance. The absence of noncontributory 
social pensions financed from general government revenues has an 
adverse impact on adequacy and therefore on sustainability. This 
suggests that while in a narrow financial sense Singapore’s pension 
system may be regarded as sustainable, it is not when assessed 
against the more relevant criteria for adequacy. These concerns 
will become even more acute as the population ages in the next 
2 decades (see Table 7.2 above). 
Suggestions for Reform
The broad directions for promoting fairness and sustainability in 
Singapore’s pension system are fairly clear: (i) using more social 
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insurance principles and social risk pooling instruments such as social 
pensions; (ii) reforming the investment policies of the CPf by bringing 
them more in line with the SAVER Plan; and (iii) improving the design of 
the CPf to promote fairness. As the defined-benefit system is currently 
available only to those receiving government pensions, these reforms 
would not constitute a fundamental departure from current practices. 
These changes will meet the needs of a high-income, rapidly aging 
economy and will bring the system into greater conformity with those 
of similar economies globally. 
The constraints on promoting fairness and sustainability are not 
financial nor are they due to a lack of institutional or organizational 
capacity. They instead arise because of the disproportionate impor-
tance given to achieving high economic growth while not taking 
sufficient account of its negative implications on social protection. 
In the 2011 general election, nearly 40% of the electorate voted 
for opposition candidates. This could be interpreted as an urgent 
need for a more balanced approach to economic growth and social 
protection. The key decisions in promoting fairness and sustainability 
in the pension system will therefore be political and will require 
reducing the nearly exclusive reliance on mandatory savings in the 
CPf, increasing the very limited scope of social assistance and pension 
programs, reducing the reliance on implicit taxes on CPf wealth, and 
reducing the gross mismatch between the revenue generated by 
foreign workers and the social benefits available to them. 
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Abstract
The pension system has numerous inequities that have been 
recognized for many years and have been studied by many experts. 
These include much higher replacement rates in the government 
system (70%); a greater proportion of pensions financed from the 
national budget and generous tax breaks; generally low coverage 
in the private, formal sector (27%) with quite low replacement rates 
(an average of 30% after 30 years and 15% after 180 months); and 
poor coverage and modest benefits for the informal sector. Since 
1999, the Old-Age Pension Fund (OAP) has been the cornerstone 
of the private sector system, but it pays no benefits in the informal 
sector and appears to be unsustainable due to inadequate funding 
and deteriorating demographics. The first pensions will be paid in 
2014, but estimates show that the fund will be depleted in 30 years. 
Currently, 14% of private sector workers contribute to voluntary 
provident funds financed through employee contributions of 2% to 
15% of salary that must be matched by employers. Information on age 
distributions and compensation categories is not available, so it is not 
possible to project eventual replacement rates. Suggestions for reform 
include establishing a mandatory national savings fund, strengthening 
the OAP, and creating an open national provident fund to provide 
annuity-based pensions at age 60 to all private sector employees who 
do not have provident fund coverage and to all workers in the informal 
economy. Before the recent national elections, the labor and finance 
ministries introduced competing programs to promote voluntary 
savings in the informal sector, and the Social Security Office introduced 
legislation to increase OAP benefits from 15% to 20% after 15 years 
of contributions. It is not clear that these interim measures will have 
a significant impact on the fairness and sustainability of the system.
Thailand
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Overview
Numerous recent studies have concluded that the Thai pension 
system provides inadequate benefits for all workers other than those 
in government or military employment and that major reforms are 
needed to assure the financial sustainability of the system as well 
as equity among different sectors and among generations (Aspalter 
2009, Pfau and Atisophon 2008, International Labour Office [ILO] 
2009, Paitoonpong et al. 2010, Lloyd-Sherlock and Schröder-Butterfill 
2008). However, competing reform philosophies (and also, perhaps, 
an interest in maintaining the status quo) have delayed major reforms, 
and the government has opted instead for interim measures that do not 
contribute to the objective of establishing a coherent national pension 
system. 
The current system has numerous inequities that include the 
following:
•	 much higher replacement rates for workers in the govern-
ment and military sectors, with a greater proportion of their 
pensions financed by the national government;
•	 generally low coverage of workers in the formal private sector 
with quite low replacement rates; and
•	 poor coverage and modest benefits for the informal sector.
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva acknowledged the inequities in 
the Thai pension system stating on 15 April 2009 that, “Old age 
social pension is not a populist policy, but rather a basic human 
right that everyone deserves. Social pensions promote income 
security in old age and the government is committed to ensure 
access to basic social pensions for all.”1 In the past 2 years, the 
government has created or improved several programs to make 
the system more equitable, and the recent electoral victory of the Pheu 
Thai party headed by Yingluck Shinawatra is seen as a victory for the 
long-marginalized rural poor increasing the likelihood that the new 
1 Help Age International. 15 April 2009. “Thai PM Guarantees Older People’s Right 
to Social Pension.” (available at http://www.globalaging.org/pension/world/social/
Thai.htm )
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government will continue or expand such programs.2 Despite recog-
nizing the need for reform, there remains a risk that simply meeting 
the expectations of those who benefit from the status quo (e.g., 
government and military employees who can retire at age 55 with a 
70% replacement rate) will be so costly as to impede the government’s 
financial ability or its will to undertake substantial reforms.
While recent changes by the outgoing government may begin 
to address the inadequacies experienced by workers in the 
non- government sectors, the costs of those changes would likely be 
borne directly or indirectly by employers and employees who face 
a variety of other economic pressures. (Directly refers to costs that 
arise out of employment while indirectly refers to costs borne by the 
government but paid by employers and employees as taxes.) 
The widespread inadequacy of pension benefits will become more 
critical as Thailand’s population ages in the relatively near future.
•	 Thailand’s old-age dependency ratio (aged 60 and older/
working age population, 15–59 increased from 11.7% in 
1994 to 14.4% in 2002 and to 16.0% in 2007.3 
•	 Thailand’s potential support ratio (i.e., workers who support 
at least one elderly person) decreased from 9.3 in 1994 to 6.3 
in 2007. 
•	 The percentage of Thailand’s elderly population is expected 
to increase gradually and to exceed 20% in 2023 while the 
potential support ratio will drop to 2.52 in 2030. 
•	 Thai society is also facing a fertility decline, so in the future 
there will be some families without any children to provide 
financial, health, or mental health support. 
•	 Between 1994 and 2002, the proportion of the elderly living 
alone increased from 3.6% to 6.3%, and in 2007 it increased 
to 7.7%. 
•	 Among all Thai elderly, 31.3% do not have savings or financial 
assets, and 34.1% have an annual income of less than 20,000 
baht. The 2007 poverty line in Thailand was 1,443 baht per 
capita per month or 17,316 baht per year.
2 Mydans, S. and T. fuller. 2011. In a Landslide, Thais Pick Party of Exiled Leader. New 
York Times. 4 July. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/world/asia/04thailand.
html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2
3 Estimates based on data from CEIC Data Company (accessed 18 May 2012).
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•	 The main income source for 52.3% of the elderly in 2007 was finan-
cial support from their children, followed by income from working 
(28.9%), financial support from their spouses (6.1%), pensions or 
savings (4.4%), and income from savings or property (2.9%). 
•	 Among employed persons, 39% do not save, 26% balance 
their earnings and expenditures, 9% need to borrow in order 
to make ends meet, and 3% have the capability to save but 
do not do so (Suwanrada 2009).
The Current System 
The statutory law of Thailand provides for a variety of retirement 
programs that fall into two categories:
•	 the formal sector for people working for an employer and 
receiving an agreed wage and various social protections such 
as severance and unemployment benefits; and
•	 the informal sector for the self-employed, small family 
businesses, microenterprises, or casual workers with no 
employer-employee relationship and subject to tax based on 
net income which is usually too low to qualify. 
Current programs in the formal sector are the Old-Age Pension fund 
(OAP), the Government Pension fund (GPf), voluntary provident 
funds (PVDs), and the Retirement Mutual fund (RMf).
Current and proposed programs in the informal sector are the Old-Age 
Act (OAA) 500 Baht Program; Article 40 of the Social Security Act; the 
RMf, though not extensively used by informal workers; and a proposed 
national savings fund (NSf). The number of persons employed in 2007 
was 36.9 million, of which 62.7% were in the informal sector. 
This chapter focuses primarily on the OAP, GPf, and PVDs because 
these are the largest programs and have been in operation long 
enough to analyze their effectiveness. 
The Old-Age Pension Fund 
The OAP is the cornerstone of the current pension system for the 
private sector. Also referred to as social security, it is a mandatory, 
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contributory, defined-benefit social insurance system for all formal 
sector workers at businesses that employ one or more employees. It 
was introduced in 1999 and will commence paying pensions in 2014. 
The features of OAP are outlined in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Contribution Rate and Pension Benefits of the 
Old-Age Pension System
Contribution rate 3% each from employers and workers.a
During the current “temporary” crisis, the 
3% contributions have been capped at a 
maximum of 450 baht per month (i.e., 6% 
or 900 baht considering both employer and 
employee contributions).
Old-age pension eligibility Age 55 and a minimum of 180 months  
(15 years) of contributions and termination 
of employment. Those with fewer than  
180 months receive only a refund of 
contributions with interest.
Old-age pension benefit 
formula
The annuity is equal to 15% of 5-year final 
average pay after 15 years of contributions 
and 1% for each additional year of contribu-
tions (recently increased to 20% and 1.5%, 
respectively).
Minimum pension The ministerial regulation relating to the 
Social Security Act of 1990 states that the 
pension amount must not be less than a 
certain minimum prescribed by SSO based 
on a consideration of the national economic 
situation at the time of payment (Kanjana-
phoomin 2004. p. 9). 
Pension indexing There is no automatic adjustment of 
pensions following retirement.
Wage cap 15,000 baht. Contributions and benefits 
are based on pay up to the wage cap. This 
limit has been in place without change 
since the system began in 1999.
a According to a recent report, the Social Security Office (SSO) is considering 
an increase in the employees’ contribution rate to 5% and an increase in the 
retirement age from 55 to 62 or 63, with the objective of improving the system’s 
long-term financial viability. (Kitjakosol 2010).
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources. 
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The OAP was designed to provide a replacement rate of approxi-
mately 30% of the average wage over the last 5 years for a person-
who contributed for at least 30 years. Those contributing for the 
minimum period of 180 months would receive a replacement rate 
of about 15 %. 
In 2009, the OAP had about 9.8 million active contributors compris-
ing approximately 14.5% of the overall population and 26.5% of 
the working population. Prior to 2004, there was a trend among 
Thai workers to leave the formal sector for the informal sector start-
ing at about age 30; however, given the decrease in the size of the 
agricultural sector and the increasing urbanization of the population, 
this trend seems unlikely to be the future pattern, so projections 
on the sustainability of the OAP are based on the assumption that 
workers in the formal sector will remain there as they age. This will 
lead to the gradual aging of the contributing workforce and an 
increase in its percentage of total employment over time until it 
eventually reaches a maximum of 35% in 2079 as shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Percent of Old-Age Pension Contributors of  
Total Workforce, 2004–2079 
Year
Percent in Formal 
Employment
2004 23.6
2006 24.7
2010 27.0
2020 32.0
2030 34.6
2040 34.7
2050 34.6
2060 35.0
2070 34.5
2079 34.7
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006).
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A key factor in predicting sustainability is the dependency ratio. 
Currently, only 9.2% of males and 8.4% of females between the ages 
of 50 and 54 are contributors to the OAP. If this were to remain static, 
the number of pensioners would be quite small. As the older formal 
sector workforce increases as a percentage of the total, however, 
that percentage will grow to 42.7% by 2030 (Asian Development 
Bank [ADB] 2006). 
Figure 8.1 Number of New Old-Age Pension Recipients, 
2014–2079
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Source: Asian Development Bank (2006).
figure 8.1 shows that the number of new old-age pensioners will 
accelerate dramatically between 2015 and 2030 and then will 
remain at a very high level for another 30 years. Beginning in 2034, 
those retiring will have 35 (or more) years of contributions, which 
means that not only will the number of pensioners increase but 
the average size of those pensions will also increase. This “double 
hit” has a further negative consequence on the finances of the 
OAP system.
figure 8.2 shows the projected pension system dependency ratio, 
i.e., the ratio of pensioners to contributors.
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Figure 8.2 Projected Dependency Ratio of the  
Old-Age Pension System, 2014–2079
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The number of pensioners is low compared to the number of contrib-
utors in 2014, but then rises rapidly. In 2020, there are only 8.8 
pensioners for every 100 contributors, but by the end of the projec-
tion in 2079 there are 80.2 pensioners for every 100 contributors—a 
dependency ratio greater than 80%. Between 2020 and 2079, the 
dependency ratio will thus increase by 911% which means the cost 
of the system will increase by a factor of 9 if no changes are made.
The Social Security Office (SSO) of the Ministry of Labor (MOL) is 
apparently aware of the deteriorating financial condition of the 
OAP but has nonetheless recently both decreased contributions 
(recognizing the burden of even a 6% contribution in a difficult 
economic environment) and increased future benefits (recognizing 
the inadequate level of benefits provided by the statutory system). 
In June 2011, The Bangkok Post reported the following.4
The Social Security Office’s retirement pension fund will run out of 
money in the next 30 years unless steps are taken to seriously revamp 
the scheme, a Thailand Development Research Institute academic 
has warned. Worawan Charnduaywit said that the first batch of 
contributors to the pension fund will begin to receive their payments 
4 Charoensuthipan, P. 2011. fledgling pension fund will run out in 30 years. 
Bangkok Post. 11 June.
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in 2014. However, from then on, money will be flowing out of the 
fund so quickly that within the next 30 years the fund will eventually 
end up in the red. … This will adversely affect younger contributors 
because by the time they reach retirement age and are eligible to 
receive the benefit, there will be no money left in the fund for them, 
Ms Worawan said. … SSO secretary-general Pan Wanapinit said the 
office is considering measures to deal with the situation.
This prognosis concurred with what pension specialists had concluded 
for several years: The OAP displays a number of structural weaknesses 
which call sustainability into question and cast doubt upon its capac-
ity to offer future pensioners anything like a 30% replacement rate 
(Lloyd-Sherlock and Schröder-Butterfill 2008. p. 15).
Because it is not yet paying pensions, the OAP currently has a surplus; 
however, the World Bank calculates that a total contribution rate of 
13% would be required to meet future pension promises notwith-
standing the temporary reduction to 3% (World Bank 2000). In 
addition, the following issues must be addressed.
•	 Investments are heavily regulated and concentrated in 
low-risk, low-return portfolios which may further reduce the 
capacity to meet future liabilities. 
•	 Evading contributions is widespread at between 25% and 
40% of the workforce (World Bank 2000). 
•	 fixing the replacement rate on the last 5 years of earnings 
creates an incentive to pay workers disproportionately 
high salaries in this period and lower amounts in the preced-
ing years. 
•	 Even when the longest-participating members have accumu-
lated 30 years of service, benefits for many low-paid workers 
will be less than the projected poverty level, and benefits for 
other workers will be below international norms. Thus, the 
OAP will fail to meet its primary goal of preventing poverty 
among elderly formal sector workers in retirement.
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The Government Pension Fund5 
Prior to 1997, government employees received a defined-benefit 
pension upon retirement based on the last month’s pay and number 
of years worked that was financed from the national budget. The 
GPf is still a budget-financed, defined-benefit plan but it also has 
a defined-contribution account. It was established on 27 March 
1997 as a result of the Government Pension fund Act B.E. 2539 of 
September 1996.  The GPf is currently Thailand’s largest institutional 
investor serving more than 1 million members. Twelve categories of 
employees are covered including civil, judicial and university officials, 
teachers, police officers, and military officers.6
Employees hired after 27 March 1997 are required to participate in 
the GPf. Government employees working prior to its inception were 
required to choose between remaining in the pre-1997 scheme or 
participating in a combination of a defined-benefit component based 
on a modified formula using compensation averaged over the final 
60 months of government service and capped at 70% of average 
compensation plus accumulations in the GPf.
The defined-benefit component requires 25 years of service and can 
be paid either as an annuity or as a lump sum. Currently, GPf member 
accounts may be withdrawn in one lump sum only on termination 
of membership, which occurs upon retirement, or termination of 
government service, or at age 60, or at death. The law does not 
provide for portability or annuity payments from a member’s GPf 
defined-contribution account.
Under the GPf, government employees and the government each 
contribute 3% of monthly wages. Upon retirement, GPf members 
receive a traditional pension (under the revised, less generous 
formula) together with a lump-sum retirement allowance based on 
three to five of the following components of the defined-contribution 
account according to the employee’s situation:
5 This information was compiled from English translations of the Government 
Pension fund Act B.E. 2539 (1996) and the GPf website, with Professor 
Suwanrada’s helpful analysis and data in the article, “Poverty and financial 
Security of the Elderly in Thailand,” Ageing International. 2009. 33:1-2. http://
tgri.thainhf.org/document/edoc/edoc_790.pdf 
6 GPf website http://www.gpf.or.th/Eng/ourmember.asp 
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a) the employee’s 3% contributions; 
b) the government’s 3% employer contributions; 
c) 2% of monthly income contributed by the government in 
addition to (b) for those who choose to receive their pensions 
as annuities; 
d) a lump-sum endowment fund (incentive scheme for persons 
employed prior to 27 March 1997 and who chose to partici-
pate in the GPf program; and 
e) investment returns.
As of September 2008, there were 1,186,691 GPf members, slightly 
more than 3% of the workforce. According to its 2008 annual report, 
the GPf had assets of 391,717 million baht, an increase over 2007 
of 16,166 million baht or 4%. 
GPf members receive generous tax treatment as contributions of up 
to 300,000 baht per year are tax deductible, and the returns on 
contributions accumulated are fully tax exempt. Sums withdrawn 
after age 50 are also tax free; however, members are not allowed to 
contribute more than the mandatory 3% of monthly wages. Addition-
ally, the GPf offers housing loans from both the member’s and the 
employer’s contribution accounts, as well as life insurance benefits.
Before 1997, the replacement rate was around 70% of the last 
salary (Kanjanaphoomin 2004. p. 11), and while the replacement 
rate under the new system is unclear at this point, it is expected to 
be comparable. In addition, those receiving pensions are also eligible 
to receive survivors’ benefits and noncontributory medical benefits 
until death.
Voluntary Provident Funds 
The PVD system was established in Thailand through the Provident 
fund Act, B.E., 1987. Under the act, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has the responsibility for registering and monitoring 
provident (defined-contribution) funds established by private sector 
employers for the benefit of their employees. PVDs are managed by 
registered management companies selected by fund committees 
typically comprising selected or assigned employer and employee 
members. Both the committees and management companies are 
monitored by the SEC.
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An employer’s decision to establish a provident fund is generally volun-
tary although companies listed on the Thai Stock Exchange are required 
to maintain them. A provident fund is financed through employer and 
employee contributions. Under the law, the employee’s contribution 
rate must be between 2% and 15% of salary; however, because employ-
ers have an obligation to contribute an amount at least equal to the 
employee’s contribution, many employers have been reluctant to raise 
employees’ contributions to the fund above the 3% level.
In 1987, 514 employers had registered provident funds with approxi-
mately 83,000 employee members. By 2007, the number of regis-
tered employers increased to 8,187 with 2,000,000 members, and 
at the end of September 2009 there were 9,307 employers and 
1,976,000 employees.
As of the end of the third quarter of 2009, the net-asset value of 
provident funds was 5.1 billion baht, and approximately 77.1% was 
invested in bonds and debt instruments, while investments in bank 
deposits and equities stood at 11.1% and 8.8%, respectively. (In that 
quarter, the proportion of investment in equities grew by 16.9% due 
to increases in the market index.) Approximately 14.4% of formal 
sector (nongovernment) workers have provident fund accounts. 
Current information on their distribution by age and compensation 
categories is not available, so it is not possible to project the replace-
ment rates that will eventually result. 
Retirement Mutual Funds
RMfs are offered by mutual fund management companies that are 
required to provide investors with funds of varying risk profiles either 
as equity, fixed income, or mixed funds. RMfs are tax-privileged; 
however, favorable tax treatment is subject to certain conditions. 
Individuals have to continuously buy RMf units until the age of 55, 
unless they do not have any income in a given year. In addition, 
savings must amount to at least 3% of income or 5,000 baht, which-
ever is lower. The amount invested may not exceed 15% of annual 
income up to a limit of 300,000 baht when combined with any other 
pension savings (e.g., PVDs and GPf).
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RMfs cover those employees not covered by PVDs, those who wish to 
make additional contributions to supplement their PVDs, and those 
who are not currently covered by any formal pension scheme. They 
also enable tax-favored savings by the self-employed or by those who 
wish to make additional savings over and above what is provided in 
a government provident fund. At the end of 2006, there were 66 
RMfs with combined assets of about 20 billion baht.
Old-Age Allowance 
The OAA provides financial assistance (capped at 500 baht per 
person per month) to informal sector workers classified as “unprivi-
leged elderly,” i.e., someone at least 60 years of age whose income 
does not meet expenses or who is unable to work. Identifying clients 
and defining payments are delegated to local authorities. Those with 
adequate resources may use their own funds to supplement the 500 
baht up to 1,000 baht per month. 
In fiscal year 2009, the number of recipients was approximately 
2.3 million with 0.5 million elderly receiving allowances financed by 
local authorities. The outgoing government had committed to raising 
the minimum to 600 baht and increasing it with age to a maximum 
of 1,000 baht for people older than 90. 
Article 40 
The Social Security Act allows workers in the informal sector who are 
not eligible for OAP or GPf to participate in OAP’s death, maternity, 
disability, and retirement programs on a voluntary basis under one 
of two options: (1) 100 baht (70 baht, worker + 30 baht, govern-
ment) for disability, sickness, and death benefits; or (2) 150 baht, 
(100 baht, worker + 50 baht, government) for the above benefits 
plus old-age savings.
With government cost-sharing and aggressive marketing, there 
has been a significant increase in enrollment. About 500,000 have 
joined so far and most have selected option 2, which is payable 
as a lump sum at age 60 and which competes with the NSf for 
retirement savings. 
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National Savings Fund 
This is a new, nationwide fund to cover 24 million workers who 
lack formal, long-term retirement savings. The voluntary program 
is aimed primarily at low-income workers; participants set their 
monthly contributions from 100 to 1,100 baht. Eligible members are 
Thai citizens younger than 60 who are not covered by the existing 
social security fund or a PVD.  The government contributes to each 
account according to the holder’s age. Members aged 20–30 receive 
monthly contributions of 50 baht, those aged 30–50 receive 80 baht 
and those older than 50 receive 100 baht. 
NSf benefits must be taken as an annuity (or as periodic withdrawals 
for those with small account balances); lump sums are not permitted. 
The program has little liquidity as members can access their savings 
prior to retirement only by cancelling their membership and forfeiting 
all government contributions. 
Suggestions for Reform
Existing Expectations
Even under the GPf, most pensions for government employees will 
continue to be paid from the national budget; thus, politics will be a 
key factor in determining its sustainability, and people with the most 
to lose or gain will be involved in making those decisions. Addition-
ally, the decision makers may have legally protected rights to their 
already accrued pension benefits.7 
Unequal benefit payments and disparities in employee shares of 
costs point to a need to reduce pension accruals or to increase 
worker costs in the public sector while devoting public resources to 
nongovern ment workers in both the formal and informal sectors. 
Substantial practical and political difficulties can be anticipated as 
7 See P. Tonguthai and M.H. Khan. 1986. Social Security for the Thai People. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin v.3. no. 1 p. 145. July. Available http://www.jstor.org/
stable/25770098?origin=JSTOR-pdf 
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indicated in a 2008 study that characterized recent Thai pension 
reforms as “unsustainable and unjust” (Lloyd-Sherlock and Schröder-
Butterfill 2008. pp. 15–16).
Recent Proposals
Recent (2006–2008) efforts at reform include the mandatory provi-
dent fund (MPf) and International Labour Office proposals.
Mandatory Provident Fund Proposal
In 2007, the Ministry of finance (MOf) proposed a legislation to 
introduce an MPf to make retirement income more adequate for 
nongovernment workers in the formal sector, but the government 
crisis shortly after the submission of the draft report resulted in delays. 
The MPf was initially controversial and continues to be notwith-
standing a widespread consensus that the Thai pension system 
needs fundamental reform. In August 2008 after consultations with 
relevant agencies, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
considered whether the MPf would suitably address the system’s 
problems and forecast that workers with a 40-year career could 
expect only a median replacement rate of about 13% to 14% of their 
final 5 years of income, that most of their pension benefits would 
likely continue to come from the already unsustainable OAP, and 
that further reforms would be needed to provide suitable pensions.
The 2009 International Labour Office Proposal 
In early 2009, the MOf requested social security experts from the 
ILO to review the MPf proposal. The findings and recommendations 
were contained in a report entitled “Pension Reform in a Time of 
Crisis” (ILO 2009). Given its established preference for “solidarity” 
systems, the ILO criticized both the necessity for and the efficacy of 
the proposal. Bearing in mind that the date of their report coincided 
with the worldwide financial crises, the ILO maintained that increased 
reliance on individual accounts subject to declines in market value 
would lead to insufficient retirement assets when they were needed. 
further, the ILO maintained that Thailand’s existing PVDs would 
provide a sufficient supplement to OAP benefits. According to the 
report, simply strengthening the OAP would provide an adequate 
response to the current crisis (market value declines) and would 
alleviate old-age poverty. 
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The Politics of Reform
Retirement reform was a major issue in the recent national election.8 
During the campaign, the labor and finance ministries introduced 
seemingly competing programs to promote voluntary savings in the 
informal sector. The SSO also introduced a legislation to increase 
OAP benefits from 15% to 20% after 15 years of service, with 
additional accruals for service beyond 15 years increased from 1% 
to 1.5% per year (Wiener 2011). It is not clear that these reforms will 
have a significant impact on the inequities and sustainability of the 
system, although the political focus on improving the situation of 
the elderly poor in the informal sector acknowledges the urgency of 
that problem for the national government. Heretofore, this problem 
was primarily addressed at the local level. 
Author’s Observations 
Formal sector. Thailand should establish the following key priorities 
for gradually reforming the system. 
•	 Increase OAP benefits to improve replacement rates for lower-
paid workers.
•	 Increase retirement ages in recognition of longer life 
expectancy.
•	 Introduce a mandatory provident fund to assure that all 
formal sector workers save for retirement.
•	 Permit workers who are able to do so voluntarily contribute 
to provident funds.
•	 Modify the current tax regime under which contributions, 
earnings or benefit payments are not taxed so that the pension 
system is not a means for the well-paid to escape taxation.
•	 When economic conditions permit, increase OAP contribution 
levels so that future national budget priorities are not distorted 
by the government paying benefits that are supposed to be 
funded through worker and employer contributions. 
8 Bangkok Post. 2011. Tax, Pension Issues for Incoming Government. 29 June. 
http://www.bdo-thaitax.com/bdo/in-the-news/3255
Thailand 115
Regardless of the option selected for increasing benefits, additional 
changes to the system for formal workers should be made to improve 
the overall design and stabilize its long-term financial outlook. 
These include (i) establishing an independent pension regulator to 
coordinate the various schemes on a long-term basis considering 
both social protection issues and macro-economic issues, and (ii) 
improving pension portability when workers change jobs, particularly 
between the government and the formal private sector.
Informal sector. In the past, benefits for elderly informal sector 
workers have been largely a matter of inter-generational care within 
families and support under the “500 baht” program administered 
locally. Prior to the NSf legislation, Thailand did not have a meaning-
ful program for informal workers (funded or unfunded). As noted 
earlier, governmental relief for the elderly poor (particularly at the 
national level) would be delivered primarily in cash, but incomes in 
the informal sector are largely unreported and many workers do not 
earn enough to pay income tax in any event. It is inherently more 
difficult to design a “replacement income” pension system without 
an earnings history. 
Concluding Comments
Pension reform is a long-term undertaking whose ultimate success 
will be evaluated in hindsight after the system has been subjected to 
numerous political, economic, and demographic factors that were 
unpredictable when reform was undertaken. The literature on pension 
reform in Thailand and elsewhere is voluminous; however, few high-
level government policy makers fully comprehend the choices among 
available reform options, and justifying policy choices to advocacy 
groups or to other organized constituencies is very difficult. 
Possibly the new Thai government with a clear mandate will make it 
possible for the incoming Prime Minister to appoint ministers who 
are more likely to seek common ground than has historically been 
the case; however, after a long period of competition, the staff of 
the ministries of health and labor may find it difficult to compromise. 
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Abstract
The contributory pension system in Viet Nam has been in operation 
since the late 1950s, but until 1995, it covered only employees in the 
state sector. Since 1995, it has been expanded to cover workers in 
the private sector and designed as a pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit 
scheme. While mandatory for most workers, it is open to all citizens 
of working age (15 and older) who are not included in the mandatory 
scheme. As of 2010, the mandatory scheme covered about 9.3 million 
people (20% of the country’s labor force) while the voluntary scheme 
covered only 62,000 persons. State sector workers account for 80% of 
active contributors. Using an actuarial framework and other relevant 
techniques, the long-term financial sustainability of the pension 
scheme was quantified, and financial fairness among generations 
was assessed. The estimates show that the large current surplus will 
become a large deficit in about 3 decades and that the scheme is 
unfair within and among generations. Increasing contribution rates 
and/or increasing normal retirement ages will significantly improve the 
financial balance. In the longer term, however, with unprecedented 
changes in the age structure of the population moving toward a 
rapidly aging society, the current contributory pension scheme should 
be changed to a system of individual accounts with a notional defined-
contribution system as a transitional step.
Viet Nam
* Vice-Director, Institute of Public Policy and Management (IPPM), National 
Economics University in Ha Noi, Viet Nam, and senior research associate, Institute 
of Social and Medical Studies (ISMS), Viet Nam (giang.long@ippm.edu.vn)
Viet Nam 117
Overview
As a result of declining fertility and mortality rates and increasing life 
expectancy, aging has become the most observable demographic 
phenomenon in both the developed and the high-performing devel-
oping economies in recent years. Population aging requires large 
public expenditures on the elderly for pensions and healthcare that 
in turn have significant impacts on government budgets, social 
protection funds, and eventually long-term fiscal sustainability. for a 
scheme with a pay-as-you-go financing mechanism and pre-defined 
benefits, a rapidly aging population will be a potential threat to 
financial stability and inter-generational fairness due to a shrinking 
labor force and the resulting large imbalance between the number 
of contributors and the number of beneficiaries (Hagemann and 
Nicoletti 1989, feldstein 1998, Kunieda 2002).
In addition to Viet Nam's impressive economic growth since Doi 
moi (renovation), the successful family planning program has also 
substantially contributed to demographic changes in terms of 
age structure in that the number of persons aged 60 and older 
has increased both in absolute number and as a percentage of the 
total population. In fact, over the past 3 decades, the elderly have 
increased at the highest rate of any population group (UNfPA 2011). 
Population projections by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Viet 
Nam show that the country will enter an “aging phase” starting in 
2017 and then an “aged phase” in the following 2 decades (GSO 
2011).1 The time needed for Viet Nam to make the transition from 
aging to aged will be only 20 years in comparison to 26 years for 
Japan and 22 years for Thailand—the two countries that have always 
been considered to be the most rapidly aging in the region.2 Such a 
demographic transition requires a comprehensive social protection 
system, including a contributory pension scheme that is financially 
sound and generationally fair. 
1 Respectively, when the elderly population (aged 60 and older) as a percentage of 
the total population increases from 10% to 20% (or from 7% to 14% when the 
elderly are defined as persons aged 65 and older).
2 In this comparison, the time needed for the transition is the time it takes the 
population aged 65 and older to grow from 7% of the total population to 14%.
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Several studies have been done on the impacts of demographic 
aging on the long-term pension fund balance in Viet Nam. In 1998, 
the International Labour Office (ILO) did one of the first actuarial 
valuations of the social security system and found that the pension 
fund will be depleted in 2035 but did not discuss inter-generational 
fairness (ILO 1998). Giang (2004 and 2006) provided estimates of 
pension liabilities for different cohorts of contributors and pension-
ers using the ILO actuarial framework. following the passage of the 
Social Insurance Law in 2007 that included a number of changes in 
important indicators like contribution rates and retirement wages, 
some studies discussed whether the new design would be able to 
help sustain financing (Giang and Pfau 2009, Gian et al. 2010).  
Given the recent changes in pension regulations and in the age 
structure of the population, the financial sustainability and gener-
ational fairness of the contributory pension scheme in Viet Nam 
were analyzed using an actuarial framework and other simulation 
techniques. Various options for reforms to deal with these issues in 
the long term are then discussed.
The Current System
The contributory pension system in Viet Nam has been in operation 
since the late 1950s, but until 1995, it covered only employees in 
the state sector. Since 1995, it has been expanded to cover workers 
in the private sector and designed as a pay-as-you-go, defined-
benefit scheme. The scheme is mandatory for (i) laborers working 
on contracts of indefinite duration or contracts valid for 3 months 
or more; (ii) state officials and employees; (iii) laborers working 
for state defense and public security agencies; (iv) commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers in the military and police force; 
and (v) laborers who joined the mandatory social insurance plan 
before working abroad for a definite duration. In addition, the 
pension scheme is voluntary to all citizens of working age (15 and 
older) who are not included in the mandatory scheme. As of 2010, 
the mandatory scheme covered about 9.3 million people (20% 
of the country’s labor force) while the voluntary scheme covered 
only 62,000 persons. State sector workers account for 80% of 
active contributors.
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Contributions to the pension scheme are from both employers and 
employees. The current total contribution rate is 18% (12% from 
employers and 6% from employees). As indicated in the 2007 Social 
Insurance Law, the total contribution rate starting in 2014 will be 
22% (14% from employers and 8% from employees). Regulations 
on contributions are different for workers whose wages are stipu-
lated by the state from those who have contract-based wages: the 
former’s contributions are computed using the minimum wage while 
the latter’s contributions are computed using the wages indicated 
in the labor contract.
Retirement benefits are normally paid to males aged 60 and females 
aged 55 with at least 20 years of contributions. Benefits are calculated 
by multiplying base earnings by a service factor that varies by gender 
and economic sector (public or private). for instance, base earnings are 
determined by the average monthly salary during the last 10 years for 
workers whose wages have been stipulated by the state; but for workers 
whose wages are contract based, the based earnings  are determined 
by the average monthly salary for the entire working life. The service 
factor is 3% for each year in the first 15 years and thereafter 2%  each 
year for males and 3% each year for females, but the total benefit rate 
(or replacement rate) cannot exceed 75%. Those with replacement rates 
of more than 75% receive a lump-sum payment for the excess. Benefits 
are reduced by 1 percentage point for each year of early retirement. It 
is not possible to defer pensions until after the normal retirement age, 
but it is possible to continue working and receive a pension. Benefits 
are adjusted based on the consumer price index (CPI), but the levels are 
decided by the government. Both contributions and pension benefits 
are tax exempt for corporations and individuals.
Investment income is one source of financing for the scheme. 
Article 97 of the 2007 Social Insurance Law indicates that pension 
fund investments can include (i) government bonds, state treasury 
bills, and bonds of state-owned commercial banks; (ii) lending to 
state commercial banks; (iii) state economic projects; and (iv) other 
investments prescribed by the government. All investments and their 
returns are tax exempt. So far, pension fund investments have been 
domestic with heavy lending to commercial banks and purchases of 
government bonds; there have been no international investments. 
This portfolio has yielded a lower rate of return than the average 
market rate (Giang and Pfau 2009, Rama 2010). 
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Analysis 
Data
The following data were used in the simulation models:
•	 general macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), growth rate, and inflation rate; 
•	 current and projected population disaggregated by age and 
gender; 
•	 current and projected labor force and employment disag-
gregated by age, gender, and economic sector; and 
•	 contributions and pension benefits.
The year 2008 was used as the base year. for the macroeconomic 
data, the GSO time-series database in the Statistical Yearbook was 
used. for the current and projected population, the population 
projections for Viet Nam by GSO (2011) from 2009 to 2049 were 
used and these were also the basis for deriving estimates of the 
labor force and employment. Data on the contributory pension 
scheme was derived from the annual reports of the Viet Nam Social 
Security Agency which contain aggregated data on the number of 
contributors and pensioners by age, gender, and economic sector. 
The Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey in 2008 was the 
source of disaggregated data on employment, pension contribu-
tions, and benefits by age and gender. 
Methodology and Assumptions
There were two steps to generate estimates and simulation models. 
first, a standard actuarial framework was used to estimate the long-
term financial balance of the pension scheme to compare expected 
benefits for contributors in terms of gender and economic sector. 
Second, one of the most important financial indicators for any 
pay-as-you-go pension scheme, i.e., implicit pension liabilities for 
different cohorts of contributors and pensioners, was estimated. 
As stated earlier, the simulation procedures for the long-term finan-
cial estimates were based on the actuarial framework proposed by 
ILO for Viet Nam in 1998. A detailed explanation can be found in 
Giang (2004). The simulations include population, labor market, 
macroeconomic indicators, and pension scheme factors.
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Projections for the Vietnamese population were taken from the GSO 
(2011) with medium-fertility assumptions, with a total fertility rate 
constantly decreasing over time and reaching 1.85 children per woman 
by 2049. These projections are disaggregated by age and gender.
from the projected population, the projected working-age (15–59) 
population by age and gender was derived. Using the total number 
of employed persons as a percent of the working-age population and 
their respective labor force participation rates, the total employed 
population was estimated based on the projected working-age 
population by age and gender. The projected unemployed popula-
tion was therefore calculated as a residual of the projected working-
age population and projected total employment.
Annual GDP growth rates are based on estimates of the short-term 
economic projections in the national economic strategy. for the long 
term, the GDP growth rate is generally established as an exogenous 
variable. The short-term and long-term assumptions on GDP growth 
are linked by the interpolation technique. Nominal GDP was calcu-
lated by multiplying real GDP by the GDP deflator for each year. The 
GDP deflator in the past was measured by dividing nominal GDP by 
real GDP. The future evolution of the GDP deflator is usually based 
on assumptions of future inflation rates.
Inflation is indicated by the annual average CPI. Assumptions about 
future inflation rates are essential for making actuarial projections 
of pensions if the pensions are periodically adjusted to reflect price 
increases in the economy, i.e., if they are indexed to inflation. Infla-
tion projections are based on estimates in the national economic 
strategy. In the actuarial assessment, inflation is also an exogenous 
input in the economic model.
In status-quo projections, wage projections were based on govern-
ment policy, i.e., statutory wage indexation. Therefore, wages were 
projected by using historical adjustments of statutory wages. In the 
short term, they can be adjusted based on the most recent develop-
ments in wage levels. In the medium and long term, however, due 
to the nature of the actuarial method, the real wage growth rate 
was usually assumed to merge with the rate of growth in labor 
productivity which is measured by subtracting the growth rate of 
total employment from the real GDP growth rate. 
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The total remuneration for employees was calculated by multiply-
ing the average wage by the number of employees. Regarding the 
pension scheme, total insurable earnings were measured by multiply-
ing average insurable earnings by the number of active contributors. 
The average wage for pensions was obtained by following the adjust-
ments of insurable earnings.
Interest rates were projected by using the historical rates in the 
reports of the central bank. Regarding the reserves of the pension 
scheme, average rates of return depend on past investments and on 
interest rates in the financial market. Table 9.1 presents the most 
important macroeconomic indicators for the simulation models.
Table 9.1 Actual and Projected Macroeconomic Indicators
Indicators 2008 2009 2019 2029 2039 2049
Real GDP growth (%) 6 7 5 5 4 4
Inflation (%) 23 10 10 5 5 5
Real wage growth (%) n.a. 15 10 5 4 4
Real rate of return on 
reserves (%)
7 7 5 5 4 4
n.a. = data not available.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Regarding the pension liabilities of various cohorts in the pay-as-
you-go, defined-benefit pension scheme started in 1995, the liabili-
ties of post-1995 pensioners and contributors only were estimated 
(see Giang and Pfau [2009] for a detailed explanation of the historical 
development of the pension scheme in Viet Nam). To do this, the 
estimation methods of franco, Marino, and Zotteri (2004) using a 
closed-group approach were applied. The reason for that choice is 
that the open-group approach would require population projections 
for more than 100 years which are not available in GSO (2011) 
modeling. Basically, the simulations for pension liabilities using the 
closed-group approach focus on liabilities of current pensioners and 
current contributors. Disability and survivor pensions and different 
rules for males and females were not considered instead, these were 
treated as one group.
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Pension liabilities of current pensioners. Suppose that in 2008, 
Nj is the number of pensioners of age j, each of whom receives Bj 
as their average pension and that their survivorship probability is S
j
. 
Pension liabilities for these people in 2008 may then be expressed 
by the equation:
jjjj BSNP =
)2008(  (1)
If these people are assumed to live until D years of age, which is the 
maximum age of the population, then their pension liabilities during 
(D-j) years will be:
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where S
j,i
 is the probability that the person aged j will be alive in 
year i. 
Moreover, by assuming that p is the constant growth rate of a 
pension, that j¯   is the minimum age of pensioners, and that r is the 
discount rate, the present value of pension liabilities to these people 
in 2008 is calculated as follows:
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Net pension liabilities of current contributors. These estimates 
are more complicated than those just outlined since both accrued 
contributions and benefits up to the year 2008 and future contribu-
tions and benefits from 2008 onwards have to be considered. Several 
other variables are required: cjN  is the number of active contributors 
of age j in 2008; cjB  is the average pension paid at retirement to 
the contributors of age j in 2008 measured as contributions already 
paid (in other words, accrued-to-date contributions); ijQ ,  is the 
probability of receiving a pension at year i for active contributors 
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of age j in 2008; c ijS ,  is the probability of being alive in year i for a 
contributor of age j in 2008; PF
c
j  is the average pension paid at 
retirement to contributors of age j in 2008 measured on the basis 
of future contributions; C is the contribution rate according to labor 
income in the year i for the contributor of age j in 2008 (i.e., FIj,i ); 
and j,iR  is the probability of being employed in year i for contribu-
tors of age j in 2008. The total present value of pension liabilities for 
current contributors is then calculated as follows: 
=+= )2008(2)2008(1)2008( jjj PVCPVCPVC  (4) 
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where PVCj(2008) is the present value of net pension liabilities for 
current contributors. This calculation includes the present value of 
accrued-to-date liabilities (i.e., PVCj1(2008)) and the present value of 
future liabilities in respect of future contributions (i.e., PVCj2(2008)). 
For each generation, the present value of (net) pension liabilities may 
be taken to represent its generational account. A positive value for 
this account indicates that the generation receives transfers from 
others and vice versa. In Viet Nam, we may expect that current 
pensioners will have positive accounts since they are pure beneficia-
ries; the question of whether current contributors will have positive 
or negative accounts is less certain since the answer depends heavily 
upon projections of future contributions and benefits. To reach inter-
generational equity, any proposed policies need to focus carefully on 
these accounts.
To estimate these liabilities, a discount rate of 5% with sensitivity 
estimates of ±1 percentage point was assumed.
Findings and Policy Discussion
Figure 9.1 presents baseline estimates of the pension fund balance 
from 2008 to 2049. It shows that in the next 2 decades, total income 
will always be higher than total expenditures, so the fund will have a 
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surplus. That surplus will, however, be used up by 2034 when total 
income equals total expenditures. A large reserve will accumulate 
during the surplus period, but starting in 2034 it will have to finance 
persistent deficits. The pension fund will be totally depleted in 2044. 
Demographic changes toward aging will have a substantial effect 
on the number of contributors (decreasing due to declining fertility 
rates) and on the number of beneficiaries (increasing due to aging 
and longer life expectancy for both males and females). 
Figure 9.1 Projected Pension Fund Balance, 2008–2049
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figure 9.2 presents two reform scenarios. The first is to gradually 
increase the normal retirement age for females from 55 to 60 by 
2025. The second is to increase the contribution rate by 1 percent-
age point every 3 years from the current 16% to 20%. The results 
show that in comparison with the baseline scenario (the status-quo 
scenario), the pension fund reserve will be more robust, especially 
when the retirement age for females is increased; nevertheless, both 
scenarios indicate that the reserves will decrease from 2040 onwards.
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Figure 9.2 Reform Scenarios for Preserving the Pension Fund 
Reserve, 2008–2049
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Regarding intra-generational fairness, figure 9.3 shows the simulation 
results for male and female laborers working in the public and private 
sectors assuming they have the same characteristics. Due to different 
benefit formulas for males and females, using the same assumptions, 
the results indicate that females seem to have better benefits than 
males when measured as a percentage of final working year’s wages. 
figure 9.3 also implies that public sector workers have much better 
benefits than private sector workers since the expected replacement 
rates for the former are higher than both the actuarial benchmark and 
expected rates for the latter. Another interesting finding is that in the 
private sector, the benefit curves for males and females spike and then 
decline after 29 years and 26 years of contributions, respectively. Thus, 
all private sector workers might expect to get fewer additional benefits 
for each additional year of contribution after these periods. In other 
words, to reach the highest possible benefit levels, the best choice for 
private sector male workers is to contribute for fewer than 29 years and 
for private sector female workers to contribute for fewer than 26 years.
Another critical issue is inter-generational fairness which can be 
expressed by the amount of net pension liabilities. Using the design 
Dong (billion)
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Figure 9.3 Estimated Replacement Rates,  
Males vs. Females and Public vs. Private Sector
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of the current contributory pension scheme, Table 9.2 presents the 
simulation results for net pension liabilities of both current pension-
ers and contributors using the closed-group approach.
Table 9.2 Net Pension Liabilities as a Percent of  
Gross Domestic Product in 2008
Category
Discount rate
4% 5% 6%
Pensioners 10.3 9.5 7.7
Contributors 21.6 18.4 16.7
Total 31.9 27.9 24.4
Source: Author’s calculations.
It is not surprising that the inter-generational accounts of current 
pensioners are positive since they are pure beneficiaries of the pension 
scheme. Maintaining positive accounts for current contributors will, 
however, be a challenge for policy makers because that means that 
current contributors can expect to receive more than they contribute. 
In other words, current and future nonparticipating workers will be 
losers if the government finances these liabilities via higher taxes. In 
general, without systematic reforms, the current pension scheme in 
Viet Nam may face a crisis in the future with regard to sustainability 
and fairness. 
Suggestions for Reform
As discussed in Giang (2011), Viet Nam should transform the current 
pension system to a system of individual accounts while simultaneously 
building a social assistance scheme for low-income persons. A notional 
defined-contribution plan should be considered as a transitional step 
to avoid making implicit pension liabilities explicit. Giang (2010) shows 
that while moving the pension scheme in this direction will help to 
improve the fund balance, it will not be a panacea for the long term.
With its current status as a low middle-income country, Viet Nam also 
needs to deal with long-term income security for a large number of 
low-income persons. A voluntary pension scheme and cash transfer 
programs should be considered as supplementary social protection 
pillars. There is also a need to pay special attention to people living in 
rural and mountainous areas.
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The country-specific analyses of the eight developing Asian countries 
covered in this study—the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and  
Viet Nam—suggest that their pension systems have a long way to go 
in terms of achieving fairness and sustainability. The eight encompass 
a wide range of income and social development levels and also vary 
a great deal with respect to the current state of their old-age income 
support systems and their main structural problems, their political and 
economic environments, and the age structures of their populations. 
Nevertheless, the analyses are clear that the pension systems of all 
eight suffer from a lack of sustainability and from serious inequities. 
Throughout East and Southeast Asia, some groups enjoy more 
privileged access to pension systems than others, e.g., urban residents 
relative to rural residents. Lack of long-term financial sustainability 
is another common regional problem, especially for pay-as-you-go, 
defined-benefit schemes. Because fairness and sustainability are the 
two central pillars of a robust national consensus for pension reform, 
their absence presents a huge barrier to achieving it. 
Policy Options for Promoting 
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in East and Southeast Asian 
Pension Systems
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Country-Specific Policy Options  
Due to the diverse conditions in the eight countries, it can be expected 
that policy options for promoting fairness and sustainability in their 
pension systems will differ substantially. Below is a summary of the 
most salient of those options by country.
The People’s Republic of China
•	 Reform the pension systems of both civil servants and public 
service employees so that their pension arrangements are 
brought into line with the urban system. Since pensions for 
public and civil servants are currently fully financed by the 
government and indexed to inflation, a rapid increase in pay-outs 
implies a significant government obligation in the future. Also 
the favorable treatment accorded to public and civil servants is 
quite inequitable and engenders distrust in the system.
•	 Pay more attention to unsatisfactory investment returns. 
The stringent investment restrictions in the pension sector 
result in returns that lag far behind the usual rate of inflation 
which means that the actual replacement rates of individual 
accounts in the state system will fall significantly short of 
planned levels. The private sector should fully utilize its skills to 
enhance investment returns while awaiting further relaxation 
of investment rules.
•	 Integrate the rural and urban systems in the second half of the 
century. While the urban pension system has been developing 
for decades, the rural system was established only in 2009; 
thus, the two systems are currently not comparable at all in 
terms of their maturity, coverage, or benefits. To engender 
fairness and sustainability, the gap between rural and urban 
benefits must narrow significantly over the next 40 years in 
preparation for integration.
Indonesia
•	 fully implement Law 40 on establishing the National Social 
Security System. Establish a timetable for implementation 
or revision to remove the uncertainty that is slowing down 
progress. To enhance credibility, separate the proposed health 
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program from the other programs covered by the law since its 
short-term nature means it can be implemented rapidly and 
will quickly expand coverage to groups currently excluded. 
•	 Increase the retirement age for civil servants without reducing 
their pensions to demonstrate a commitment to fairness and 
to stimulate pension reform in state-owned enterprises and 
other large employers.
•	 Direct the Office of the Vice-President or a suitable top-level 
alternative to analyze all current data and make the informa-
tion available to all stakeholders. The objective is to provoke 
a wide-ranging debate in industry and civil society in order to 
reach a robust consensus on the key elements of a national 
old-age policy. The focus should first be on the minimum level 
of social protection needed in terms of age and on fair and 
affordable benefits. 
•	 Implement a program that covers the entire population. 
There is no real national social protection program in Indone-
sia and thus, no coverage for the two-thirds of the labor 
force in the informal sector. Law 40 has had no discernible 
effect since its passage in 2004. Credibility requires concrete 
steps; the one program that can produce visible results quickly 
is health. 
The Republic of Korea
•	 Alleviate the poverty of the current elderly population. Due to 
rapid aging and the late introduction of the national pension 
scheme, many of the current elderly did not prepare for 
old age and do not receive pension benefits while support 
in the form of private transfers from children is dwindling. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the Republic of Korea has the 
highest elderly poverty rate among member countries. As the 
national pension scheme matures, however, its development 
should not be impeded by poverty relief for the current elderly 
which makes the task rather difficult.  
•	 Extend the coverage of the national pension scheme. 
Currently it is a social insurance program for the workforce, 
so people outside—mostly housewives and workers in the 
informal sector—are not properly covered. Credit for social 
contributions should be offered to increase qualifying years 
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and to facilitate voluntary affiliation; increasing the benefits 
that surviving spouses receive should also be considered. 
•	 Improve the long-term financial stability and inter-genera-
tional equity of the national scheme. The long-term financial 
goals should first of all be agreed by national consensus before 
measures are enacted to attain them. The scheme has been 
reformed twice in the past 20 years, so although another 
reform may not be urgent, as the scheme matures it will be 
more difficult to implement. Measures to make the scheme 
more stable financially in the long term are needed now. 
Malaysia
•	 Make the provisions of the three pension schemes more 
equitable. Currently, contribution rates and pay-out options 
vary widely. Workers covered by the contributory, defined-
contribution Employees’ Provident fund (EPf) receive a lump 
sum at age 55 that does not address risks of longevity, infla-
tion, or survivors’ benefits. The Armed forces plan is also 
a defined-contribution scheme but it provides disability and 
survivors‘ benefits and pays higher annual dividends than the 
EPf. In contrast, civil servants are covered by a noncontribu-
tory, defined-benefit plan that addresses longevity, inflation, 
and survivors‘ benefits.
•	 Extend the coverage of the EPf. Currently, 35% to 38% of the 
labor force is not covered by formal employer-based pension 
schemes; 20% are foreign workers. Malaysia should consider 
entering into totalization agreements with the countries that 
supply its foreign labor to bring them under the social security 
system and thereby improve coverage. 
•	 Increase the replacement rate of the EPf. The rate estimated 
by the OECD in 2010 was 35% for a median male earner and 
31.1% for a median female earner, both far below the recom-
mended replacement rate of 66% from all income sources 
during retirement. A targeted social pension scheme should 
be seriously considered. Preliminary calculations suggest that 
the cost of providing benefits equal to 33% of 2009 per capita 
income to all poor senior citizens would be 0.23% of 2009 
GDP. If similar benefits were offered to all senior citizens, the 
cost would be equivalent to 1.7% of GDP. This appears to be 
within the capacity of the country and merits  consideration. 
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A social pension scheme could improve equity and address 
some of the concerns about adequacy in the current 
pension system. 
The Philippines
•	 Establish an independent umbrella regulator or overseer to 
harmonize the overall pension system and steer the various 
components consistently toward established goals. The 
mandatory pension programs were created by different laws, 
they are administered independently by separate government-
run institutions, and they are supervised by different regula-
tory bodies. This causes disparities that raise issues of equity 
and sustainability. The regulator can review actions of policy 
makers/institutional regulators and enforce changes if they 
challenge the equity and sustainability of the pension system. 
•	 Align the two mandatory defined-benefit programs—the 
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social 
Security System (SSS)—by first re-establishing the ceiling on 
GSIS salary credits with the ultimate objective of integrat-
ing the two systems. Resulting government savings could be 
channeled to social assistance programs.
•	 Enlarge and consolidate existing defined-contribution 
programs and improve the investment climate to provide 
alternatives for people who have additional funds to invest for 
retirement. The GSIS and SSS currently have high replacement 
rates that need to be revised to meet their stated objectives 
of providing a benefit sufficient to meet basic needs and to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of the programs. 
Singapore
•	 Eliminate the regressive implicit tax on Central Provident fund 
(CPf) wealth by moving toward a market-determined interest 
rate and away from the current administratively determined 
rate. As the vast majority of CPf members do not benefit 
from the income tax deduction, this implicit tax subsidy is also 
regressive and should be eliminated. 
•	 Improve assistance for the indigent. The current system is 
minimal and rigorously means-tested. To improve overall 
equity, a zero-pillar social pension scheme funded from the 
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government budget should be established. Given the relatively 
small population size and administrative capabilities of the 
CPf, the scheme would be relatively inexpensive; Singapore 
appears to have the fiscal capacity to finance it. 
•	 Introduce social insurance principles in the CPf Lifelong Income 
Scheme and Medishield. for example, women currently pay 
a higher effective premium than men as they as a group live 
longer, but on average they have lower CPf balances which 
reduces the amount available for retirement. Because of the 
market failures associated with healthcare, social insurance 
is inherently desirable. It will also ease the overall equity and 
efficiency of Singapore’s pension system.
Thailand
•	 Phase-out the exempt-exempt-exempt tax regime except 
possibly on smaller benefits for the elderly poor. The new tax 
revenues could be used to provide benefits to the informal 
sector. Taxing pension wealth or retirement income would be 
relatively efficient since it either originates with the govern-
ment or has been tracked by the government and would be 
a “redistribution tool” that would not add directly to the 
expenses of active laborers.
•	 Establish a national pension regulator to eliminate or reduce 
inconsistent pension policies among various ministries and 
agencies.
•	 Increase retirement ages except possibly for those who have 
already accumulated long service or who work in physically 
challenging occupations.
Viet Nam
•	 Revise benefits to achieve more intra-generational equity. The 
current formulas have disparities with regard to gender and 
economic sector given similar records of contributions and 
working conditions. 
•	 Improve the sustainability of the current contributory, pay-as-
you-go defined-benefit system. Contribution rates and normal 
retirement ages play important roles in improving long-term 
sustainability. Current contribution rates are relatively high, so 
continuous increases will not be wise. As life expectancy at 60 
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for both males and females is improving, higher retirement 
ages should be considered. 
•	 Transform the current scheme to a system of individual 
accounts with a notional defined-contribution system as a 
transitional step. With an aged population in 3 decades, the 
current pension scheme will not be financially sustainable and 
will accumulate liabilities that in turn will negatively affect 
inter-generational equity. The proposed system will help to 
promote intra-generational equity by closely linking contribu-
tions and benefits and will also help to reduce inter-genera-
tional disparities by decreasing pension liabilities and making 
the fund more sustainable. The notional defined-contribution 
plan should not, however, be considered a panacea for finan-
cial sustainability and generational equity.
Priorities for the Region 
While priorities for promoting fairness and sustainability in pension 
systems vary with the conditions in each country, the analyses yielded 
a number of common reform themes applicable to the entire region. 
Three in particular stand out.
Recognize the Urgency for Addressing the Challenges 
Aging Populations Pose 
It must be recognized that this is a major national issue that must 
be addressed now at the highest levels of government. There should 
be a clear mandate for developing an integrated set of policies to 
coordinate and synchronize initiatives on retirement, labor markets, 
budgets, and financial and capital market opportunities for pension 
and provident funds. This responsibility could be assigned to a 
minister/director who could consider forming a national authority to 
make recommendations for reform, monitor the results, and enforce 
policies designed to meet the aging challenge. Specifically, such an 
agency could address the following.
a) The pension systems are currently fragmented and provide 
significantly different benefit levels with varying degrees of 
certainty to different groups, which challenges both fairness and 
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sustainability. The authority could act as a coordinating body 
from an objective perspective and could thus improve commu-
nication among different provident and pension organizations.
b) A focal point in each country is needed to address total 
resource costs, the financing mix, and other issues that should 
be discussed on a national level. The absence of such a focal 
authority has led to a lack of awareness on aging issues and 
a low priority for them on the political agendas of most 
Asian countries.
c) The proposed authority could narrow the gap between best 
practices and the actual practices of pension and provident 
fund organizations by encouraging the development of 
professional expertise in the sector.
d) By providing objective oversight, the authority could counter-
act the tendencies of organized groups to pursue their inter-
ests at the expense of fairness and sustainability and could 
advocate for broadly shared growth.
Put Greater Emphasis on Delivering Pension Benefits 
It is of paramount importance to ensure that benefit promises remain 
credible over time. These promises are of a long-term nature, so the 
design and management of pension plans and provident funds, the 
quality of their actuarial projections for long-term assets and liabili-
ties, and their transparency and accountability are crucial. Transi-
tional arrangements, including costs, need consideration as well and 
will require innovative designs of schemes, products, and delivery 
systems. There is considerable scope for such innovations, particularly 
in low- and middle-income Asian countries where employment in the 
informal sector is high. Policies must ensure not only the accumula-
tion of sufficient pension wealth but also its effective conversion into 
sustainable financial security throughout retirement.
Manage the Impact of Increased Longevity on Length 
of Retirement
In most Asian countries, the proportion of life spent in retirement 
mandated by pension rules has increased significantly due to 
relatively inflexible young retirement ages. But this has yet to be 
recognized and has created unequal treatment for those not covered 
by formal plans. Inequality could also occur if workers currently not 
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covered are covered by special schemes while the ages for pension 
eligibility remain at current levels. As the population ages, labor 
market policies must adapt to turn increased longevity into increased 
productivity in a structural rather than a palliative manner. This will 
require major rethinking and communicating with and educating 
all stakeholders.
Final Observations 
This book examined fairness and sustainability, two specific dimensions 
of pension systems that are especially relevant for building a strong 
national consensus and a viable national blueprint for delivering 
affordable, adequate, sustainable old-age income support for the 
large and growing elderly populations of East and Southeast Asia. 
Making pension systems more equitable and sustainable is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for overall pension reform since there 
are many other dimensions of the systems, and pensions are only 
one part of old-age income support. Nevertheless, promoting fairness 
and sustainability will go a long way toward establishing sound and 
efficient old-age income support in the region in the context of rapid 
demographic change and declining family-based support. 
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Pension Systems in East and Southeast Asia
Promoting Fairness and Sustainability
Population aging poses two major challenges for Asian policy makers: 
(i) sustaining rapid economic growth in the face of less favorable 
demographic conditions; and (ii) providing affordable, adequate, 
sustainable old-age income support for a large and growing elderly 
population. This book explores the second issue by examining the pension 
systems of eight countries in East and Southeast Asia: the People’s Republic 
of China, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. It also puts forward both country-
specific and region-wide reforms to address two critical areas of pension 
reform, namely, fairness and sustainability. 
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